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Dissertation

THE CHRISTOLOGIES OF
FRIEDRICH SCHLEIERMACHER
AND
PAUL TILLICH

by

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

1. The Problem of the Dissertation

The problem of this dissertation is to give an exposition, comparison, and evaluation of the Christologies of Friedrich Schleiermacher and Paul Tillich. Tillich acknowledges his indebtedness to Schleiermacher in developing his Christology. But he equally maintains that his position is similar to but not identical with that of Schleiermacher due to the ontological character of his Christology.[1] Therefore, as the study proceeds, an attempt will be made to disclose areas of convergence and divergence between their Christological positions and to evaluate them accordingly.

2. Definitions

The Christology of Tillich is his theological solution to the problem of man's self-estrangement as posed by the philosophy of existence and to man's universal quest for the New Being. The Christology of Schleiermacher is his theological solution to man's universal consciousness of sin and the universal need for redemption.

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[1] Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology: Existence and the Christ, Vol. II (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957), p. 150.

3. Limitations

Only those writings of Schleiermacher and Tillich which have specific bearing on the problem of Christology will be treated. However, a development of thought on Christology may be discerned in the writings of both men. In order to give a sympathetic and objective exposition of this portion of their thought, therefore, the mature Christological statements in Schleiermacher's The Christian Faith and in Tillich's Systematic Theology, Volume II, will be accepted as definitive and normative. Citations from other writings will be included solely for purposes of clarity, sympathetic interpretation, and analysis. The comparison and evaluation of their Christological positions will be based on the exposition.

4. Previous Research in the Field

There has been no previous research dealing with the problem of this dissertation. An unpublished Ph.D. dissertation has been written on Schleiermacher's Christology,[1] and Richard R. Niebuhr has written a work, Schleiermacher on Christ and Religion.[2] The interest of both men is clearly singular, not comparative. Furthermore, Paul Tillich stated in recent correspondence that no one has attempted to compare his thought with that of Schleiermacher, and he advised focusing upon a "small soluble problem," such as Christology.

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[1] Sidney Arnold, "The Christology of Schleiermacher" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Southern Baptist Theological Seminary, 1940). The exposition of this work is taken solely from The Christian Faith with innumerable secondary interpretations interspersed in its entirety. Failure to treat the Sämmtliche Werke, and especially Das Leben Jesu, contributes greatly to its inadequacy. Furthermore, there is no treatment of theological method, and the appraisal is not of Christology but of Schleiermacher's theology as a whole.

[2] Richard R. Niebuhr, Schleiermacher on Christ and Religion (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1964).

5. The Methods of the Dissertation

Three major methods of procedure will be employed in the investigation of the problem stated for this dissertation.

First, the expository method will be utilized to give a comprehensive and sympathetic account of the Christological positions of Schleiermacher and Tillich.

Second, the comparative method will be used to place in juxtaposition major aspects of the Christologies of the two men for the purpose of determining areas of convergence and divergence.

Third, the critical method will be invoked to provide an evaluation of the Christological constructions in question. The intention is that the criticisms will deal internally with the two positions so as to expose the actual situation, the ambiguities or unsettled questions, the inconsistencies between affirmations and performances, and problematical implications involved in taking the positions seriously.[1] To appraise adequately the status of the historical Jesus in their Christologies, the internal critical approach must be supplemented by an analysis if their faithfulness to the New Testament witness to the Christ, which they acknowledge to be the basic source of our knowledge of the Christ. Due to the diversity of interpretations of the New Testament witness itself, an attempt will be made to discern whether or not they take with equal seriousness the interpretative nature of the sources and the historical Jesus within the sources themselves. This portion of the evaluation will depart, at least partially, from the internal critical approach in so far as the author is influenced by the interpretation of the New Testament witness to Christ which is advocated by James M. Robinson and other exponents of the so-called new quest of the historical Jesus.[1]

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[1] For this internal critical approach the writer is indebted to John B. Cobb, Jr., Living Options in Protestant Theology (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1962), pp. 14f.

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[1] James M. Robinson, A New Quest of the Historical Jesus (London: SCM Press, 1959).

CHAPTER II

THE THEOLOGICAL METHODS OF SCHLEIERMACHER AND TILLICH

Due to the architectonic structures of the theological systems of Schleiermacher and Tillich it is deemed necessary to include an exposition of their theological methods. This will elucidate their methodological and structural contexts for and approaches to Christology. Moreover, it will provide the background for understanding the central significance of Christology in their theologies.

1. Schleiermacher's Religio-psychological Method

An exposition of Schleiermacher's religio-psychological method presupposes some of the central concepts of his religious construction. For purposes of clarity those concepts which are most determinative with regard to his theological method will now be defined.

i. Central Concepts of Religious Construction

(1) Religion.--Schleiermacher's conception of religion was expressed initially in his apologetic work, On Religion, and this was further elucidated in the preface of his magnum opus, The Christian Faith. In order to establish the proper sphere of religion the first part of On Religion is devoted to a clarification and rejection of the naturalistic and rationalist conceptions of religion held by Schleiermacher's cultured Romanticist friends. According to Schleiermacher,

whenever religion is comprised of dogmas and theories of the origin and end of the world or of analyses of the nature of an incomprehensible Being, it is simply empty pretense. He writes: "If you have only given attention to these dogmas and opinions, therefore, you do not yet know religion itself, and what you despise is not it. Why have you not penetrated deeper to find the kernel of this shell?"[1] For Schleiermacher dogmas and doctrines are simply the result of reflection on and comparison of religious feelings,[2] and for him one always looks in vain for religion in externals.[3]

Already it is clear that Schleiermacher's conception of religion demands a theological method which is at once religious and psychological in nature. His apologetic explication of the nature of religion led him to attack his contemporaries who patched together modes of knowing and acting, called the result religion, and then despised it. For him "piety cannot be an instinct craving for a mess of metaphysical and ethical crumbs."[4] Furthermore, in seeking out the original and characteristic possession of religion he absolutely resigns all claims on anything that belongs to science and morality.

> And yet, however high you go; though you pass from the laws to the Universal Lawgiver, in whom is the unity of all things; though you allege that nature cannot be comprehended without God, I would still maintain that religion has nothing to do with this knowledge, and that, quite apart from

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[1] Friedrich Schleiermacher, On Religion: Speeches to its Cultured Despisers, trans. by John Oman (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner and Co., Ltd., 1893), p. 15.

[2] Ibid., p. 87.

[3] Ibid., pp. 65, 112.

[4] Ibid., p. 31.

> it, its nature can be known. Quantity of knowledge is not quantity of piety.[1]

Having established the independence of piety or religion in relation to knowing and doing, Schleiermacher insists that the proper zone of human experience or self-consciousness wherein religion resides is that of feeling. This pious feeling, however, is not excluded from all connection with knowing and doing; rather it mediates between them as it determines the self-consciousness. In no sense is this feeling of piety to be understood as merely a subjective emotion; it refers to one's contact with the universe that creates all experiences of reality.[2] Schleiermacher writes: "Your feeling is piety in so far as it is the result of the operation of God in you by means of the operation of the world upon you."[3] The essence of his conception of religion as essentially contemplative piety is fully expressed in the following quotation:

> The contemplation of the pious is the immediate consciousness of the universal existence of all finite things in and through the Eternal. Religion . . . is to have life and to know life in immediate feeling, only as such an existence in the Infinite and Eternal. Wherefore, it is a life in the infinite nature of the Whole, in the One and the All, in God, having and possessing all things in God, and God in all. Yet religion is not knowledge and science, either of the world or of God. Without being knowledge it recognizes knowledge and science. In itself it is an affection~~,~~ a revelation of the Infinite in the finite, God being seen in it and it in God.[4]

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[1] Ibid., p. 35.

[2] This is an interpretative conclusion of the translator of On Religion. Cf. John Oman, The Natural and the Supernatural (New York: Macmillan and Co., 1931), p. 27.

[3] On Religion, p. 45.

[4] Ibid., p. 36.

This definition of religion in On Religion is developed further in Schleiermacher's mature work, The Christian Faith. In this work the essence of piety is no longer simply a self-conscious contemplation of the universal existence of all finite things; it is the consciousness of being absolutely dependent, or, of being in relation with God.[1] In man's relation to other men, to nature, and to the world a reciprocity exists in which man both acts and reacts upon them, and thus he experiences the feelings of relative freedom and dependence.[2] Only in relation to God does man experience the feeling of absolute dependence, which constitutes the highest grade of human self-consciousness.

This highest self-consciousness is an essential element of human nature, and it is always related to the two lower grades of self-consciousness, the animal and the sensible. The animal self-consciousness is the confused grade and is the lowest. The sensible self-consciousness includes feeling and perception and social and moral feelings.[3] It is necessary for the highest self-consciousness to be united with the sensible self-consciousness, because the Infinite is always mediated by the finite. In order to achieve a sympathetic exposition and understanding of Schleiermacher's thought these differentiations of the animal, the sensible, and the highest self-consciousness must be kept in mind, for they are integral to his defense against the charges of subjectivism and pantheism.

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[1] Friedrich Schleiermacher, The Christian Faith, trans. by H. R. Mackintosh and J. S. Stewart (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1928), p. 12.

[2] Ibid., p. 18.

[3] Ibid., pp. 19-20.

Religion, then, is characterized by Schleiermacher as an immediate self-consciousness which involves a feeling of absolute dependence. This definition is not as simple as it may appear. Each part of this definition has a crucial meaning which must not be overlooked if misinterpretation is to be avoided. Self-consciousness indicates that religion has to do with the way in which the self is present to itself. In the immediate self-consciousness the self is found to be absolutely dependent.[1] Religion is understood as an immediate self-consciousness because the self that is present to the self is the underived self, the self that is unqualified or undetermined by the world.[2] This consciousness of the immediate or underived self involves a feeling of absolute dependence, which indicates that the self is apprehended to have been posited. The term dependence places the sense of relation at the center of the immediate self-consciousness, and thus any idea of a mystical identity between the self and that upon which the self feels dependent is excluded. The underived self as dependent is what is immediate to the self so there can be no mystic intuition or identity with that upon which the self feels dependent.[3] But this self is not just apprehended as dependent in the immediate self-consciousness; its dependence is apprehended as being absolute. Therefore, Schleiermacher declares that to speak of a feeling of absolute

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1. Ibid., p. 131.

2. Richard R. Niebuhr, Schleiermacher on Christ and Religion, pp. 181-183.

3. Ibid.

dependence is to speak of a feeling of the "whence" that determines personal existence in its entirety. As Schleiermacher states it: "The self-identical essence of piety is the consciousness of being absolutely dependent, or, which is the same thing, of being in relation to God."[1] This qualifying word absolute (schlechthinnig) refers to the radical finitude of the self. It also reminds us that one's relationship to God presupposes relative relationships in the world. The absolute dependence presents itself in consciousness along with the feeling implication in a nexus of relative dependencies. For Schleiermacher, then, there can be no separation of God-consciousness or world-consciousness.

Having located religion in feeling or the self-consciousness of being absolutely dependent, it is inevitable that Schleiermacher should insist that only through pious self-contemplation can the nature of religion be discerned. Religion is located first of all in feeling and not in idea. If one insists that the word God cannot be dissociated from some idea, Schleiermacher would reply that the idea underlying the word is simply the expression of the feeling of absolute dependence and the first and most direct expression of it. In essence, then, the theological method which Schleiermacher employs in producing his dogmatic work, The Christian Faith, is predicated upon the interpretation of religion as the statement of the facts of the self-consciousness.

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[1] The Christian Faith, p. 12.

(2) Religions and Christianity.--Schleiermacher holds that the plurality of religions is the result of the endlessly progressive work of the Spirit that reveals Himself in all human history.[1] And this multiplicity is inevitable, since "as long as we are individuals, every man has greater receptiveness for some religious experiences than for others. . . . Hence, the whole of religion can be present only when all these different views of every relation are actually given."[2] Consequently he concludes in On Religion that the plea for one religion is vain and foolish, since no one religion has quite reached actuality. Furthermore, each positive religion is formed around a fundamental intuition or revelation of the Infinite which gives it eternal necessity.[3] And because there is something of the true nature of religion, as Schleiermacher has presented it, in all religions, "the whole of religion is nothing but the sum of all the relations of man to God, apprehended in all the possible ways in which any man can be immediately conscious in his life."[4]

It is readily apparent that this philosophical analysis of religions precludes the establishment of Christianity as the absolute religion. Yet, Schleiermacher stresses the importance of the two distinguishing marks of Christianity in terms of its fundamental intuition and its founder. He maintains that Christianity's fundamental intuition is universal in scope in that it recognizes the "universal resistance of finite things to the unity of the Whole, and of the way Deity treats this resistance."[1] That is to say, Christianity alone recognizes universal godlessness and God's eternal efforts to bring man into relation to Himself, and for this reason religion is nowhere so fully idealized as in Christianity.[2] And since any fundamental intuition of the Infinite is always mediated through the finite, the founder of Christianity must necessarily be a mediator who requires no mediation. Indeed, the Founder of Christianity must not be conceived to be purely finite. He must "participate in the Divine Essence in the same sense in which he participates in human nature."[3]

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[1] On Religion, p. 214.

[2] Ibid., p. 218.

[3] Ibid., pp. 236-238.

[4] Ibid., p. 217.

While it would appear that these statements give Christianity a certain absoluteness in relation to other religions, such is not the case. Schleiermacher qualifies both distinguishing marks of Christianity. He allows that a new religion may well arise from a fundamental intuition which would supersede Christianity and draw all men to the Highest Being. And he states that God is continually setting up "ever more exalted mediators between Himself and men that men might learn to know the eternal being."[4] Indeed, he points out that Christ himself never maintained that he was the only mediator or the only one in whom this fundamental intuition had actualized itself.[5] And he concludes such qualifying statements by asserting that it would be grossly unchristian to demand uniformity in religion, for "in all ways the Deity is to be contemplated and worshipped."[1] Thus, at most On Religion gives only a qualified superiority to Christianity in relation to other forms of religion.

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[1] Ibid., p. 241.

[2] Ibid., p. 243.

[3] Ibid., p. 247.

[4] Ibid., p. 242.

[5] Ibid., p. 248.

The absolute superiority of the Christian religion, however, is asserted by Schleiermacher in The Christian Faith. He considers the monotheistic religions of Judaism, Islam, and Christianity to be the highest forms of religion, because they most adequately express the dependence of everything finite upon the Infinite.[2] Christianity stands higher than the other two because Judaism tends to localize the Deity and fall into idol worship, a confused state of self-consciousness, and Islam, in spite of its strict monotheism, is inclined toward polytheism due to the strong influence of the sensible self-consciousness.[3] According to Schleiermacher, Christianity remains free from both such weaknesses and takes its place as the highest and purest form of monotheism which has appeared in history. He contends that "this comparison of Christianity with other similar religions is in itself a sufficient warrant for saying that Christianity is, in fact, the most perfect of the highly developed forms of religion."[4]

Schleiermacher further confirms the superiority of the Christian religion by elaborating upon the two distinguishing marks of a positive religion which were set forth in On Religion. He does so by defining the peculiar essence of Christianity in terms of its distinctive beginning (outer unity) and the peculiar form which the religious emotions and utterances take in the Christian communion (inner unity):

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[1] Ibid., p. 252.

[2] The Christian Faith, p. 34.

[3] Ibid., p. 36.

[4] Ibid., p. 38.

> Christianity is a monotheistic faith, belonging to the teleological type of religion, and is essentially distinguished from other such faiths by the fact that in it everything is related to the redemption accomplished by Jesus of Nazareth.[1]

Externally, then, Christianity is superior to other religions because its Founder is the Redeemer who cannot be "regarded as having been at any time in need of redemption Himself; and is therefore separated from the beginning from all other men, and endowed with redeeming power from his birth."[2] Internally, Christianity is superior to all religions in that all its religious emotions are related to the redemption accomplished by Jesus of Nazareth, and such redemption is universal and complete. "Only through Jesus and only through Christianity has redemption become the central point of religion."[3] This means that although Christianity has a special historical connection with Judaism, in terms of its aim and historical existence Christianity relates to Judaism and heathenism in the same manner.[4]

These statements clearly indicate a development in Schleiermacher's thought concerning the relation of Christianity to other religions. There is no hint of other mediators or redeemers to come, nor is there any idea of a new religion arising to supersede Christianity, as is found in On Religion.[1] The implication of Schleiermacher's presentation of the peculiar essence of Christianity in The Christian Faith is that all subordinate forms of religion, including Judaism, are destined to pass over into Christianity, and that Christianity itself will only be perfected by exhibiting more perfectly the relationship of its religious emotions and affections to the redemption accomplished by Jesus of Nazareth. Thus, the central significance of Christology in the thought of Schleiermacher already emerges clearly into view.

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[1] Ibid., p. 52.

[2] Ibid., p. 58.

[3] Ibid., p. 57.

[4] Ibid., p. 60.

(3) Individual, World, and God.--In the immediate self-consciousness and feeling of absolute dependence there is given an awareness of a "Whence" which is presented to the religious self-consciousness in relation to the totality of being--the world. For Schleiermacher the individual, the world, and God are correlates; they are absolutely inseparable but not identical.

The individual and/or individuality is given an understandable priority in Schleiermacher's thought by virtue of his locating religion in the realm of human feeling or immediate self-consciousness. His definition of religion as the feeling of absolute dependence naturally inclines him toward Spinoza's concept of substance and monistic view of

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[1] It is precisely this development in Schleiermacher's thought on the relation of Christianity to other religions that is glossed over by Barth in his criticism of Schleiermacher for being a philosopher of religion rather than a servant of Christianity. (Cf. Karl Barth, From Rousseau to Ritschl, trans. by Brian Cozens [London: SCM Press, 1959].) Perhaps it would be well to point out that On Religion is essentially an apologetic work by Schleiermacher, the philosopher of religion; whereas The Christian Faith is a theological work, with an apologetic preface, by Schleiermacher, the Christian theologian.

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the world. But Kant's insistence upon the absolute dignity of man leads Schleiermacher to oppose Spinoza's violating the sense of human personality and to establish individuality as a doctrine and ideal of life in his own thought.[1] He clearly establishes the pivotal significance of the unique individual for knowledge of other human beings, the world, and God in his second literary effort, Soliloquies (Die Monologen). In this work Schleiermacher declares: "I shall take possession of the whole world by virtue of inner activity."[2] In other words, for Schleiermacher the pious self is the key to the Whole, because man's spirit is a copy of all things and everything is a reflection of his spirit.[3] This implies that by looking within the pious individual is in immediate contact with the Infinite and the Eternal.[4]

This pious self-contemplation and the realization of one's individuality does not take place in isolation, however. It can be accomplished only in fellowship with other pious souls. In his lectures on psychology Schleiermacher explains that an inner unity of selfhood, our own affirming of ourselves as "I's," is aroused in each person through the recollections and descriptions of him given to him by other persons as Thou's standing over against him.[1]

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[1] On Religion, Introduction, xii.

[2] Friedrich Schleiermacher, Soliloquies, trans. by H. L. Friess (Chicago: Open Court Pub. Co., 1926), p. 82.

[3] This declaration is congruent with Schleiermacher's insistence that man is an image of the universal logos and reflects the logos in a unique way, thereby contributing to the whole concept and wealth of human history and culture. Cf. Friedrich Schleiermacher, Werke: Auswahl in vier Bänden, herausgegeben von O. Braun und D. J. Bauer (Leipzig: Verlag von Felix Meiner, 1913), Bd. II, p. 255. On this same page it is significant to note that Schleiermacher states that we have reason only in the form of personality. This provokes the reader to wonder how or why he preferred to think of God in non-personal terms.

[4] Soliloquies, p. 11.

The importance of acknowledging the significance of the individual and individuality in Schleiermacher's thought is that, in a real sense, it prefigures his psychological approach to theology. For him the primary reality is an inner spiritual reality. The external world simply symbolizes the spirit, that is, it reveals man's inmost nature and the Infinite and Eternal. The primary difficulty, however, with this doctrine of individuality, which may well be his most original and creative contribution to philosophical and theological thought,[2] is that conceivably it fosters an open blurring of the distinctions between man, the world, and God. If so, Schleiermacher's thought may be conceived to be in harmony with that of the absolute idealists.

It is precisely at this point that Schleiermacher's ontological epistemology, as developed in the Dialektik, must be considered, for such a consideration will indicate how Schleiermacher renders the charges that he is a mystical, pantheistic, identity philosopher inaccurate.[3]

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1. Friedrich Schleiermachers Sämmtliche Werke: Psychologie, herausgegeben von L. George (Berlin: Verlag von G. Reimer, 1862), Abt. III, Bd. 6, pp. 14f. Hereafter cited as Psychologie

2. This is the contention of John Oman, the translator of On Religion. Cf. On Religion, Introduction, xii.

3. Brunner, Baillie, Mackintosh, Barth, Cobb and a host of others criticize Schleiermacher for being more of a mystical, pantheistic, identity philosopher than a Christian theologian. John Cobb, for

The primary concern of the Dialektik is to relate man's thinking to "being," that is, an independent object of thought. In all knowledge, according to Schleiermacher, there is an opposition between thinking and being, and thus the being of God and the being of the world are necessarily distinct from the being of man.[1] Furthermore, since in every thinking there is an antithesis between the organic function (the receiving of sense impressions) and the intellectual function (the sorting and ordering of sense impressions), or, what is the same, the real and the ideal, it follows that there can be no conclusive conception or perception of God or the world so long as this antithesis obtains.[2] This means that God and world are transcendent in that both are beyond ordinary thinking, because there can be no possible annulment of the antithesis of the intellectual and organic functions or of the ideal and the real. It also means that because of the antithesis, God and the world cannot be separated and are correlatives: there can be no God without the world and no world without God.[3] This, of

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example, repeats the old remonstrance against Schleiermacher's affinities with Spinoza by saying: "Schleiermacher requires little more than that the universe as a whole be understood as a living and infinite unity on which each of its parts must be seen as absolutely dependent. Specifically, Schleiermacher finds fully acceptable the philosophy of Spinoza." See John B. Cobb, Jr., Living Options in Protestant Theology (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1962), p. 131.

[1] Friedrich Schleiermachers Dialektik, herausgegeben von Rudolf Odebrecht (Leipzig: J. C. Hinrichs Verlag, 1942), p. 137. Richard Niebuhr rightly declares that the epistemology of the Dialektik reveals Schleiermacher's opposition to the claim of the absolute idealists to transcend the subject-object relationship. Schleiermacher on Christ and Religion, pp. 90f.

[2] Ibid., pp. 137, 172-174.

[3] Ibid., p. 303.

course, can be understood only when this ontological epistemology is related to man's religious self-consciousness in which, as has been stated, there are given a world-consciousness and a God-consciousness.[1]

World-consciousness means simply a consciousness of undeveloped finitude in general or of limited coherence with nature. The world, or the total coherence of nature, is co-posited in our self-consciousness in so far as we are conscious of ourselves as part of the world.[2] The world, then, is the totality of being which includes all antitheses. Its unity or totality can never be perceived, for it is a transcendent correlate of God. And God is transcendent because the divine being excludes all antitheses.

In The Christian Faith it is clearly established that there is a continuity between world-consciousness and God-consciousness, precisely because the feeling of absolute dependence presents itself to the self in its nexus of relative dependences upon the finite things of the world. Because God-consciousness corresponds to the highest self-consciousness whereas world-consciousness corresponds to the mediating sensible consciousness, Schleiermacher is led to assert that "the perfection of God-consciousness is dependent upon the perfection of world-consciousness."[1]

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[1] For a complete explication of Schleiermacher's ontological epistemology see Paul Frederick Mehl, "Schleiermacher's Mature Doctrine of God as Found in the Dialektik of 1822 and the Second Edition of The Christian Faith (1830-1831)" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University, 1961).

[2] The Christian Faith, p. 138.

Thus at least three conclusions can be stated concerning the relation of God and the world in Schleiermacher's thought: (a) There is some sense of totality of being or the world present in every feeling of absolute dependence, and the God-consciousness is dependent upon the development of the world-consciousness. (b) God and the world are not identical nor can they be separated. (c) It can never be established clearly whether God is in the world or beyond the world.[2]

With regard to God it must be acknowledged that Schleiermacher has a philosophical doctrine of God and a dogmatic doctrine. While a certain amount of overlapping was unavoidable, Schleiermacher nonetheless sought to keep the two doctrines independent, and he totally rejected any idea that his dogmatic doctrine of God was derived from philosophy.[3]

His philosophical doctrine of God refers to God as the transcendent ground which is the presupposition of all thinking. Also, God is referred to as the Highest Being which conditions all actual being and must necessarily be unconditioned.[1] Schleiermacher, in On Religion, prefers to speak of the Highest Being as a living God rather than a personal God, because he recognizes so clearly the limitation of personal existence and the difficulty in thinking of a personality as truly infinite.[2] Furthermore, he contends that the profoundest Christian teachers sought in their writings to "annihilate anthropomorphism in the conception of the Highest Being."[3]

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[1] George Cross, The Theology of Schleiermacher (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1911), p. 175. Schleiermacher has been charged with "relegating the religious consciousness to a purely subjective region of mental life." See John Baillie, The Interpretation of Religion (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1928), p. 214. Schleiermacher's ontological epistemology as it relates to the apprehension of God and the world by the religious self-consciousness indicates the unsympathetic nature of this interpretation.

[2] Cf. Paul Mehl, "Schleiermacher's Mature Doctrine. . . ," p. 94f.

[3] This he stated in a letter to his friend, Lücke. Cf. Friedrich Schleiermacher, Sendschreiben über seine Glaubenslehre an Lücke, neu herausgegeben von Herman Mulert (Giessen: Alfred Töpelmann, 1908), p. 25.

By preferring the impersonal form of thinking of the Highest Being Schleiermacher admits his affinity with Spinoza, but believes that his speaking of the living God sufficiently distinguishes his view from the material pantheism of Spinoza.[4] Furthermore, he concedes that it is an almost inevitable necessity to form a personal conception of God whenever one relates his religious emotion to another or when one enjoys communion with God.[5] Nevertheless, he concludes his mature philosophical doctrine of God in the Dialektik by reiterating that all perceptions and conceptions are incapable of representing God to the self-consciousness, since the unconditioned being is an absolute subject which excludes all antitheses necessary to thinking. Therefore God, according to Schleiermacher, cannot be conceived to be the natura naturans of Spinoza nor can the world be his natura naturata.[6]

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[1] Dialektik, p. 241.

[2] On Religion, pp. 97-116.

[3] Ibid., p. 23.

[4] Ibid., pp. 114-116.

[5] Ibid., p. 116.

[6] Dialektik, p. 244.

By completely ruling out any adequate conceptualization of God and any identification of God and the world in his philosophical doctrine of God, Schleiermacher thus clears the way for Christian theology to receive its foundation not from philosophy but from the Christian religious self-consciousness and the feeling of absolute dependence. It is here that his dogmatic doctrine of God takes its rise.

By reflecting on the self-consciousness apart from the antithesis of sin and grace Schleiermacher discovers that there is a "Whence" or co-determinant of the feeling of absolute dependence.[1] This "Whence" is the divine being upon which man and the world are absolutely dependent. The traditional doctrines of creation and preservation, writes Schleiermacher, while having no basis in religious consciousness, are actually one in expressing the absolute dependence of man and the world upon God. Because of the equivalence between the doctrines of creation and preservation, Schleiermacher prefers to speak only of eternal creation.[2]

The traditional divine attributes are employed by Schleiermacher in order to relate dogmatics and church history and to rid the dogmatic doctrine of God of its alien elements.[3] In this presentation the "Whence" that is co-determinant in the immediate self-consciousness and feeling of absolute dependence is called "divine causality." The divine attributes do not describe the divine being itself; they denote "only something special in the manner in which the feeling of absolute dependence is to be related to Him."[1] There are four attributes of the divine causality apart from the antithesis of sin and grace: eternity, omnipresence, omnipotence, and omniscience. Together these attributes express that the entire coherence of nature is founded upon the divine causality, and they make clear that "everything that happens in space and time has its determination in the totality of that which is outside it in space and before it in time."[2]

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[1] The Christian Faith, p. 12.

[2] Ibid., pp. 147-148.

[3] Ibid.

The form and purpose of the divine causality as determined by the antithesis of sin and grace in the Christian self-consciousness are expressed by the attributes of justice, holiness, love and wisdom. The holiness of God causes man's conscience to experience arrested development of the God-consciousness as painful and to acknowledge it as sin. The divine justice causes man to experience evil as the punishment of sin. The purpose of evil is to prevent the "dominant sensuous tendencies from . . . attaining complete mastery through unchecked habit."[3] In short, evil dams up the process of sin until the process of redemption arrives to abolish it. Thus, the divine attributes of justice and holiness, as expressed in the consciousness of sin, are interdependent and can be understood only in relation to redemption.

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[1] Ibid., p. 194.

[2] Ibid., p. 215.

[3] Ibid., p. 351. Note that there is no mention of mercy as an attribute of God. Schleiermacher asserts that God is incapable of sensuous sympathy, that is, mercy.

The divine attributes of love and wisdom conclude Schleiermacher's dogmatic doctrine of God as it is determined by the consciousness of grace. The work of redemption involves a self-impartation of divine love which is effected in Christ and Holy Spirit. Since there can be no distinction between essence and attributes in God, anything which can be truly predicated of God must express the Divine Essence itself. Love alone is such a predicating attribute.[1] Divine wisdom refers to the divine ordering and determining of the world to be the scene of redemption, that is, the divine self-imparting. The relation between divine love and divine wisdom is clearly an interdependent one.

The traditional doctrine of the Trinity cannot be of ultimate importance with regard to Schleiermacher's dogmatic doctrine of God, because, in his view, it borders on tritheism by positing eternal personal distinctions in the Divine Essence. It thus gets lost in metaphysical speculation. He believes that the original intent of the doctrine was simply to defend the truth that the Divine Essence was united with human nature in the person of Christ and with the common spirit of the Christian Church.[2] He contends that much revision and rethinking of this doctrine must take place within the church.[3]

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[1] *Ibid.*, pp. 727-733.

[2] *Ibid.*, pp. 732-738.

[3] Schleiermacher's own position on the doctrine of the Trinity is inclined toward Sabellianism, which he did not deem relevant to incorporate into his dogmatic theology, perhaps because he did not want to jeopardize the acceptance of his dogmatic work by the Christian Church for whom his *magnum opus* was solely intended. Cf. "On the Discrepancy Between the Sabellian and Athanasian Method of Representing the Doctrine of the Trinity," trans. with notes by Moses Stewart, *Biblical Repository and Quarterly Observer*, April

(4) Revelation.--Just as Schleiermacher has a philosophical and dogmatic doctrine of God, so he has a philosophical and a dogmatic conception of revelation. While a certain amount of overlapping is in evidence, the distinction must nevertheless be acknowledged if Schleiermacher is to be interpreted sympathetically.

In his philosophical writings the idea of general and/or natural revelation is expounded. In *On Religion* Schleiermacher borrows from Schelling in viewing the universe as infinitely active and declares that any interaction between man and the universe is revelational.[1] This conception of revelation is foreshadowed in his conception of "religion as *Gefühl*, a revelation of the Infinite in the finite, God being seen in it and it in God."[2] Because religion is characterized as a feeling of absolute dependence, revelation is clearly the *source* of the original feeling of absolute dependence and is not self-produced. Schleiermacher writes: "Revelation is mere receptivity, inspiration mere productivity."[3] His basic contention is that the Christian religion seeks a common state of piety, and therefore it seeks the Infinite in all finite things.[4]

Schleiermacher's idea of general or natural revelation is thoroughly consistent with his conception of individuality in which the

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and July, 1835. From "Ueber den Gegensatz zwischen der Sabellianischen und der Athanasianischen Vorstellung von der Trinität," *Sämmtliche Werke*, Abt. 1, Bd. 2.

[1] *On Religion*, pp. xxix, 48. Much of the criticism of Schleiermacher's idea of revelation is centered upon his philosophical conception rather than his dogmatic conception in *The Christian Faith*.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 36. [3] *Ibid.*, p. 114. [4] *Ibid.*, p. 245.

2-22

Whole is in man by the unity of self-consciousness.[1] But this conception of revelation is relational rather than contentful: "What we feel and are conscious of in our religious emotions is not the nature of things, but their operation upon us."[2] Furthermore, revelation is thus "more self-disclosure than impartation and it induces in the other member of the dialogue not so much a direct understanding as a heightened self-consciousness, . . . and an intuition of the other."[3]

This philosophical line of reasoning about revelation is implicit in The Christian Faith. In the Preface it is established that in the immediate religious consciousness God-consciousness and world-consciousness cannot be separated, for the correlative highest self-consciousness is mediated in and through the sensible self-consciousness. This means that revelation or self-disclosure of the Infinite must always be in and through the finite, and any contact with the world can be revelational. It also means that revelation is ostensibly synonymous with consciousness of God.

> . . . God is given to us in feeling in an original way; and if we speak of an original revelation of God to man or in man, the meaning will always be just this, that, along with the absolute dependence which characterizes not only man but all temporal existence, there is given to man also the immediate self-consciousness of it which becomes a consciousness of God.[4]

In expounding his predominantly dogmatic conception of revelation, Schleiermacher makes it clear that revelation never refers to what is

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[1] Soliloquies, p. 82.

[2] On Religion, p. 48.

[3] Werke: Auswahl, Bd. II, pp. 596-597.

[4] The Christian Faith, pp. 17-18.

2-23

discovered in the realm of experience by one man and handed on to others, nor does it refer to divine communication.[1] Rather, revelation "signifies the originality of the fact which lies at the foundation of a religious communion in the sense that this fact, as conditioning the individual content of the religious emotions which are bound in the communion, cannot itself in turn be explained by the historical chain which precedes it."[2] For Schleiermacher, then, revelation is supra-rational (or supernatural) and rational (or natural). It is supra-rational in that the appearing of the founder of a religious communion cannot be explained solely by the natural reason of men.[3] With this affirmation Schleiermacher avoids the notion that "any original ideal which arises in the soul, whether for an action or for a work of art . . . may be regarded as revelation."[4] He also asserts, however, that revelation (or the originating fact of a religion) cannot be absolutely supra-rational (or supernatural) because one cannot distinguish in an individual "what is effected by the divine Spirit and what is effected by human reason."[5]

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[1] Ibid., p. 50. When Mackintosh criticizes Schleiermacher for equating revelation with human discovery, he discloses that he has understood Schleiermacher's philosophical concept of revelation, such as is found in On Religion, to be definitive, and then has proceeded to criticize it for its theological inadequcy, from a Christian perspective. Schleiermacher's failure to deal with the relationship between his philosophical and dogmatic conceptions of revelation exposes him to such criticism. Cf. H. R. Mackintosh, Types of Modern Theology (London: Nisbet and Co., 1937), pp. 31-100.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Ibid., pp. 64-65.

[4] Ibid., p. 51.

[5] Ibid., p. 65.

Thus, it appears that Schleiermacher refuses to draw a line between revelation and what comes to light through inspiration in a natural way. This may be due, in part at least, to his taking with utter seriousness the role of human reception in a revelatory event. Because he connects all revelation with the originating fact or Founder of a religious communion, he seems bound to affirm that regardless of the imperfect forms of religion "they rest upon revelation, however much error may be mingled in them with the truth."[1] At any rate Schleiermacher declares:

> No religion can claim that its own divine communication is pure and entire truth, while the others contain falsehood. For complete truth would mean that God made Himself known as He is in and for Himself. But such a truth could not proceed outwardly from any fact, and even if it did in some incomprehensible way come to a human soul, it could not be apprehended by the soul and retained, it could not become operative.[2]

The importance of this predominantly dogmatic conception of revelation for Christology should be readily apparent. Divine revelation for a member of the Christian church is connected with the appearance of the Redeemer. Indeed, Schleiermacher states that "there is no ground whatever for admitting anything supernatural or supra-rational which is not connected with the appearing of the Redeemer."[3] He even declares that Christ alone is "destined gradually to quicken the whole race into a higher life. Anyone who does not take Christ in this universal way as divine revelation cannot desire that Christianity should be an enduring phenomenon."[1] And yet, while insisting upon a radical difference between Christ and other founders of religion and other men, Schleiermacher also maintains that the incarnation of the Son of God is a natural fact. Two conclusive reasons are given for such an affirmation in the following quotation:

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[1] Ibid., p. 52.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Ibid., p. 66.

> In the first place: as certainly as Christ was a man, there must reside in human nature the possibility of taking up the divine into itself, just as did happen in Christ. So the idea that the divine revelation in Christ must in this respect be something absolutely supernatural will not stand the test. And secondly, even if only the possibility of this resides in human nature, so that the actual implanting therein of the divine element must be purely a divine and therefore eternal act, nevertheless the temporal appearance of this act in one particular Person must at the same time be regarded as an action of human nature, . . . as the highest development of its spiritual power.[2]

For these reasons Schleiermacher conceives of divine revelation through Christ as being identical with his whole being. Thus the historicity and the humanity of the Redeemer are, in his thinking, integral to both revelation and Christology, since he rejects absolute supernaturalism and insists that the appearance of the restorative element in Jesus is not simply by divine arbitrariness but is also humanly conditioned.[3] This much at least is clear: neither revelation nor the Redeemer are to be conceived in an absolutely natural or absolutely supernatural sense.

ii. Nature and Application of Method

(1) Analysis of Christian Self-consciousness.--Because Schleiermacher characterizes religion as an immediate self-consciousness which

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[1] *Ibid.*, p. 63.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 64.

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 65.

involves a feeling of absolute dependence, his theological method of necessity is introspective and psychological in nature. His theological or dogmatic method pertains solely to the Christian religion which is distinguished from other religions in that its entire contents are intrinsically related to and determined by the person and work of Jesus of Nazareth. This means that the Christian religious self-consciousness and feeling of absolute dependence can only be experienced and apprehended in and through relation to the person and work of the Redeemer. Also it means that the unity of the Christian self-consciousness is established by this determinative relation to Christ.

Schleiermacher therefore set himself to the task of expounding the substance of Christianity by drawing upon data derived through a descriptive and systematic analysis of the Christian self-consciousness. Because such data are accessible to everyone who has a believing experience within the Christian community, Schleiermacher believes that his theological method is wholly straightforward and empirical.[1]

Just as the feeling of absolute dependence presents itself to the self in a nexus of relative dependencies, so the Christian self-consciousness is not to be understood as shut up in inviolable privacy. Rather, the Christian self-consciousness comes into being within the church.[2] But the Christian self-consciousness is not produced by man or his community; rather it results from preaching within the Christian community in which Christ Himself is present. In Schleiermacher's thinking the whole work of Christ "was conditioned by the communicability of his self-consciousness by means of speech and similarly Christianity has always and everywhere spread itself solely by preaching."[1] Perhaps the clearest statement of Schleiermacher's conviction that the Christian self-consciousness is God-given and Christ-centered is found in his letter to Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi:

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[1] Sendschreiben, p. 21. Schleiermacher's attempt to be nonspeculative and practical leads him to place practical theology at the apex of the study of theology. Cf. Brief Outline of the Study of Theology, trans. by W. Farrer (Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark, 1850), Part III.

[2] The affinity of this affirmation with Schleiermacher's concept of individuality is readily apparent.

> If my Christian feeling is conscious of a divine spirit in me that is something other than my reason, I will never cease to search it out in the deepest depths of my soul's nature, and if my Christian feeling is conscious of a Son of God who is different from the best of us in another way than by being still better, so will I never cease to search out the genius of this Son of God in the depths of nature and to say to myself that in all likelihood I shall comprehend that other Adam, just as soon as I do the first Adam or Adams, whom I also must accept without comprehending.[2]

(2) Dogmatic Theology.--Since religious Gefühl mediates between knowing and doing in Schleiermacher's religious construction, the pious self necessarily seeks a means of communicating his feeling. Theology, therefore, is simply the self-conscious employment of language by and on behalf of the subject of religious feeling. In the Christian religion such theological reflection on the Christian self-consciousness serves to guide and vocalize the common life shared by believers. Schleiermacher refers to his own theological magnum opus as "dogmatic" because it is

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[1] The Christian Faith, p. 77.

[2] Friedrich Schleiermacher, The Life of Schleiermacher as unfolded in his Autobiography and Letters, trans. by Frederica Rowan (London: Smith, Elder, and Co., 1860), Vol. II, p. 281.

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comprehensible only in the context of the historically mediated religion of the Christian community.[1] This is the true import of his prefixing The Christian Faith with Anselm's lines:

> Nor do I seek to understand in order that I may believe,
> but I believe in order that I may understand.
> For he who does not believe does not experience,
> and he who does not experience, does not understand.[2]

Thus, Schleiermacher's theological system is conceived to be "dogmatic" in that it seeks to elucidate and systematize through concepts the entire contents of the religious self-consciousness of the Christian church in its particular time and place. Dogmatic propositions and doctrines prevalent in the church at a given time arise from ordered reflection upon the immediate utterances of the Christian religious self-consciousness.[3] Dogmatic theology collocates, connects, and relates such propositions and doctrines in order to articulate the religious emotions or content of the faith of the members of the Christian Church.[4]

So conceived, dogmatic theology subserves the interests of preaching or the outer side of the Christian self-consciousness, and it affirms that all true doctrine is traceable to religious affections which originate in the Christian consciousness of Christ's self-proclamation.[5]

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[1] The Christian Faith, p. 2.

[2] These lines appear only in the preface of the first edition of The Christian Faith.

[3] The Christian Faith, pp. 81-88.

[4] Ibid., p. 85.

[5] Ibid., p. 92. Also see Richard R. Niebuhr, Schleiermacher on Christ and Religion, p. 148f. Niebuhr rightly states that this is one of

In essence, then, the need for preaching and dogmatic theology stems from Jesus' giving only a summary presentation of his being and work, and dogmatic theology is but a manifestation of the communicative impulse that gives rise to Christian preaching.[1] However, it is not identical with preaching since its task is not only to set forth the affective religious states of the soul but to do so in the form of scientifically qualified propositions.

Since Schleiermacher's dogmatic theology exists to articulate the faith of the church, it is not a simple Bible-determined structure. It cannot be so determined since the content of the faith that is preached in the church and the religious consciousness of the Christian communion are larger than, though not independent of, biblical exegesis. Yet, The Christian Faith stands in a relationship of independence and reciprocity with exegetical theology in that Schleiermacher seeks to unfold and interpret meaningfully the New Testament as the original translation of the Christian feelings of the earliest Christian community.[2] Each communion, according to Schleiermacher, must acknowledge the New Testament as the normative guide for the living, historical consciousness of the church. As such, it is the instrument of

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the points at which Brunner most seriously and consistently errs in his account of Schleiermacher, alleging that he had no regard for the Word of God but only for the inner, subjective states of immediacy to the Absolute. Cf. Emil Brunner, Die Mystik und das Wort (Tübingen: Verlag von J. C. B. Mohr, 1929), Chap. III.

[1] Ibid.

[2] Werke: Auswahl in vier Bänden, Bd. 2, p. 351.

the life-communication that was in Christ and that Christ imparted in founding the church, and it guarantees the historical continuity of the church.[1] However, the church in every age must not only acknowledge its dependence upon the written deposit of the faith of the earliest church, but it must appropriate and clarify its own identity in terms of its own doctrinal convictions. Thus, in Schleiermacher's thought exegetical and historical theology are not simply auxiliary sciences to dogmatics, but the three reciprocally influence each other in the living, historical church.

Because Schleiermacher views theology as human reflection, there can be no isolation of theology from the other uses to which man turns his reason. Indeed, it must stand in a dialectical relationship to philosophy in that it is independent yet open to philosophy. Although Schleiermacher is critical of the idealists who confuse religion and philosophy by sublimating doctrines into truths of the speculative intellect, he is not opposed to the principle of communication between theology and philosophy.[2] Since a theological proposition can always be re-enacted and tested from the standpoint of religious feeling, Schleiermacher contends that the question as to

> . . . whether the same proposition can be true in philosophy and false in Christian theology, and *vice versa*, will no longer be asked, for the simple reason that a proposition cannot appear in the one context as it appears in the other; however similar it sounds, a difference must be assumed.[3]

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[1] *Schleiermacher, Werke: Auswahl in vier Bänden*, Bd. 2, p. 351.

[2] *The Christian Faith*, p. 92.

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 82.

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It appears that Schleiermacher's conception of the relationship between philosophy and theology is synonymous with his view of the relationship between feeling and understanding. He wrote to Jacobi that for him "the innermost life of the spirit consists only in this galvanic operation by the feeling in the understanding and by the understanding in the feeling, wherein, however, both poles always remain deflected from each other."[1] Therefore, the relationship between dogmatic theology and philosophy is conceived to be an edifying one in that theology uses a common language to execute its responsibility of refining the popular language of piety.

Actually it should be noted that Schleiermacher's dogmatic theology presupposes the work of philosophical theology which consists in stripping away all pseudo- or unchristian elements in a particular communion and points out the presence of essential Christianity in the same communion.[2] In the preface to The Christian Faith evidence of such a presupposition is indicated by the differentiation between Christianity and other religions and in his stipulation of the boundaries of theological reflection in terms of the four classical heresies of docetism, Ebionism, Manichaeanism, and Pelagianism.[3] Thus, it is fully comprehensible that Schleiermacher should write in his autobiography and letters that his "philosophical and dogmatic theologies are firmly resolved

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[1] The Life of Schleiermacher, Vol. II, p. 351.

[2] Cf. Brief Outline of the Study of Theology, arts. 32-68.

[3] The Christian Faith, pp. 97-100.

2-32

not to contradict each other, but, just on that account, both will never be completed."[1]

(3) Examination and Selection of Dogmatic Material.--Dogmatic propositions and doctrines serve to articulate the faith of the church. They are traceable to an immediate utterance of the Christian self-consciousness, but not all of them are of equal value. They are not of equal value because of the changing configurations of the human spirit that make up the church context, and because of the use of different words, concepts, and symbols to express and represent the Christian self-consciousness of the Church. Dogmatic theology, therefore, has the task of determining which words, concepts, and symbols are truly appropriate vessels of expression for the Christian self-consciousness of a particular religious communion.

Obviously not all dogmatic material in the living and historical Church can be so examined. Selective criteria must be invoked. The first selective criterion is: all dogmatic material which is discordant with the distinctive essence of Christianity is declared heretical and is excluded.[2] Since the essence of Christianity roots in the redemption wrought by Jesus of Nazareth, heretical material assumes one of two forms: (a) Human nature is so defined that redemption either cannot be accomplished, as in Manichaeanism (man is so infected with evil as to be incapable of knowing the need of or of receiving redemption), or is unnecessary, as in Pelagianism (man is so absolutely capable of redemption that the hindrance to the entrance of God-consciousness is infinitesimal so that need for redemption is reduced to zero. (b) The Redeemer is so defined that He cannot accomplish redemption because he is either so infinitely different from men that he cannot participate in human nature to redeem it (Docetism) or so much like men that ultimately the Redeemer himself must be in need of redemption (Ebionism).[1] All four of these "natural heresies" may be avoided by recognizing that Christ is the Redeemer who evokes God-consciousness in men by being the mediator, that is, that men participate in God-consciousness through Him who has an exclusive superiority over all others and an essential likeness to all others.[2] Only when the Redeemer is so conceived can he impart the redemption mankind needs.

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[1] The Life of Schleiermacher, Vol. II, p. 351.

[2] The Christian Faith, pp. 95-96.

The second selective criterion is: Protestant dogmas and doctrines are the primary concern of the Protestant dogmatic theologian, because a differentiation must be made between Roman Catholic and Protestant dogmas and doctrines. The Protestant, contends Schleiermacher, makes the individual's relation to the Church dependent upon his relation to Christ, whereas the Roman Catholic makes the individual's relation to Christ dependent on his relation to the Church.[3] While testifying that Christian piety arises only in and out of communion, Schleiermacher is very much concerned to give Christ priority over the corporate life He founded; this, he believes, Roman Catholicism fails to establish clearly

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[1] Ibid., pp. 97-99.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Ibid., p. 103.

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enough. Furthermore, as a dogmatic theologian, he is concerned to set forth the prevalent doctrine in his particular religious communion.

Once the dogmatic material is selected, the critical examination is undertaken with a purpose of purging all dogmas and doctrines of inconsistencies and connotations which prevent it from representing the Christian consciousness in the clearest fashion humanly possible. The application of his psychological and critical dogmatic method has already been observed in the explication of his religious construction. For example, rather than retain the separate doctrines of creation and preservation, Schleiermacher maintains that "eternal" or "continuous" creation more adequately represents the original disclosure of the Christian self-consciousness that everything is absolutely dependent on God.[1] In other words, both dogmatic propositions must be traced back "to that simple expression which truly interprets the immediate religious consciousness,"[2] for only in so doing will the danger of passing from the peculiarly religious sphere to the speculative be avoided. Both doctrines are not needed, therefore, because they are two conceptual modes of one fact of the Christian self-consciousness.

Similarly, he relegates the doctrine of the Trinity to a secondary status, because he believes it to be impossible to correlate an insistence upon the absolute unity of the Godhead with the declaration of the absolute equality of three persons. The conclusion that the doctrine is an unfinished one has its roots in Schleiermacher's contention that the consciousness of God is given only in our Christian self-consciousness. Hence, there is no criterion by which one may distinguish the being of God in himself from the being of God in relation to our Christian self-consciousness. Quite apart from the application of his psychological and dogmatic method to the ecclesiastical doctrine of Christ, then, it becomes comprehensible that "for Schleiermacher dogmatic theology is the countervoice of the church."[1]

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[1] Ibid., pp. 146-147.

[2] Ibid., p. 145.

(4) Formation of Dogmatic System.--In the Einleitung of the first edition of The Christian Faith Schleiermacher wrote that the order and structure of the system in which the dogmatic propositions were placed was what constituted the greatest value of his dogmatic theology. Indeed, since all elements of the Christian self-consciousness are intrinsically related to the redemption accomplished by Jesus of Nazareth, it can be stated that Schleiermacher's dogmatic system is fundamentally Christocentrically oriented. This follows necessarily from his theological method which is a systematic and descriptive analysis of the Christian self-consciousness. In fact, Schleiermacher holds that Christian doctrine is comprised solely of the facts of the Christian self-consciousness which are presupposed and determined by the antithesis expressed in the concept of redemption.[2] His system, then, is ostensibly a predication of his Christological and soteriological concern.

Nevertheless, The Christian Faith has a conventional order proceeding from creation to redemption to church. That this should be the case is due, to a large extent, to Schleiermacher's concern for dogmatic theology to subserve the interests of preaching and the articulation of the faith of the living, historical church. That is to say, while the arrangement and formation of dogmatics must be in accord with the whole business of communicating the meaning of the immediate Christian self-consciousness, concessions must be made to church history, history of doctrine, and biblical thought. Otherwise, the dogmatic system "would be of little practical use either for purging the doctrinal system of alien elements or for maintaining the clarity and verity of the rhetorical and poetical communication."[1]

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[1] Richard R. Niebuhr, Schleiermacher on Christ and Religion, p. 153.

[2] The Christian Faith, p. 123.

Hence, this overriding pragmatic concern leads Schleiermacher to approve and include dogmatic propositions which appeal to Confessional documents, or, in default of these, to the New Testament, and to exhibit their homogeneity with other dogmatic propositions already recognized.[2] Similarly, it causes him to declare that

> . . . all propositions which the system of Christian doctrine has to establish can be regarded either as descriptions of human states, or as conceptions of divine attributes or modes of action, or as utterances regarding the constitution of the world; all three forms have always subsisted alongside of each other.[3]

Strictly speaking, however, dogmatic propositions are to be taken from reflection upon the immediate religious consciousness of the Christian, because utterances of the world may well belong to natural science and utterances of divine attributes may be purely metaphysical. For this reason the propositions of the second and third forms must be developed out of propositions of the first form; "only on this condition can they be really authenticated as expressions of religious emotions."[1] It can be concluded, therefore, that the attributes of God and the world are included in Schleiermacher's dogmatic system for the purpose of giving it historical support and ecclesiastical character. That this implies a concession to pragmatic concern is indicated by the fact that Schleiermacher himself seems never to have been quite satisfied with his solution to the problem of order in the formation of his dogmatic system.[2] And this is understandable in the light of his straightforward insistence that the fundamental basis for all dogmatic expressions must be "the direct description of the religious affections themselves . . . [which] avoids giving the impression of a quite independent speculative theory."[3]

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[1] *Ibid.*, p. 127.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 112.

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 125.

This insistence by Schleiermacher that the basal dogmatic form is a direct expression of the religious self-consciousness of the Christian is precisely the reason that his theological method is commonly understood to be "religio-psychological" in nature.[4] It is so understood because his dogmatic work, The Christian Faith, results from an unfolding of the religious consciousness which is determined and ordered by the highest self-consciousness or feeling of absolute dependence, which is made possible, for the Christian, by the person and work of Jesus of Nazareth. The theological method of Schleiermacher's *magnum opus*, then, is at once *psychological*, as it looks upon the religious experience of the Christian as a phase of human psychical life, and *religious*, as it interprets the religious conviction which is determined by the person and work of Jesus of Nazareth.[1]

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[1] Ibid., p. 126.

[2] Cf. Sendschreiben, pp. 30ff.

[3] The Christian Faith, pp. 127-128.

[4] See, for example, Georg Wobbermin, The Nature of Religion, trans. by T. Nenzel and D. S. Robinson (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Co., 1933), pp. 7-13.

At every level in his architectonic system there is in evidence Schleiermacher's normative judgment that all valid and valuable dogmatic expressions must be traceable to direct descriptions of inner religious affections. It is clear, therefore, that the structure of the Christian religious self-consciousness is the foundation upon which he builds the methodological principle of *The Christian Faith*. It is the believing self or faith and not the object or objects of faith which is the starting point of his dogmatic system. And the end product is a *Glaubenslehre*, a science or doctrine of faith, rather than a doctrine *de deo et rebus divinis*. The theological method must be seen in its inseparable relation to the resulting system, for, as Schleiermacher himself said, "The method here adopted can only be justified by the finished argument itself."[2]

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[1] Georg Wobbermin, *The Nature of Religion*, pp. 7-13.

[2] *The Christian Faith*, p. 128.

2. Tillich's Method of Correlation

Tillich's method of correlation is implied in his definition of theology as apologetic. This is in turn implied in his proposition that man and the world, as beings, are indissolubly bound in an ontological structure and to God as the ground of being. Thus, in order to understand and make understandable Tillich's conception of the apologetic nature of theology, the method of correlation, and ultimately, Christology, it is necessary to explicate some of the central and controlling concepts of his ontological-theological construction.

i. Central Concepts of Ontological-theological Construction

(1) Ultimate Concern.--For Tillich, religion is defined as a state of "being grasped by an ultimate concern,"[1] and "faith is the state of being ultimately concerned."[2] To be in the state of ultimate concern means to take something so seriously that one would be willing to suffer and even die for it.[3] The word "grasped" means only that we did not produce the ultimate concern, but found it in ourselves.[4] Actually, once we begin to reflect on it, it has already grasped us. And it is only the mind of man that is capable of this awareness of ultimacy. In this sense, the mind of man is necessary for religion, and the ultimate is dependent on man's concern for this subject-object relationship.[5]

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[1] D. MacKenzie Brown, Ultimate Concern: Tillich in Dialogue (New York: Harper and Row, 1965), p. 4. Hereafter cited as Ultimate Concern.

[2] Paul Tillich, Dynamics of Faith (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1957), p. 1.

[3] Ultimate Concern, p. 8. [4] Ibid., p. 9. [5] Ibid., p. 13.

It is this rather broad concept of ultimate concern which Tillich employs as a criterion for juding concrete religions and quasi-religions--ideologies, such as nationalism or socialism, which claim the loyalty or veneration of their followers sometimes with the intensity of the theistic religions.[1] For him, a religion to be a religion must express and cultivate in its life and thought an ultimate concern. As a criterion of judgment of world religions, the term "ultimate concern" indicates not only our being ultimately concerned but also the object of our ultimate concern. The question, "What is ultimate?" or "What is the true object of our ultimate concern?" is now raised, because "the history of religion can be described as the attempt to find what can with justification be called this object."[2] The real danger is that something finite may be worshipped as truly infinite. Instead of ultimacy, then, there would be idolatry. Tillich seeks to answer the question concerning the object of ultimate concern and avert the problem of idolatry by calling this object not simply "God" but the ultimate ground of being or being-itself.

What must be delineated now is the manner in which the term "ultimate concern" is employed by Tillich to constitute the two formal criteria for theology. First, theology must have as its object that which is of ultimate concern. "Only those propositions are theological which deal with their object in so far as it can become a matter of ultimate concern for us."[1] In this connection Tillich states that this "ultimate concern" is an "abstract translation" of the great Commandment: "The Lord, our God, the Lord is one; and you shall love the Lord your God with all your heart, and with all your soul and with all your mind, and with all your strength."[2] Second, this ultimate concern is placed within a very definite ontological framework. As a result, "only those statements are theological which deal with the object in so far as it can become a matter of being or not-being for us."[3] That which is of ultimate concern, then, is what has the power to threaten or save the being of man. By "being" Tillich means the whole of human reality, the structure, the meaning, and the aim of existence.[4] Therefore, having an ultimate concern is a universal condition of the life of man, but not all men are ultimately concerned about the ultimate, the ground of being-itself.

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[1] Cf. Paul Tillich, Christianity and the Encounter of the World Religions (New York: Columbia University Press, 1963).

[2] Ultimate Concern, p. 11.

It can be concluded, then, that the first formal criterion seeks to protect theology from being concerned with preliminary concerns rather than ultimate concerns. A preliminary concern may become the vehicle of the ultimate concern, if it does not claim ultimacy for itself. Then, and only then, does it have a true and valuable function. For then the finite serves to make the infinite known. It is in this context that Tillich declares that the test of all theology is "its

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1. Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology, Vol. I (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1951), p. 12.

2. Ibid., p. 11. Mark 12:29 (Revised Standard Version).

3. Ibid., p. 14.

4. Ibid.

ability to preserve the absolute tension between the conditional and the unconditional."[1] The second criterion seeks to exclude from the object of theology things which cannot determine our being or non-being. Indeed, ultimate concern actually is initiated by an "ontological shock." Of this shock Tillich writes, "The threat of non-being, grasping the mind, produces the 'ontological shock' in which the negative side of the mystery of being--its abysmal element--is experienced."[2] In the face of this shock or threat of non-being, man asks the question of being. And it is in this experience that there is a direct "apprehension" of the ground of being and meaning.[3]

(2) *God as Being-itself*.--Grounding his discussion of God in the experience of ultimate concern, Tillich contends that to be finite is to be in a state of anxiety, to face the possibility of non-being, to experience an ontological shock. This gives rise to the question of being, which is the question of God. This is a clear expression of an ultimate concern in which man seeks for an answer to his question, for the courage to be or his grounding in being-itself.[4]

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[1] Paul Tillich, *The Protestant Era*, trans. with a concluding essay by James Luther Adams (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948), p. 79. Also in Tillich's review of *The Growth of Religion* he states: "Under continuous attack from Karl Barth and his friends I have tried to develop a philosophy of religion in which the relationship of the unconditioned and the conditioned element in the idea of God is explained in terms of 'meaning' and 'symbolic representation.'" Cf. Paul Tillich, "Review of The Growth of Religion, by Henry Nelson Wieman and Walter Marshall Horton," *The Journal of Religion*, Vol. XIX (July, 1939), pp. 69-72.

[2] *Systematic Theology*, Vol. I, p. 113.

[3] *Ibid*., pp. 79, 186.

[4] Paul Tillich, *The Courage to Be* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1952), p. 35.

Hence, while Tillich begins with the concrete experience of ultimate concern, he intends to go beyond it to describe the underlying ontological foundation.[1] Before proceeding further, therefore, it is appropriate to delineate briefly Tillich's ontology.

Ontology is the study of being. It is the attempt to understand what it means to be or not to be. Ontology does not start with nothing; rather it asks for the one thing held in common by all things which can be said to be. The question of being necessarily implies the question of the being of all that is. Therefore ontology is the basis of all philosophy, and ontology is presupposed in every philosophical system. The same may be said for theology. A theological system should begin with the study of being, man's being, and should relate it to being-itself, God's being. Such a beginning is necessitated by the fact that man's reason refuses to be confined to the realm of the particulars of experience and asks about the structure of being. It asks about what which makes the union of subject and object possible in the act of cognition.[2]

In Kantian language Tillich states that there must be ontological concepts which are a priori to or necessary conditions for man's experience and which constitute the structure of experience. Yet they are not known prior to experience but are "products of a critical analysis of experience."[1] The implication is that the "being" to be analyzed is to be found only in the knower, and not, except derivatively, in the known. Tillich writes, "Man is able to answer the ontological question himself because he experiences directly and immediately the structure of being and its elements."[2] Thus, for Tillich, the ontological concepts called "principles" or "categories" tell us something about the nature of being. He distinguishes four levels of such ontological concepts, which can be noted here only briefly.

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[1] Tillich acknowledges that "ultimate concern" is rather close to Schleiermacher's "feeling of absolute dependence." Yet he maintains that his analysis of ultimate concern is more decisive than Schleiermacher's phenomenological description of the feeling of absolute dependence, because it is more ontological in nature. Cf. Systematic Theology, Vol. I, p. 215.

[2] Ibid., p. 169.

First, the basic ontological structure which man experiences is the interdependence of the ego-self and world.[3] The self is an original centered structure (Gestalt) which logically precedes all questions of existence and transcends every spatio-temporal environment. But the self is not an isolated self; it is always related to its world either dependently (being changed and shaped by it) or independently (changing or shaping it.)[4] Being, then, is man encountering the world.

Second, the ontological elements which constitute the self-world and subject-object structure of being are individualization and participation, dynamics and form, and freedom and destiny. Each of these polar elements is discovered in the self's experiencing of the world and then generalized for all interactions within being. The first element in each of these polarities expresses the self-relatedness or self-centeredness of being--its power of being something for itself. The second element expresses the belongingness of being--its character of being a part of the universe of being. Each element, then, is meaningful only in relation to its opposite polar element.

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[1] Ibid., p. 165.

[2] Ibid., p. 169. At this juncture Martin Luther King, Jr. rightly points out that "Tillich's language implies the Kantian critical philosophy, while his analysis implies an epistemological realism." Cf. "A Comparison of the Conception of God in the Thinking of Paul Tillich and Henry Nelson Wieman" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Boston University, 1955), p. 65.

[3] Systematic Theology, Vol. I, p. 171.

[4] Ibid.

Third, being and finitude constitute another level of ontological concepts. The concept of "being" includes within it "non-being," "me on," that is, a negative ontological concept which is not simply a potentiality of being but which resists and perverts being. In God this non-being is continually overcome by his power of being. In man, non-being exists alongside being and is not overcome: "Man's finitude or creatureliness, is unintelligible without this concept of dialectical nonbeing."[1] Nevertheless, man is more than finite. He has the power to transcend himself and look upon himself as possibly infinite. This is what makes man aware of his finitude and also aware of his belonging to being-itself.

The central part of this third level of ontological concepts is Tillich's distinction between essence and existence. "Essence" refers to the power of being and the criterion of being; it is that which makes a thing what it is. "Existence" refers to the actuality of being; it refers to the actualization of being-itself in God's creation. However, wherever there is actualization of being there is a concomitant distortion of the essence of being.[1] This means that a split exists between what is essential and what is existential within being-itself, and that a consequent split obtains between created goodness and distorted existence. Tillich puts it thus: "The distinction between essence and existence, which religiously speaking is the distinction between the created and actual world, is the backbone of the whole body of theological thought."[2] Thus, it may be said that for Tillich essential being includes within itself non-being, but is not disrupted by it. Existential being, by way of contrast, is split, distorted, and threatened by non-being. It is out of this finitude and correlative anxiety that man raises the question of essential being--the question of God. This question is asked in different ways in Tillich's treatment of the categories of being and knowing.

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[1] Ibid., p. 189.

The fourth level of ontological concepts is that of the categories of being and knowing. They are the "forms in which the mind grasps and shapes reality."[3] They are not mere logical forms, related only indirectly to reality; they are ontological--present in everything. Tillich analyzes four main categories in the light of human finitude: time, space, causality, and substance. Externally, they express the union of being and nonbeing. Internally, they express the union of anxiety and courage. But the ontological analysis cannot answer the question as to how courage is possible in the face of ineradicable anxiety. The answer to this question is furnished by revelation and by the existential decision which enters into faith in God. However, in order for this revelatory answer to be received and to be relevant, an analysis of the ontological elements which are in tension and conflict in finite or existential being must be undertaken. Such an analysis serves to disclose the questions to which the doctrine of God is the answer. It also reveals the genuinely existential character of Tillich's ontology.

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[1] Ibid., pp. 202f.

[2] Ibid., p. 204.

[3] Ibid., p. 192.

In finite man the polarity of individualization and participation appears as the threat of loneliness over against the threat of collectivization or loss of self.[1] Dynamics threatens to become lost in rigid forms or to break through them, causing chaos and a consequent loss of both dynamics and form.[2] Destiny, instead of giving meaning and direction to man's being, threatens man's freedom, and his freedom is in danger of falling into arbitrariness.[3] Man in his finitude is therefore driven to ask for a power to save him from final disruption and the loss of being. He necessarily asks the question of God.

Before explicating his doctrine of God as the answer to the question of finitude, Tillich makes it clear that in no sense is the question of God to be understood as an argument for God. "Natural theology" as a tool for proving the existence of God by means of ontological, cosmological, or teleological arguments must be dismissed.[4] Natural theology, at best, can only pose the questions of God from analyzing human existence.[5] Man may ask the question of God, because there is an awareness of the infinite in man's awareness of himself as finite.[1] Moreover, the unconditional element appears in the structure of reason and reality, in the self and the world.[2] The question of God, then, according to Tillich, is implied in the finite structure of being. In man's ontological anxiety there arises inevitably a quest for revelation, a quest for God.

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[1] Ibid., pp. 197f. [2] Ibid., pp. 199-200. [3] Ibid., p. 200.

[4] Paul Tillich, "Natural and Revealed Religion," Christendom, Vol. I (Autumn, 1935), pp. 161f.

[5] Ibid.

From a phenomenological perspective, "'God' is the answer to the question implied in man's finitude; he is the name for that which concerns man ultimately."[3] But Tillich moves beyond the phenomenological description of God to the ontological meaning of God. In fact, his discussion of the nature of God is centered in his statement that "the being of God is being-itself."[4] Or, what is the same, God is "the power of being in everything, the infinite power of being."[5] These statements clearly express the _aseity_ of God. The _aseity_ of God means that God is the "ultimate," the "unconditioned," the "absolute," the "infinite," the ground of the courage to be."[6] Moreover, it means that God is beyond the contrast between essence and existence. In no sense, therefore, can God be conceived to be _a_ being or to _exist_.[7] In so far as being-itself is abysmal, God transcends every being; that is, there is an absolute break or "infinite jump" between finite being and being-itself.[1] Yet every finite being can be said to participate in being-itself because all "reality stands in God."[2]

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[1] _Systematic Theology_, Vol. I, p. 206.

[2] _Ibid._

[3] _Ibid._, p. 211.

[4] _Ibid._, p. 235.

[5] _Ibid._, p. 236.

[6] _Ibid._, pp. 236, 248, 249. Also, see "Three Lectures by Paul Tillich on 'Christianity and Existence,'" (Harvard Divinity School, Vertical File on Tillich - microfilm, n.d.), p. 31.

[7] _Ibid._, p. 237. Alexander McKelway, in his book, _The Systematic Theology of Paul Tillich_ (Richmond: John Knox Press, 1964), p. 123, refers to John Hick's contention that Tillich is saying only that God does not exist in the way that man exists, that he is simply

In relation to the ontological elements the symbol "personal God" is "absolutely fundamental because an existential relation is a person-to-person relation."[3] However, this does not mean that God is a person, but only that God is the ground of everything personal. Actually, the symbol of "personal God" is confusing because "God is the principle of participation as well as the principle of individualization.[4] Individualization and participation, then, have a common rootage in God, who transcends them both as the ground and aim of life.

The polarity of dynamics and form points to potentiality and actuality which are held in perfect balance in God. Actually this must

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differentiating between the unconditional being of God and the contingent being of man. See John J. Hick, "The Idea of Necessary Being," The Princeton Seminary Bulletin, Vol. LIV (Nov., 1960), pp. 11-21.

[1] Ibid.

[2] Paul Tillich, "The Religious Symbol," trans. James Luther Adams from chapter in Religiöse Verwirklichung, Journal of Liberal Religion, Vol. II (Summer, 1940), p. 33.

[3] Ibid., p. 244. "Against Pascal I say: The God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob and the God of the philosophers is the same God. He is a person and the negation of himself as a person." Paul Tillich, Biblical Relation and the Search for Ultimate Reality (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1955), p. 85. Also Tillich states that God is "supra-personal" in concurring with Schelling's assertion that "only a person can heal a person." Cf. Theology of Culture, edited by Robert C. Kimball (New York: Oxford University Press, 1959), p. 132.

[4] Ibid., p. 245.

be understood symbolically, because actuality and potentiality are applicable only to finite being and not to being itself. Tillich objects to the classical notion of God as *actus purus* in which everything potential is actual, because this violates the dynamic element in God. Similarly, he rejects any idea of potential being residing in God because this implies a lack, and God lacks nothing.

In relation to the polar elements of freedom and destiny the *aseity* of God indicates that God is his own destiny, which is to say that God is free. Symbolically, this means that God is in no way dependent on any finite being, yet he participates in becoming and in history.[1] But God's freedom does not consist in arbitrary activity. Rather it is an expression of his destiny. Thus, the essential *logos* structures of being are the expression of his freedom.[2]

God may be understood as "Spirit," which means the unity of power and meaning. It is an inclusive symbol for divine life.[3] "Power" refers to God's creative activity, the abysmal power of being, whereas "meaning" refers to the *logos* or structure of being--that which channels the creative power of God to rational creatures. These principles then prepare the way for a Christian doctrine of the Trinity in that they are moments within the process of divine life.[4]

For Tillich, the doctrine of creation is a correlative answer to the question of finitude. God's creativity is identical with his life, and creation simply describes the relation between God, man, and the world. Three modes of time symbolize the essentially creative divine life: "God _has_ created the world (originating), he _is_ creative in the present moment (sustaining), and he _will_ creatively fulfill his _telos_ (directing)."[1]

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[1] *Ibid.*, p. 249.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 244.

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 250.

[4] *Ibid.*, pp. 249-252.

Divine omnipotence is "the power of being which resists nonbeing in all its expressions and which is manifest in the creative process in all its forms."[2] Faith in this ultimate power of being is the answer to the problem of anxiety of nonbeing and gives the courage to be. The eternity of God means the power to embrace all periods of time, and it gives to man the basis for courage to be in time. The omnipresence of God refers to God's participation in the spatial existence of his creatures, and overcomes man's anxiety of not having a space for himself.[3] The omniscience of God expresses the spiritual character of the divine omnipotence and omnipresence. But above all of these attributes of God is his being of love. As an ontological concept, love may be said to be God, for "being-itself is love."[4] God's love, _agape_, draws man to himself and unites his being with the power of being itself. The God who is the ground and power of being is the answer to the question of being and the basis for man's courage to be.

(3) _Belief-ful Realism and Symbolism_.--All that has just been stated concerning the nature and being of God must be understood to be symbolic. For Tillich such attributes of God as love, power, omniscience, omnipresence, and the like "are taken from experienced qualities

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[1] _Ibid_., p. 253.

[2] _Ibid_., p. 273.

[3] _Ibid_., pp. 274-276.

[4] _Ibid_., p. 278.

we have ourselves. They cannot be applied to God in a literal sense. . . . The symbolic character of these qualities must be maintained consistently."[1] In the second volume of his Systematic Theology Tillich resolutely avows that the only non-symbolic assertion that can be made about God is "the statement that everything we say about God is symbolic."[2] The problem of the symbolic knowledge of God may be formulated as follows:

> If God as the ground of being infinitely transcends everything that is, two consequences follow: first, whatever one knows about a finite thing one knows about God, because it is rooted in him as its ground; second, anything one knows about a finite thing cannot be applied to God, because he is . . . "ecstatically transcendent." The unity of these two divergent consequences is the analogous or symbolic knowledge of God.[3]

While this is a succinct statement of the problem of symbolic knowledge of God, it by no means makes understandable Tillich's doctrine of symbols, which plays such an important role in his view of revelation, God, and Christ. Actually, his doctrine of symbols may be explained only in the context of his epistemological position, which he calls "belief-ful realism" (gläubigen Realismus).[4] James Luther Adams translates "gläubigen Realismus" as "self-transcending realism,"[1] and Tillich himself, in speaking of mythical symbols, proposes a "transcendent realism" in place of a critical idealism.[2] These translations are attempts to catch Tillich's insistence upon two elements for a valid epistemology: that which is given and that which transcends the given. The "given" constitutes the realistic element in his epistemology, and "faith" is that which enables man to transcend the given. Thus, in Tillich's epistemology, faith and realism are held in necessary tension with each other.

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[1] Paul Tillich, "Religious Symbols and our Knowledge of God," The Christian Scholar, Vol. XXXVIII (Sept., 1955), p. 194.

[2] Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology, Vol. II (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1957), p. 9.

[3] Ibid.

[4] For this insight the writer is indebted to the work by Theodore Runyon, Jr., "The Immediate Awareness of the Unconditioned and the Interpretation of History in the Theology of Paul Tillich" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Göttingen, 1958), p. 48.

The import of belief-ful realism in understanding Tillich's doctrine of symbols can now be stated. Belief-ful realism is an attitude in which the transcendent ground of meaning is received through the symbolic media of empirical reality in a given historical situation. This means that the belief-ful realist "sees the world with the sober eyes of the scientist or realistic artist, accepting it at the same time as symbolic of the eternal and unconditioned source of all meaning and ground of all being."[3] Everything that exists is therefore potentially a symbol, for it participates in the power of being over non-being, and this power can be mediated to one with the eyes of belief-ful realism. Moreover, belief-ful realism continues to look for more perfect symbols, symbols which point most clearly beyond themselves to the ground of being

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1. "Realism and Faith," in The Protestant Era, pp. 66-93.

2. "The Religious Symbol," p. 26.

3. Paul Tillich, The Religious Situation, trans. with a preface by H. Richard Niebuhr (New York: Meridian Books, 1956), pp. 11-12.

itself. Jesus as the Christ, the historical man whose essence is one with his existence, is the object of complete fulfillment for belief-ful realism.[1]

In this context Tillich avows that a "religious symbol uses the material of ordinary experience in speaking of God, but in such a way that the ordinary meaning of the material used is both affirmed and denied."[2] The literal meaning of the religious symbol is negated, but the symbol affirms itself in its self-transcending meaning."[3] At this point a symbol may be distinguished from a sign. A sign merely points to something with which it has no inner relationship, whereas a symbol participates in the reality it symbolizes.[4] The sign, of course, may be changed arbitrarily, but the "symbol grows and dies according to the correlation between that which is symbolized and the persons who receive it as a symbol."[5] This "correlation" between what is symbolized and the person receiving the symbol must not be overlooked. The symbol conveys the power and meaning of what is symbolized only to the person who has the eyes of belief-ful realism. That is to say, "real symbols provide no objective knowledge, but yet a true awareness of God."[6] This means that the symbol stands not only for the verbal expression but also for the subjective appropriation of the power of being.

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[1] The Protestant Era, p. 82. It is at this point that Tillich declares that "there is no way of meeting the 'historical Jesus' (i.e., the product of historical criticism) because the Jesus of whom we have reports was from the very beginning the 'Christ of faith.' . . . He who is the Christ is contemporaneous, or he is not the Christ" (Ibid.).

[2] Systematic Theology, Vol. II, p. 9. Also see Vol. I, pp. 131, 239.

[3] Ibid.

[4] Systematic Theology, Vol. I, p. 239.

[5] Ibid.

[6] "The Religious Symbol," p. 28.

The other aspect of this differentiation between the sign and the symbol which needs further elucidation is that of "participation." "Participation" seems to be the key to Tillich's doctrine of symbolism: "Without participation the category of relation would have no basis in reality. Every relation includes a kind of participation."[1] Since the religious symbol provides a true awareness of God who is the ground of being or the power of being, Tillich seems to imply by "participation" a basic ontological conformity between the symbol and that which is symbolized.

This ontological conformity between the symbol and that which is symbolized can be conveyed to and appropriated by man because a basic *analogia entis* exists between man and God. "The *analogia entis* gives us our only justification of speaking at all about God. It is based on the fact that God must be understood as being-itself."[2] This *analogia entis* is based on the fact that the *logos* structure of man's being has its depth rootage in the *logos* structure of reality or being-itself.[3] Because of this *analogia entis* between God and man and because of the *logos* structure of man and reality, Tillich declares that man alone is microcosmos, that the ground of being is a necessary co-implicate of his finite consciousness, and that man is able to become immediately aware of the Unconditional or being-itself.[1]

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[1] *Systematic Theology*, Vol. I, p. 177.

[2] *Ibid.*, pp. 240; Vol. II, p. 115.

[3] This fundamental assumption or presupposition permeates Tillich's entire theological system. For example, see *Ibid.*, Vol. I, pp. 23, 25, 26, 28, 75, 84, 154, 240f.

This immediate awareness of being-itself, which Tillich calls the mystical a priori,[2] is the non-symbolic point of reference which is necessary for an adequate theory of symbolism. If this non-symbolic ground were not present, the symbolic language would be adrift despite any internal coherence it might have.[3] This non-symbolic element in all religious knowledge is none other than "the experience of the unconditioned as the boundary, ground, and abyss of everything conditioned. This experience is the boundary-experience of human reason and therefore expressible in negative-rational terms."[4] What Tillich seems to be asserting is that in the awareness of the Unconditional one becomes immediately aware of God as being-itself, without the use of media.

A real religious symbol, then, participates in that which it symbolizes--the ground of being. One may say that religious symbols are double-edged: they are directed toward the infinite of which they speak and toward the finite through which they speak. Whether or not a religious symbol is true depends on its "inner necessity" for the apprehension of ultimate reality."[5] This removes religious symbols beyond the creative or destructive power of historical criticism.[6] To absolutize

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1. Ibid., pp. 176, 240.
2. Ibid., p. 9.
3. Paul Tillich, "Symbol and Knowledge, a Response," Journal of Liberal Religion, Vol. II (Spring, 1941), pp. 202-206.
4. Ibid., p. 203.
5. "The Religious Symbol," p. 28.
6. Ibid., pp. 30-31.

a moment of symbolic apprehension in the past and make it authoritative for the present would be heteronomous.[1] While this seems clear enough, it is not quite clear what Tillich means by saying that the truth of a symbol is contingent upon its "inner necessity" for apprehending ultimate reality. Apparently he is referring to the fact that a true symbol "participates" in or has an ontological conformity with that which it symbolizes. This participation or ontological conformity is then conveyed to man. Thus, that symbol is true which serves as a medium for a correlation between being-itself, which is *logos*-structured, with a human knower, who is also *logos*-structured.[2]

(4) *Revelation.*--Revelation, in correlation with reason, falls necessarily under the heading of religious knowledge. In the treatment of Tillich's epistemological position of belief-ful realism and his doctrine of symbols, certain presuppositions of religious knowledge were noted. Three of these presuppositions are worthy of reiteration: "awareness" or mystical *a priori*, *analogia entis*, and man as *microcosmos*.

In the "awareness" of the unconditioned man transcends the subject-object bifurcation and experiences being-itself in an immediate non-objectified way.[3] This "awareness" constitutes a reunion with the ground or power of being, or an immediate awareness of the unitive nature of being. It may therefore be called the mystical _a priori_, for it has the character not of faith but of self-evidence.[1] As such, it is the "prius of everything."[2] Obviously this "ontological awareness is immediate and not mediated by inferential processes."[3] Psychological or cognitive categories are unable to analyze exhaustively this awareness or mystical _a priori_, because the whole man is aware of the unconditional and the "awareness of the unconditional is itself unconditional."[4] Religious knowledge, then, is predicated on the mystical _a priori_, as Tillich defines it.

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[1] *Systematic Theology*, Vol. I, pp. 148-149.

[2] For this insight the writer is indebted to Thomas A. Langford, "A Critical Analysis of Paul Tillich's Method of Correlation" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Duke University, 1958), p. 42.

[3] *Systematic Theology*, Vol. I, p. 79.

The second and third presuppositions of religious knowledge combine to provide the possibility of the mystical _a priori_. The correlation between the _logos_ structure of man and the _logos_ structure of reality or being-itself constitutes the _analogia entis_ which makes possible an immediate awareness of one's relationship to the ground of being. Not only is justification for man's speaking about God given by the _analogia entis_, but the very possibility of knowledge resides in the fact that the _logos_ structure of man enables him to participate in the _logos_ structure of being-itself. "Since knowing is an act which participates in being . . . every analysis of the act of knowing must refer

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1. _Ibid._, pp. 9, 79. Also cf. _Theology of Culture_, pp. 22-26.

2. Paul Tillich, _A History of Christian Thought_ (a stenographic transcription of lectures delivered during the spring term, 1953, Union Theological Seminary, by Peter H. John), p. 98.

3. Paul Tillich, "Two Types of Philosophy of Religion," _Union Seminary Quarterly_, Vol. X (May, 1946), p. 10.

4. _Ibid._

to an interpretation of being."[1] The microcosmic principle which holds that man alone is the microcosmos in whom all levels of reality are present is therefore a supportive corollary of the *analogia entis*.[2] It also points to the fact that in man alone is the world present directly in conscious encounter and that through the usage of language and universals man, potentially at least, is unlimited in terms of his participation in the universe. "Theology," writes Tillich, "should learn from modern naturalism, which at this point can serve as an introduction to a half-forgotten theological truth. What happens in the microcosm happens by mutual participation in the macrocosmos, for being itself is one."[3]

Given these three presuppositions for religious knowledge, it would appear that Tillich has paved the way for a thorough-going natural theology. Such, however, is not the case. "While accepting the method '*analogia entis*,'" says Tillich, "I cannot accept any attempts to use it in the way of rational construction."[4] Nevertheless, several truths implied in natural theology with respect to revelation are retained by Tillich. He concurs that revelation presupposes the *imago Dei* and that in having an idea of himself man has an idea of God.[5] He also holds that man alone has the capacity for receiving revelation and that "revelation must be received by the human mind if it is to be a revelation to man."[1] Indeed, he says that without the preceding religious experience of mankind revelation would be meaningless. But revelation is more than religious experience. "It is the divine criticism and transformation of religious experience."[2] It can therefore be said that "man in history is never without revelation and he is never without questioning for revelation."[3]

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[1] *Systematic Theology*, Vol. I, p. 19.

[2] *Ibid.*, pp. 176, 260.

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 261.

[4] "Symbolism and Knowledge, a Response," p. 203.

[5] "Natural and Revealed Religion," p. 163.

Turning to reason and revelation, Tillich begins with an analysis of the ontological character of reason in its essential and actual nature for the express purpose of demonstrating the possibility of and need for revelation. Ontological reason encompasses both "subjective" and "objective" reason. Subjective reason is the logos structure of man's mind which enables him to grasp and shape reality, and objective reason is the logos structure of reality which can be grasped and shaped. Both the "grasping" and the "shaping" may be interpreted as expressions of the logos structure of reality in that they point to the "depth of reason."

The full import of Tillich's concept, "depth of reason," can be grasped only in the light of his distinction between essential and existential or actual ontological reason. Essential reason is an expression of the universal logos of being and is identical with the content of revelation.[1] But once ontological reason is actualized in self and world it is subjected to the finitude and separation of existence. The "depth of reason," however, indicates that it is never completely severed from its original unity with the ground of being and that it participates, fragmentarily at least, in salvation.[2] Moreover, it affirms that while existential reason is incapable of grasping the infinite, it is nonetheless aware of its own depth, its essential structure, its infinitude. In other words, it is precisely the presence of the infinite within finite reason which enables man to ask the question of revelation.

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[1] Ibid.

[2] Ibid., p. 167.

[3] Ibid., p. 169. Tillich also says that "man is never left by God and separated from him." Ibid.

The quest for revelation is occasioned by the tensions or conflicts between the structural elements within actual reason: autonomy and heteronomy, absolutism and relativism, formalism and emotionalism. These conflicts prevent actual reason from realizing the unity which the elements have in the ground of being. Yet they also give rise to a search for a reintegration for reason. "Reason," contends Tillich, "does not resist revelation. It asks for revelation, for revelation means the reintegration of reason."[3] Thus, he proceeds to show how revelation is the solution for the conflicts within actual reason.

A phenomenological description of revelation discloses three characteristics that must always be present: mystery, miracle, and ecstasy. Literally, revelation means "removing the veil,"[4] which implies the manifestation of the mysterious--the ground of being. The word "mystery" reiterates the view that the ultimate nature of being-itself is abyss.[1] The objective element in the revelatory event is "miracle," a sign event in which the mystery of being reveals itself.[2] And the subjective element is the "ecstatic" response by a man in which he is grasped by the ground of being and meaning. This means that man's reason surpasses its finite structure with its subject-object relationship and becomes aware of the ground of being. It is an experience in which reason is reunited with its depth. What is communicated in the revelatory event, then, is not factual knowledge but an insight into the mystery of being and the meaning of man's relationship to the ground of being.[3] Knowledge of revelation may be said to be knowledge of God or being-itself only in a symbolic sense.

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[1] Systematic Theology, Vol, I, p. 74.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Ibid., p. 99.

[4] Ibid., p. 108.

Tillich says that revelatory truth can be judged only by criteria which are derived from within the situation of revelation.[4] But he also adds a "critical" element to the phenomenological description of revelation which is none other than the revelation of Jesus as the Christ. This "classic example" of revelation is the criterion for judging all revelation. It, too, is a phenomenological concept in that what is described as expressing the essential nature of every revelation is, in the final analysis, man's experience of the New Being which is mediated through Jesus as the Christ.[5]

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[1] Ibid., p. 139.

[2] Ibid., p. 117.

[3] Ibid., p. 129.

[4] Ibid., p. 131.

[5] Ibid., pp. 107-108.

Every thing and every person participate in being-itself and thereby may become a medium for the revelation of being-itself. Nature itself is a medium for revelation, yet one cannot say that there is "natural revelation." History, historical groups, or individuals can be bearers or media of revelation in so far as they are transparent to the ground of being and meaning. Since a person is a microcosmos and is logos structure, he more fully manifests the central qualities of being-itself and is thus potentially the most adequate medium of revelation.[1] The third medium of revelation is the Word of God. The Word of God is "every reality through which the ultimate power breaks into our present reality."[2] In no way is God's Word to be mixed up with revealed doctrines, the word of Scripture, or the word of preaching.[3] Tillich ascribes six meanings to the Word of God: the logos character of the ground of being which is expressed in every self-manifestation of that ground; the medium of creation; the self-manifestation of God in the history of revelation; the name for Jesus as the Christ who manifests within existence the logos nature of being; the Bible; and the preaching and teaching of the church in so far as they participate in and witness to the revealed Word in Jesus as the Christ.[4]

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[1] Ibid., p. 118.

[2] The Protestant Era, p. 81.

[3] Cf. Alexander McKelway, The Systematic Theology of Paul Tillich, p. 88. This is a paraphrase of his translation from Kirche und Kultur (Tuebingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 1924).

[4] Systematic Theology, Vol. I, pp. 158-160.

These six characterizations of the Word of God make it quite clear that the logos character of being-itself is what makes revelation possible and is what is given in revelation. The first three meanings have to do with general or preparatory revelation which is necessary to a reception of the final revelation in Jesus as the Christ. "To assert that a revelation is final without pointing to a history of revelation in which there has been preparation for it dehumanizes man and demonizes God."[1] The last three meanings deal with the final and concrete revelation of the logos nature of being-itself to man through Jesus as the Christ. Man is able to recognize such a manifestation in Jesus as the Christ only because he already participates in the logos character of being.

This final or actual revelation in Jesus as the Christ is decisive and fulfilling for the person who is grasped by it and participates in it. The reception of Jesus as the Christ by the disciples is the original revelatory event upon which the Christian church is dependent, and it is the criterion for judging all other revelations. This particular revelatory event is final because Jesus as the Christ is able to sacrifice everything finite in him, thereby becoming completely transparent to the logos of being.[2] Such a complete sacrifice was possible because Jesus as the Christ maintained an "uninterrupted

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1. The Protestant Era, p. 139.

2. Paul Tillich, "A Reinterpretation of the Doctrine of the Incarnation," Church Quarterly Review, Vol. CXLVII (Jan.-Mar., 1949), p. 135.

unity with the ground of his being,"[1] or because he was in a continuous "state of being grasped by the power of being itself."[2] It is important to note here that Jesus as the Christ, not Jesus as Jesus, is completely united with God. Indeed, the finite Jesus had to sacrifice himself in order to prevent distortion of the manifestation of the ground of being within and through him as the Christ.

Under the conditions of existence reason is estranged from its depth or ground and is unable to recognize God. "The eyes of reason must be opened by the revelatory presence of the divine Spirit in the human spirit. Only when this happens can truth be received by human reason."[3] Philosophy can resolve the questions and conflicts of existential reason only if it is theonomous.[4] Theonomy, of course, involves an "openness to the conditional, a turning toward it, receiving and bearing it."[5] Standing within the theological circle Tillich declares that "there is no theo-logy where there is no concrete revelatory experience. And there is no theo-logy where there is not the universal claim for truth."[6] Out of this conviction he demonstrates how revelation resolves the conflicts within actual reason.

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[1] Systematic Theology, Vol. I, p. 137. [2] The Courage to Be, p. 156.

[3] Biblical Religion and the Search for Ultimate Reality, p. 64.

[4] Paul Tillich, "Reply to Interpretation and Criticism," The Theology of Paul Tillich, p. 337.

[5] The Protestant Era, p. 43.

[6] Paul Tillich, "Relation of Metaphysics and Theology," Review of Metaphysics, Vol. X (Sept., 1956), p. 58.

Final revelation overcomes autonomous reason because of its complete transparency to the ground of being, and it overcomes heteronomous reason by the complete sacrifice of Jesus to the Christ, the symbol for the ground of being. Theonomy is effected as the two elements are pointed to their unity in being-itself. The concrete revelatory medium of the human and historical person of Jesus answers the demand of relativism, while the self-sacrifice of Jesus to the Christ answers the demand of absolutism. This concrete absolute character of final revelation resolves the conflict between absolutism and relativism and expresses the power of love as it reunites finite being and being-itself.[1] Final revelation discloses the logos structure of reason which is present in persons as participants in being-itself. It therefore satisfies the needs of formalism and of emotionalism respectively. This means that in a real sense salvation and revelation are equivalent, for as the mind of man is healed in revelation so is his whole being. In final revelation, then, man is made aware of the fact that he already participates in the ground of being, and, as a result of this revelation, he finds the courage to affirm his essential being.

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[1] Systematic Theology, Vol. I, pp. 152-153. Tillich's more complete explanation of love as an ontological concept is given in Love, Power, and Justice (New York: Oxford University Press, 1954).

ii. The Nature of Apologetic Theology

Tillich's entire theological system is devoted to satisfying two basic needs: "the statement of the truth of the Christian message and the interpretation of this truth for every generation."[1] "Interpretation" involves the finding of proper language for the Christian message which will show the existential significance of the Gospel.[2] In order to do this apologetic theology considers and responds to the human "situation" or "the totality of man's creative self-interpretation in a special period."[3]

(1) Rationale.--For the Christian theologian the contents of the Christian faith must necessarily be a matter of ultimate concern, and he must assume the responsibility of giving a methodological interpretation of the event of Jesus as the Christ. At all times Christian apologetic theology must be understood as

> . . . the methodological self-interpretation of the Christian Church (1) in the direction of its foundation, the "new reality" which has become manifest in Jesus as the Christ, and (2) in the direction of the life, past and present, which is determined by the new reality.[4]

Because of his conviction that Christianity can comprehend all elements of religious truth without ceasing to be Christianity, Tillich

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1. Systematic Theology, Vol. I, p. 3.

2. Paul Tillich, "How to Communicate the Christian Message," New Christian Advocate, Vol. III (May, 1959), p. 14.

3. Systematic Theology, Vol. I, p. 4.

4. Paul Tillich, "The Problem of Theological Method," The Journal of Religion, Vol. XXVII (Jan., 1947), p. 19.

believes that the Christian message can be adapted to contemporary situations without surrendering its uniqueness.[1] The error of fundamentalistic and kerygmatic theologies is their unwillingness to give due consideration and response to the "situation." They both tend to emphasize "the unchangeable truth of the message over against the changing demands of the situation."[2] Apologetic theology, by correlating the questions implied in the situation with the answers implied in the message, is able to unite message and situation so that neither of them is obliterated.[3] "Yet certainly it is necessary to ask in every special case," concedes Tillich, "whether or not the apologetic bias has dissolved the Christian message."[4]

(2) Relation of Philosophy and Theology.--For Tillich philosophy of religion seems to be a necessary presupposition for an apologetic theological undertaking[5] in the light of such assumptions as:

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[1] Ibid.

[2] Systematic Theology, Vol. I, p. 4.

[3] Ibid., p. 8.

[4] Ibid.

[5] In an early essay Tillich states this position: "It is the task of theology to draw up a normative system of religion on the basis of the categories of philosophy of religion from a concrete standpoint, a standpoint which is intimately related to the confessional, the general religious-historical, and the universal cultural-historical standpoints." "Ueber die Idee einer Theologie der Kultur," Religionsphilosophie der Kultur (Berlin: Reuther und Reinhard, 1920), p. 31. Translation mine. Similarly, in another early work Tillich writes: "Religionsphilosophie ist Lehre von der religiösen Funktion und ihren Kategorien. Theologie ist normative und systematische Darstellung der konkreten Erfüllung des Religionsbegriffs." Taken from "Religionsphilosophie," Die Philosophie in ihren Einzelgebieten, ed. Max Dessoir (Berlin: Im Verlag Ullstein, 1925), p. 773.

the logos structure of man and reality which provides an analogia entis between God and man; the analogia entis which constitutes the basis for the universal possibility of knowledge in an immediate way and through the medium of symbols; the mystical a priori or awareness of the unconditional which is the beginning point of reference for all religious knowledge and symbolism; and the microcosmic principle which affirms that in man alone all levels of reality are present.

The apologetic theologian, therefore, begins with philosophy of religion, but he adds to these general categories the criterion of the Christian message.[1] He cannot be satisfied to formulate generally valid concepts of religion; he must enter into the theological circle, a situation of faith or existential commitment to a historical faith-tradition. Moreover, once he has entered the theological circle, he must become an intellectual critic, even of that which he represents.[2]

Philosophy of religion, then, provides the basis for an analysis of the mystical a priori and of the existential situation out of which arise the question and quest for theology with its revelatory answer. In this sense there is a correlative relationship between philosophy and theology. Philosophy is "that cognitive approach to reality in which reality as such is the object."[3] By "reality as such"

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[1] Systematic Theology, Vol. I, p. 9.

[2] Paul Tillich, "Religion and its Intellectual Critics," motive, Vol. XV (May, 1955), p. 31.

[3] Systematic Theology, Vol. I, p. 18.

Tillich means the structure which makes reality a whole, the categories and structures which are presupposed in the cognitive encounter with reality. Because every philosophy is concerned to investigate the relation of signs, symbols, and logical operations to reality, it cannot avoid beginning with or ultimately having to deal with the structure of being. Indeed, every act of knowing involves an "ontic relation," a participation in and an interpretation of being.

This means that theology, too, cannot escape the question of being, for the object of theology which concerns us ultimately is the very ground of being. Both disciplines, then, ask the question of being but from different perspectives. "Philosophy deals with the structure of being in itself; theology deals with the meaning of being for us."[1] Tillich therefore proceeds on this basis to delineate three basic differences between philosophy and theology.

First, there is an attitude difference in that the philosopher seeks to maintain detached objectivity toward being and its structures, while the theologian is passionately involved in being.[2]

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1. Ibid., p. 22. Tillich equally maintains, however, that the meaning and structure of being must be held in unity. Cf. Ibid., pp. 9, 70, 187ff.

2. Ibid., pp. 22-23. In an earlier article Tillich frankly admits that he has been profoundly influenced by Kierkegaard's "existential attitude," and he writes: "I have sought to give it aggressive expression." Paul Tillich, "Kierkegaard as Existentialist Thinker," The Union Review, Vol. IV (Dec., 1942), p. 5. Furthermore, there exists a definite similarity here with Kierkegaard's use of "passion" as the moment when an individual "realizes existentially a unity of the finite the infinite which transcends existence." See Søren Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript, trans. David Swenson and Walter Lowrie (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1941), p. 174.

Second, the sources are different in that the philosopher studies the whole of reality in an objective way in order to discover the structure of reality. For the philosopher, "the place to look is all places; the place to stand is no place at all; it is pure reason."[1] By way of contrast, the theologian does not examine reality as a whole; rather, he looks for the structure of being in the place where his ultimate concern is manifest--the event of Jesus as the Christ in which the *logos* of being becomes flesh. That is, he believes that in this event the final and decisive meaning of being and the final aim of existence may be found. The implication of this approach, however, is that in order to identify the *logos* with Jesus as the Christ, it is necessary to know already the *logos* structure of reality. Still Tillich insists that the theologian differs most radically from the philosopher precisely because of his ultimate commitment to the concrete, historical event of Jesus as the Christ.[2]

Third, the theologian is not primarily concerned with epistemology and the cognitive function, as is the philosopher, but with soteriology--saving knowledge for the whole of man's being. Very succinctly, the philosopher is concerned only with knowledge *about* religion, while the theologian is concerned with knowledge *out of* religion, that is, knowledge based on actual experience and participation in being-itself.[1]

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[1] *Systematic Theology*, Vol. I, p. 23.

[2] George Tavard, whom Tillich regarded as one of his best interpreters, declares that this is the key to Tillich's theology. He writes: "If we want to pinpoint the whole of Tillichian theology, we can hardly find a better view of it than this; it consists in bringing to light the unconditional concern of man and in showing the identity of the unconditional with which man is concerned with the New Being manifested in Jesus as the Christ." Cf. George H. Tavard, "The Unconditional Concern," *Thought*, Vol. XXXVIII (Summer, 1953), p. 241.

Having stated the basic divergencies between philosophy and theology, Tillich turns to their points of convergence. The philosopher necessarily faces the possibility of non-being and is driven to ask the question of what determines his being or non-being. In the very act of asking this question the philosopher, like all other men, is grasped by an ultimate concern.[2] Hence, in so far as the philosopher's analysis of the *logos* structure of reality is determined by his existential situation and ultimate concern he is a "hidden theologian." Similarly, in so far as the Christian theologian seeks to demonstrate the universality of his ultimate concern, which is the event of Jesus as the Christ, he is a philosopher, ontologically and existentially.[4]

This means that the theologian stands within the theological circle so long as his ultimate concern is with the Christian message and he is concerned to give a methodological interpretation within and on behalf of the church. But the theologian must also examine critically the adequacy of the manifestation through the symbol of the *logos* become flesh, the event of Jesus as the Christ. To do so, he must step out of the theological circle. Very subtly Tillich is declaring here that the apologetic theologian cannot stand completely within the theological circle, as implied earlier; rather the must assume a position on the "boundary" between the philosophical and theological circles.

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[1] Paul Tillich, "Religion and Education," *Protestant Digest*, Vol. III (April-May, 1941), pp. 58-61.

[2] *Systematic Theology*, Vol. I, p. 191.

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 24.

[4] *Ibid.*, p. 25.

In summation, there can be neither absolute conflict nor absolute synthesis between theology and philosophy. Conflict is averted because theology has its common ground in ultimate concern and the common denominator of philosophy is its ontological analysis of the *logos* structure of being. Furthermore, "no philosophy which is obedient to the universal *logos* can contradict the concrete *logos*, the Logos 'who became flesh.'"[1]

(3) *Norm of Theology*.--All theology must be concerned with an object of ultimate concern, and this ultimate concern must be that which determines our being or non-being. The material norm of Christian theology is the New Being in Jesus as the Christ. When this material norm is combined with the formal and protective principle of all theology, namely, ultimate concern, "one can say that the material norm of systematic theology today is the New Being in Jesus as the Christ as our ultimate concern."[2] This means, of course, that this norm is the criterion for the use of all the sources of systematic theology, including the Bible, church history, and the history of religion and culture.

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[1] *Ibid.*, p. 28.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 50.

The Bible is the basic theological source, "because it is the original document about the events on which the Christian church is founded."[1] In other words, it is a record of the giving and receiving of the revelation of the New Being in Jesus as the Christ. However, the Bible "has never been the norm of systematic theology. The norm has been a principle derived from the Bible in an encounter between Bible and Church."[2] These words make it clear that the Church must apply the norm of theology to its historical material. They also illustrate Tillich's insistence that experience is the medium of the sources of theology. Indeed, Tillich even allows that the norm is religiously and culturally conditioned, because the New Being most adequately answers the questions arising out of the analysis of the "situation" pole of apologetic theology. Thus, the New Being, which is brought by and is manifested in Jesus as the Christ, is _the_ norm of theology; it stands over against the sources and the medium of theology as criterion and judge.

(4) _Rational Character_.--Because the theologian has accepted the Christian message or the genuine paradox of the Christian faith, the New Being in Jesus as the Christ, as his ultimate concern, the reason he enlists for the purpose of building his theological system is ecstatic reason, reason that is grasped by this ultimate concern. In other words, the Christian theologian accepts not only the truth of the New Being, but he seeks to express it in a semantically, logically,

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[1] _Ibid_., p. 35.

[2] _Ibid_., p. 50.

and methodically rational way. This attempt roots in his overarching concern to give "an interpretation of the Christian message which is relevant to the present situation."[1] Tillich recognizes, however, that the theologian does not live in complete theonomy, a state in which his formal reason and ecstatic reason are in complete harmony. He therefore concedes that, like every other human activity, systematic theology is "subject to the contradictions of man's existential situation."[2]

iii. The Method of Correlation

Tillich's conception of his theology as apologetic and his ontological-theological construction provide the context in which his theological method, the method of correlation, is not only understood but virtually demanded. Apologetic theology is an "answering theology," a theology which responds to man's questions implied in his situation.[3] The relevance between the theological answers and the questions is based upon the *analogia entis* between God and man. Furthermore out of the philosophical analysis of man as finite being the questions of ultimate concern are derived. The Christian theologian must then correlate the answer which he has found in the New Being in Jesus as the Christ to the questions. Thus Tillich writes: "The method of correlation explains the contents of the Christian faith through existential questions and theological answers in mutual interdependence."[4]

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[1] *Ibid.*

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 54.

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 6.

[4] *Ibid.*, p. 60.

(1) The Existential Questions.--Because of the interdependence of the questions and answers in the method of correlation Tillich argues that his method does not "begin" at any "place." Nevertheless, in each section of his system the existential questions are elucidated prior to the giving of the revelatory answers.

That Tillich's theological structure has an anthropological beginning point is implied in his statement that "man is the question he asks about himself before any question has been formulated."[1] Indeed, in one of his reviews Tillich writes: "Let us start then, with man, no matter how much such a proposal may horrify some theologians."[2] Such an affirmation is in accord with the view that man as the microcosmos can "become aware of the fact that he himself is the door to deeper levels of reality, that in his own existence he has the only possible approach to existence itself."[3] This means that man can ask ultimate questions which are "existential," because he himself participates in ultimate reality. Thus, an analysis of man's situation yields the questions which theology must answer.

The existential questions which result from this analysis arise because man is a finite being, a mixture of being and non-being. This means that man, while participating in essential being, cannot avoid asking the question of being, because He necessarily experiences "ontological shock," the threat of non-being. "Like the beating of the heart," says Tillich, "it is always present, although one is not always aware of it."[1]

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[1] Ibid., p. 62.

[2] Paul Tillich, "Review of The Grandeur and Misery of Man by David E. Roberts, Christianity and Crisis, Vol. XV (Nov., 1955), pp. 51-52.

[3] Systematic Theology, Vol. I, p. 62.

It is primarily the task of philosophy of religion to analyze this ontological state of anxiety. It remains a philosophical task, even when it is performed by the theologian in the light of his ultimate concern. If, perchance, the theolgian should see "something he did not expect to see in the light of his theological answer, he holds fast to what he has seen and reformulates the theological answer."[2] He can do this because of his confidence that nothing can change the substance of his answer, the logos of being, which is manifest in Jesus as the Christ. Thus, Tillich believes that the urgent need for the theological answer is revealed in every analysis of the questions implied in man's finitude.

(2) The Revelatory Answers.--Having analyzed the human situation out of which the existential questions arise, the theologian must then demonstrate "that the symbols used in the Christian message are the answers to these questions."[3] The answers implied in the revelatory event must be correlated to the existential questions if they are to be meaningful. But in no sense are the revelatory answers produced by man or derived from the analysis of human existence. "These answers are contained in the revelatory events on which Christianity is based,"

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[1] Ibid., Vol. II, p. 67.

[2] Ibid., p. 64.

[3] Ibid., Vol. I, p. 62.

says Tillich, "and are taken by systematic theology _from_ the sources, _through_ the medium, _under_ the norm."[1]

The answer (to which the symbols of the Christian message point) to the existential questions implied in human finitude is "God" or being-itself or the power of being that overcomes the threat of non-being.[2] This answer can be received by man only because he participates in the essential nature of being. Here again the _analogia entis_ provides the formal ground by which the reception of knowledge of God is possible for man.[3] And the correlation itself is the recognition by man of his participation in the ground of being.[4]

For the Christian theologian this theological answer to the questions implied in human finitude is given _to_ man in final revelation. In final revelation being-itself is manifested in such a way that man comes to recognize his own participation in the ground of being and is thereby given the courage to affirm his being even in the face of non-being.[5] This final revelation can come only through the medium of an individual as _microcosmos_, for "the potentialities of being are completely actual in personal life alone."[6] For the Christian this final revelation is, of course, identified with the event of Jesus as the Christ, in that Jesus sacrifices all that is human and finite to the

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[1] _Ibid._ [2] _Ibid._, p. 64. [3] _Ibid._, Vol. II, p. 115.

[4] _Ibid._, Vol. I, p. 61. [5] _Ibid._, p. 135.

[6] _Ibid._, Vol. II, p. 120. Also see Vol. I, pp. 118, 150.

Christ which is the infinite ground of being and meaning.[1]

(3) Correlation as Interdependence.--"Correlation," for Tillich, does not consist simply in matching together questions and answers in his theological system. By "correlation" he means that there is a mutual dependence between question and answer. That is to say, both sides of the correlation remain independent, and at the same time both sides affect one another. In one way this "interdependence" of question and answer can be expressed in terms of the content and form of the Christian answers. "In respect to *content* the Christian answers are dependent on the revelatory events in which they appear; in respect to *form* they are dependent on the structure of the questions which they answer."[2] In another way this "interdependence" can be expressed in terms of the theologian's being mutually conditioned by the questions and the answers. He formulates the questions implied in human existence, and then, under the guidance of the questions, he formulates the answers implied in revelation. Even though the analysis of human existence is a philosophical task, the theologian cannot avoid looking at human existence "in such a way that the Christian symbols appear meaningful and understandable to him."[3] But then, again, if he sees something extraordinary in his analysis, "he holds fast to what he has seen and reformulates the theological answer."[4]

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[1] *Ibid.*, Vol. I, p. 136.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 64.

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 63.

[4] *Ibid.*, p. 64. In the attempt to clarify the interdependence of the question and answer of his method of correlation Tillich reveals his concern to use kerygmatic theology as a beginning-point while simultaneously using apologetic theology for purposes of relevance.

Thus, it would appear that in emphasizing the interdependent character of the correlation of question and answer Tillich has established the circularity of his method. He can say, symbolically, that "God answers man's questions, and under the impact of God's answers man asks them."[1] The presupposition for such an affirmation is that of the _analogia entis_ between God and man. The inseparableness of the question and answer "belongs to man's essential being, to the unity of his finitude with the infinity in which he was created and from which he is separated."[2] Indeed, the final revelation (which gives the theological answer to man) is the New Being in Jesus as the Christ, and this "New Being" is not ultimately different from the essential being in which every man participates.[3]

In the final analysis, therefore, the existential questions and the revelatory answers are derived alike from the _logos_ of being itself. And, ostensibly, the whole structure of the method of correlation is predicated upon the _analogia entis_ between God and man. This assumption, it would seem, prompts Tillich to say that "nothing he sees in his analysis of the human situation can change the substance of his answer, because the substance is the _logos_ of being, manifested in Jesus as the Christ."[4]

(4) _Inadequate Methods_.--There are three theological methods which are inadequate for relating the Christian message to human

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[1] _Ibid_., p. 61.

[2] _Ibid_.

[3] _Ibid_.

[4] _Ibid_., p. 64.

existence: supranaturalistic, naturalistic, and dualistic. These three must be replaced by the method of correlation.

The supranaturalistic method "takes the Christian message to be a sum of revealed truths which have fallen into the human situation like strange bodies from a strange world."[1] The weakness of this method, according to Tillich, is that it puts man in the impossible situation of receiving answers to questions he never has asked. In more Tillichian terms, this supranaturalistic method is heteronomous in that it fails to place any emphasis on an analysis of human situation. Instead it requires man to become something else than man in order to receive revelation.

Tillich identifies Karl Barth as the leading exponent of this supranaturalistic method.[2] Indeed, Tillich says that Barth's emphasis on the absoluteness of the kerygma and sovereignty of God leads him to throw the Christian message at man in his situation as if it were a stone.[3] His most serious error, therefore, is his failure to allow for man's "capacity for receiving answers from the divine and for asking questions of the divine."[4] Tillich believes that his own apologetic theology, employing the method of correlation, avoids the pitfalls of the supranaturalistic method without falling back into idealistic

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1. Ibid.

2. Paul Tillich, "Natural and Revealed Religion," p. 164.

3. Systematic Theology, Vol. I, p. 7.

4. Paul Tillich, "What is Wrong with the 'Dialectic' Theology?" The Journal of Religion, Vol. XV (April, 1935), p. 138.

liberalism. It does so by stating the basic truth of the Christian message and by interpreting the truth in the existing cultural situation.

The naturalistic or humanistic method is also inadequate because it develops its answer out of human existence, whereas human existence itself is the question.[1] Much of the liberal theology in the past two centuries, declares Tillich, explained the contents of the Christian faith as "creations of man's religious self-realization in the progressive process of religious history."[2] As such, it held only to the horizontal dimension of life. It failed to realize that the answer of revelation to the problems of existence involves a vertical dimension. It must be spoken by God to man, not by man to himself.

The dualistic method is likewise rejected by Tillich, but it fares better than the other two under his critical fire. Basically, the dualistic method builds a supranatural structure on a natural substructure. It realizes that in spite of the infinite gap between man's spirit and God's spirit, there must be a positive relation between them. It then proceeds to express this relation by so-called arguments for God's existence and positing a "natural theology." Like the naturalistic method, the dualistic method errs in deriving its answer from existence and failing to see that the answer must come from beyond existence. Tillich states that there can be revelation through nature but not natural revelation. If natural revelation is natural knowledge, then it is not revelation. Natural theology can supply only the question of revelation or the question of the ground of being on the basis of its analysis of existence. The answer to such a question comes in real revelation. Thus, Tillich believes his method of correlation solves this historic and systematic riddle by resolving natural theology into the analysis of existence and by resolving supranatural theology into the answers given to the questions implied in existence.[1]

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[1] Systematic Theology, Vol. I, p. 65.

[2] Ibid.

(5) Method and System.--In light of the interdependence of the question and answer sides of the method of correlation it is understandable that Tillich should insist that "method and system determine each other."[2] Indeed, "the question of a method cannot be answered before the method is applied successfully or unsuccessfully. Method and content cannot be separated."[3] This means that for Tillich a prior knowledge of the object to which a method is applied is essential. It also implies that a prior knowledge of the system to be built by the method is imperative. And, reciprocally, the structure of the system follows from the method. Thus, his method of correlation requires that every part of his systematic theology contain two sections: one section must develop the question through an analysis of human existence and existence generally, and another section must state the theological answer to the question on the basis of the sources, the medium, and the norm of systematic theology.

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[1] Ibid., pp. 65-66.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Love, Power, and Justice, p. 24.

CHAPTER III

SCHLEIERMACHER'S CHRISTOLOGY

For this exposition of Schleiermacher's Christology the presentation of the person and work of Christ in The Christian Faith will be normative, as it is his definitive statement on Christology. However, relevant material from his other works will be cited whenever it is deemed valuable for purposes of clarity, sympathetic interpretation, and analysis.

1. The Relationship Between Sin and Grace

Christian doctrine, for Schleiermacher, is comprised solely of the facts of the Christian religious self-consciousness which are presupposed and determined by the antithesis of sin and grace expressed in the concept of redemption. The antithetical relationship between sin and grace consists in man's being "aware of the inability to inform all moments of life with the feeling of absolute dependence and the corresponding ability communicated to us by the Redeemer."[1] Therefore, Schleiermacher's Christology begins with the consciousness of sin, with a correlative experiencing of the need of redemption, and the experience of grace.

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[1] The Christian Faith, p. 123. Underlining my own.

i. Universal Consciousness of Sin

(1) Sin as a State of Man.--The universal consciousness of sin must first be understood as a state of derangement of human nature.[1] This derangement refers to the man's disordered state of being in which his sensible self-consciousness has a priority over his highest self-consciousness; that is, the feeling of absolute dependence is erroneously connected with an intra-worldly object.[2]

This disordered state of being or sin may also be expressed as a conflict within man between the flesh and the spirit, and this conflict constitutes an arrested development of God-consciousness.[3] The flesh has the lead over the spirit or the development of God-consciousness in human development, alleges Schleiermacher, and the spirit never succeeds in overcoming it. Indeed, it is only as God-consciousness emerges that we become aware of sin, for only as the spirit enters does it encounter resistance which is experienced as painful.[4]

Thus, the consciousness of sin is a consciousness of a divisiveness within ourselves which can be overcome only through redemption.[5] In a sermon on the text, "For God is not a God of confusion but of peace" (I Cor. 14:33), Schleiermacher proclaims that the creating power of God is born into human life through strife, and that "our first and last battle that never ceases . . . is against ourselves."[1] This is reiterated in *The Christian Faith* by his contention that sin is the state of man's inability to take command of himself, and that in every moment of religious experience man is aware that the God-consciousness does not permeate his whole being uniformly.[2]

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[1] Ibid., p. 275.

[2] Ibid., pp. 18-26, 34-36. In treating the concept of individuality Schleiermacher refers to the conflict between the inner self and the self tied to the externals of time and necessity. Cf. Soliloquies, p. 11.

[3] Ibid., p. 273.

[4] Ibid., p. 274.

[5] Friedrich Schleiermacher, Christmas Eve, trans. by W. Hastie (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1890), p. 118.

(2) *Corporate Sinfulness and Actual Sin.*--In Schleiermacher's treatment of the universal consciousness of sin the concept of the "corporate sinfulness of man" replaces the traditional Augustinian doctrine of original sin. This is due in part to the objectionable Manichaean connotations of total depravity. That is, it implies that man is absolutely incapable of receiving redemption or recognizing the need of redemption.[3] Furthermore, universal sinfulness cannot be explained by the sin of Adam and Eve, because we have no consciousness

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[1] *Friedrich Schleiermachers sämmtliche Werke: Grundlinien einer bisherigen Sittenlehre*, herausgegeben von L. George (Leipzig: Verlag von Felix Meiner, 1846), Abt. III, Bd. I, p. 249.

[2] *The Christian Faith*, p. 275. The biblical text of this assertion appears to be Romans 7:23: "In my members I discern a law at war with the law of my mind." It is significant to note that this dogmatic explication of sin is implied in or presupposed by Schleiermacher's epistemological construction in the *Dialektik*. Schleiermacher states that thinking is driven by the *will to know*, by a will to grasp being *an sich*. It aspires toward a final unity of the ideal and real. But the thinking self forever remains in a situation of striving to know, which is expressed by the self's conflict with others concerning the object of thought. Cf. *Dialektik*, p. 53f.

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 98.

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of an absolutely historical beginning nor can we have a historical doctrine of Adam.[1]

It is sufficient therefore to understand sinfulness in terms of the totality of things, of man in a nexus of dependencies and relationships with God, world, men, and self. Such an understanding allows that one individual may represent the whole race, "for the sinfulness of each points to the sinfulness of all alike in space and time and serves to condition the totality both around him and after him."[2] It also makes possible a reinterpretation of the doctrine of original sin. It means that Adam and all men are the same, because an incapacity for good is a universal state of man and was present in human nature before the first sin.[3] Rather than speak of original sin and guilt, then, Schleiermacher prefers to speak of corporate sin and corporate guilt to explain that which is in "each the work of all, and in all the work of each."[4]

Actual sins are inevitable manifestations of the corporate sinful state of all men. They represent a momentary victory of the flesh over the spirit and an absence of the determining and ordering power of God-consciousness in the self-consciousness of an individual. They are therefore constant reminders that no one moment in the religious consciousness purely expresses the power of God-consciousness. In fact, actual sins prompt recognition of corporate sin and guilt which is tantamount to a "recognition of the universal need of redemption."[1] For this reason Schleiermacher avers that it is not by Adam but by Christ that we discern the universality and actuality of sin.

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[1] Ibid., pp. 285, 301.

[2] Ibid., p. 288.

[3] Ibid., p. 301.

[4] Ibid., p. 288.

ii. Universal Need of Redemption

Because Schleiermacher conceives of his magnum opus as a dogmatic theological work which pertains solely to the Christian church, subserving the interests of preaching, clarifying and systematizing prevalent doctrine in the church, he feels no compulsion to "prove the necessity of redemption or that Christ is the only Redeemer."[2] Nevertheless, a profound recognition of a universal need for redemption is implied in his thought on the relationship between sin and grace. In order to discern this it is necessary to note the implications of his reinterpretation of the original perfection of the world and man and of his insistence that sin is divinely ordained in relation to grace.

(1) Original Perfection of World and Man.--A historically real perfection of the world prior to the present world, as implied in the Genesis account of creation must be discounted, because it would undermine the unity of the world and continuous creation. The original perfection of the world means simply that divine omnipotence reveals itself everywhere in the world as omniscient and omnipresent, and that the totality of finite existence (the world) works together to help the God-consciousness realize itself.[3] Indirectly this implies the

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[1] Ibid., p. 285.

[2] Ibid., p. 69.

[2] Ibid., p. 233.

existence of a universal need of redemption both before and after Adam.

The original perfection of man means nothing more than that human nature includes or possesses all those conditions necessary for the continuous existence in God-consciousness.[1] That is to say, there is an inner impulse in the human soul to attain those states of self-consciousness in which the God-consciousness can realize itself.[2] Nevertheless, while this is possible for every man, only Christ has actualized this possibility.

> If we are to see everything that can develop out of such original perfection all together in a single human instance, it is not to be sought in Adam, in whom it must have been lost, but in Christ, in whom it has brought gain to all.[3]

Here again, then, is a clear recognition of the universal need of redemption in Schleiermacher's thought.

(2) Divine Ordination of Sin and Grace.--Sin is ordained of God in relation to grace, that is, sin is that which necessitates redemption and that which redemption overcomes.[4] Just as the highest self-consciousness co-exists with the sensible self-consciousness in the religious self-consciousness, so there can be no consciousness of sin without consciousness of grace, and *vice versa*.[5] Sin refers to alienation from God which we experience as action originating in ourselves.

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[1] *Ibid.*, pp. 246-247.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 22.

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 248. It is significant to note that "original righteousness" as traditionally attributed to Adam has no meaning for Schleiermacher, except that "sin must have been preceded by free activity which was not sinful." *Ibid.*, p. 255.

[4] *Ibid.*, p. 220.

[5] *Ibid.*, p. 326.

It is not simply a defect in man's human development. The defect becomes sin only as it impairs God-consciousness, is experienced as painful, and is seen to demand redemption.[1] Grace refers to our being conscious of fellowship with God as due to communication with the Redeemer.[2] Sin and grace are therefore facts of the Christian self-consciousness which cannot be separated "without disadvantage to their content."[3] They cannot be separated because they are ordained of God to stand in relationship with each other.

The declaration that God is the author of sin in relation to grace subserves Schleiermacher's concern to mediate between two extreme views on man and sin. On the one hand, it avoids a Manichaean view of sin as independent of divine causality, which renders man incapable of receiving redemption or knowing his need of redemption.[4] On the other hand, it dispels the Pelagian view of sin which tends to vitiate man's real need for a Redeemer or redemption.[5] Hence, this idea of the divine ordination of sin in relation to grace makes credible a universal need for redemption. It also contains the implication that the Redeemer came at precisely the kairotic moment to meet this universal need: "The very fact that the Redeemer appeared when the fullness of time was come makes it quite clear that from the beginning everything had been set in relation to His appearing."[1]

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[1] Ibid., pp. 262, 336.

[2] Ibid., p. 262. A relative human freedom is granted here, for Schleiermacher declares that to say that God permits sin or that sin is due to human freedom is the same as saying that God ordains sin and that sin is grounded in divine volition. Cf. Ibid., p. 338.

[3] Ibid., pp. 264-266.

[4] Ibid., pp. 98, 270, 330.

[5] Ibid.

iii. Experience or Consciousness of Grace

The experience of grace or the approximation of blessedness is an increasing God-consciousness which diminishes the power and pain of sin, and it is possible only by divine help. Also, since sin is a corporate act involving corporate guilt, the experience of grace in the Christian life must have its ground in the church, the divinely-effected corporate life that works against the corporate life of sin and misery.[2] Only through the influence of Jesus did the Church come into existence, and only through the communication of His sinless perfection or unhindered God-consciousness is redemption effected in and through it.[3] This means that one cannot enjoy the experience of redemptive grace or fellowship with God without being in relation to Christ, and one cannot be in relation to Christ apart from the corporate life which He instituted.

Thus it is clear that the consciousness or experience of grace cannot be separated from an explication of the consciousness of sin. The very impotence of God-consciousness, which is sin, is ordained of God to produce a longing for and receptivity of the redemption communicated by Jesus. And for Schleiermacher the new life or experience of grace released by Christ consists in an increased God-consciousness and a harmonized self-consciousness, a restored and perfected instance of human life as such.

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[1] Ibid., p. 328.

[2] Ibid., p. 358.

[3] Ibid., p. 361.

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2. The Person of Christ

The preceding account of the relationship between sin and grace reveals Schleiermacher's conviction that the central figure of the Christian faith can be approached only through the experience of his benefits or of his life as it is mediated in the historical continuity of the divinely-effected corporate life, the Church. In other words, an edifying discourse about Christ can be genuinely effected by and understood only by one who has experienced the new life released by Christ in and through the Church. This means that Schleiermacher's concern in Christology, as in his entire dogmatic system, is to describe how the Christian faith originated and how it is experienced in the present.

The method of approach to Christology in _The Christian Faith_ appears to be prefigured in an earlier work, _Christmas Eve_ (_Die Weihnachtsfeier_). In this work the inquiry into the historical figure of the Redeemer takes its departure from an analysis of the joy and peace experienced by the circle of family members and friends celebrating Christmas Eve. In the dialogue Ernestine expresses the feeling that "something inward must lie at its basis, otherwise it could be neither effective nor endure. This inner something, however, can be nothing else than the ground of all joy itself."[1] Ultimately she concludes that the appearance of the Redeemer is the common internal source of all the joy in the Christian world.[2] This one illustration indicates

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[1] _Christmas Eve_, p. 64.

[2] _Ibid._

Schleiermacher's concern to project his explication of Christology from present religious experience to the existence of the historical Founder of Christianity.

Because of Schleiermacher's departure from Christian religious experience his theological discussion of the person of Christ rather naturally begins with the relatedness or likeness of Christ to humanity. However, because the Christian religious self-consciousness is vitiated by sin, it obviously would be incapable of producing the impression of a sinless redeemer. Therefore, the absolute God-consciousness in Jesus cannot be understood as a product of the corporate life of sinfulness, and an explication of His distinctness from men must also be given.

i. Christ's Likeness to All Other Men

(1) Sharing of Human Nature.--Schleiermacher's conception of revelation requires that the founder of the Christian religion cannot be conceived to be absolutely supernatural. If the person of Christ were so conceived, He would so radically contradict human nature that He could neither be received nor understood by mankind.[1] This, of course, would preclude His being the Redeemer and would virtually undermine the Christian faith. Schleiermacher came to this startling

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[1] It is significant that although Schleiermacher's earlier work, Die Monologen, was not written to explicate the Christian faith, it contains a foreshadowing of his opposition to an absolutely supernatural conception of Christ: "A completely perfect being is a god; it could not endure the burden of life and has no place in the world of mankind." Soliloquies, p. 87.

conclusion as a young man, for in a letter to his pious father he questioned "the naïvely supernatural Christology of the Moravians."[1] And in his _magnum opus_ he proposes that "we should abandon the idea of the absolutely supernatural, because no single instance of it can be known by us, and we are nowhere required to recognize it."[2]

The Docetic stress upon the unlimited difference between Christ and other men makes it impossible for Him to redeem men.[3] Indeed, Christ as the Second Adam could not be the originator of the more perfect life, unless He were "like all of Adam's descendants."[4] This does not mean that mankind produced the Redeemer or that Jesus was "wholly natural" so that He can be explained by the context in which He appeared. It does affirm, however, that there must be in human nature the possibility of receiving the divine according to the wisdom and decree of God.[5] After all, whatever affects the human consciousness, regardless of its origin, is in one sense _natural_. Thus, regardless of the difference between Christ and other men, "we are not prevented from regarding the Incarnation of the Son of God as a natural fact."[6] For this reason Schleiermacher holds the Virgin Birth to be symbolical only, and he believes that it should not be stressed today, because "it creates the problem of justifying the real humanity of the Redeemer."[7]

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[1] _Letters_, Vol. I, p. 46. Pages 46-67 contain a series of letters on Christology written by Schleiermacher as a young man to his father.

[2] _The Christian Faith_, p. 183. [3] _Ibid_., p. 367. [4] _Ibid_., p. 367.

[5] _Ibid_., p. 63. [6] _Ibid_., p. 62. [7] _Christmas Eve_., p. 58.

These statements on the way Christ shares our humanity afford us an insight into Schleiermacher's refusal to make a clear distinction between nature and supernature in theological discourse. To his long-time friend Jacobi, Schleiermacher writes: "Everything is natural in one sense, and supernatural, in another. Even that the Son of God became man must be natural in a higher sense."[1] In other words, the 'natural' is profoundly qualified by the Christ-relation for the Christian self-consciousness.[2] Such a qualification of the 'natural' is consistent with Schleiermacher's fundamental conviction revealed so clearly in Christmas Eve--that participation in Christ is a precondition of a genuine understanding of Christ. It also augments his argument against the charge of apriorism in the explication of his Christology.

(2) Participation in Corporate Sinfulness.--Only because Christ as the Second Adam shared our human nature and was like all the descendants of Adam was it possible for Him to establish a corporate life in which the activity of the God-consciousness could be increased among men. Therefore, the Redeemer "certainly must have entered into the corporate life of sinfulness; He cannot have come out of it, but must be recognized *in* it as a miraculous fact (*eine wunderbare Erscheinung*)."[3]

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[1] *Letters*, Vol. II, p. 250.

[2] *The Christian Faith*, pp. 72, 179. An illustration of such a qualification of the 'natural' is Schleiermacher's interpreting many of the miracles of the New Testament, especially the healing miracles, as 'natural' in the light of Christ as the head of natural order. Cf. *Werke*, Bd. IV, pp. 151ff.

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 381.

(3) *The Historical Become Ideal*.--This expression contains within it Schleiermacher's conviction that the "possibility" of being determined completely by God-consciousness lies within human nature. Simultaneously it enunciates his belief that only in the historical individual, Jesus of Nazareth, has this possibility been actualized:

> God put human nature under the law of earthly existence in the sense that just as the sensuous self-consciousness developed first in each individual, while the God-consciousness came later, and up to a point gradually took possession of the sensuous self-consciousness and subjugated it, so too the God-consciousness in the race to begin with was inadequate and impotent, and only later broke forth in perfection in Christ, from whom it continually extends its authority, and proves its power to bring peace and blessedness to men.[1]

Repeatedly in Schleiermacher's thought one encounters *die menschlichen Entwicklung des Gottesbewusstseins Christi* affirmed.[2] Indeed, to maintain that the ideal nature or God-consciousness of Jesus was carried within Him from birth would be to make Him a master at language, conscious of self as an Ego from birth, and make his childhood only appear to be a childhood in a Docetic sense.[3] In a real sense, therefore, Schleiermacher recognizes Christ as the crown of creation and the

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1. *Ibid*., p. 368.

2. *Friedrich Schleiermachers sämmtliche Werke*: *Das Leben Jesu*, herausgegeben von K. A. Rütenik (Berlin: Druck und Verlag von Georg Reimer, 1864), Abt. I, Bd. 6, p. 85. Hereafter cited as *Das Leben Jesu*. Also, since this volume is a compilation of Schleiermacher's own lecture notes and student notes on lectures given at the University of Berlin in 1832, whenever Schleiermacher's own notes are cited the symbol (S) will be appended.

3. *The Christian Faith*, p. 381. The significance of Luke's account of Jesus in the Temple at age twelve is to point out the natural development of his God-consciousness. Cf. *Das Leben Jesu*, p. 83.

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completion of the creation of men and not simply the creative act of God.[1] To say that the historical became ideal, then, is to recognize that the will and person of Jesus, His Vorbildlichkeit or exemplary status, enables Him to be the medium for the communication of redemption. In other words, Jesus' Vorbildlichkeit appears to have much to do with God's choosing Him to be the Redeemer rather than some other person.[2]

The foregoing makes it clear that an abstract Christ has no place in Schleiermacher's theology. He who became ideal was truly historical. Although there is no explicit treatment of the life of Jesus in The Christian Faith, Schleiermacher's connection of all revelation with the total being and impression of the Redeemer who communicated redemption through self-proclamation indicates his concern for the concrete character and personality of Jesus. Material evidence of this concern with the identity of Christ is found in Das Leben Jesu.[3]

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[1] Ibid., p. 389.

[2] Jesus' Vorbildlichkeit signifies His solidarity with the human race which is necessary for the communication of redemption. That which is communicated through His Vorbildlichkeit is His Urbildlichkeit, His ideality or redeeming God-consciousness. These two aspects are inseparable, according to Schleiermacher (The Christian Faith, pp. 378f). By virtue of the Urbildlichkeit Jesus is the redeemer; by virtue of the Vorbildlichkeit he communicates redemption (Cf. Richard R. Niebuhr, Schleiermacher on Christ and Religion, pp. 218-226). Thus, Schleiermacher can say that "if the man Jesus was really ideal, or if the ideal became historical and actual in Him--the one expression means the same as the other. . . ." The Christian Faith, p. 380.

[3] It has already been stated that this volume is composed of Schleiermacher's simple and brief lecture notes and students' notes. Nevertheless, the material of Das Leben Jesu is thoroughly supportive and consistent with the Christological principles given in The Christian Faith.

Undoubtedly Schleiermacher's understanding of the reciprocal relation between exegetical theology and dogmatic theology is largely responsible for the readily apparent inseparability of historical inquiry into the life of Jesus and Christology in his thought. To avoid the intrusion of speculative imagination the identity of Christ is firmly grounded in the New Testament which presents Jesus as a man standing "under the potency of the times and of his people's character."[1] However, that the Gospels are interpreted accounts of Jesus and that the findings of the interpreter can only approximate a perfect understanding of the authors' meaning is fully acknowledged.[2] The disparate and conflicting views of the New Testament prohibit a Chronik of Jesus, a chronological account of the external moments in His life.[3] Indeed, Schleiermacher asserts that "no one can lay hold of the continuity of his life in its temporal evolution."[4]

He also states, however, that "it is not sufficient simply to establish the possible existence of Jesus."[5] "It is therefore undeniable that we cannot be satisfied with a disconnected or incoherent presentation of the life of Jesus."[6] The kind of unified presentation that

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[1] Das Leben Jesu, p. 12. Translations my own.

[2] Friedrich Schleiermachers sämmtliche Werke: Hermeneutik, herausgegeben von F. Lücke (Berlin: Verlag von G. Reimer, 1864), Abt. I, Bd. 7, pp. 88, 108. Hereafter cited as Hermeneutik.

[3] Das Leben Jesu, p. 36. [4] Ibid., p. 9. [5] Ibid., p. 41.

[6] Ibid., pp. 1 (S), 36. "Je mehr wir aber das Einzelne von diesem Gesichtspunkt aus beschreiben, müssen wir sagen, die Aufgabe ist da, die Einheit zu finden, wodurch sich eben dieses Einzelne in allen seinen verschiedenen Erscheinungen von jedem andern Einzelnen unterscheidet." Ibid., p. 3.

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Schleiermacher seeks within the New Testament, therefore, is not a Chronik but a Geschichte of Jesus, a history that grasps Jesus' life-unity or sense of identity.[1]

Schleiermacher's contention that such a life of Jesus could be and should be written grows out of his hermeneutical and dogmatic presupposition that Jesus proclaimed Himself and that the Gospel accounts are the results of the response of the writers to Jesus' self-communication.[2] In fact, the New Testament writings are conceived to be documents of proclamation by and of Christ. Moreover, his theological method requires him to consider the proclamation of Jesus to be the outer side of his pious, feeling, thinking self, just as is all Christian preaching. Quite naturally, then, Schleiermacher contends not only that Jesus proclaimed Himself but that a fundamental continuity obtains between Jesus' self-consciousness and the New Testament accounts of Him. Support for this position can be found in his lectures on psychology in which he avows that an inner unity of self-hood is achieved through recollections and descriptions of oneself given by other persons.[3] Therefore, only by considering the historical personality of Jesus in relation to his historical context is it possible to gain access to his inner life-unity and self-consciousness.[4]

Thus, by insisting upon the continuity between Jesus' self-proclamation and the New Testament accounts of His self-consciousness

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[1] Richard R. Niebuhr, Schleiermacher on Christ and Religion, p. 221.

[2] Ibid., pp. 15(S), 20f, 79(S), 84f.

[3] Psychologie, pp. 14f.

[4] Das Leben Jesu, p. 13.

Schleiermacher believes he has avoided apriorism. The idea that the original narrators imported their own views into the utterances of Christ throughout the New Testament is denied, because this would make it impossible to pursue a life of Jesus historically. If His disciples held wrong views of Him, surely Christ would have corrected them.[1] By these words Schleiermacher discloses his concern to combat the idea that Jesus was the Redeemer only by virtue of the faith or imagination of the earliest Church. Yet by focusing upon the self-consciousness and the self-communication of Jesus he is enabled to maintain that our knowledge of Christ presupposes, above all, that His influence has begun to exercise itself upon us.[2]

Although Schleiermacher's treatment of Jesus' self-consciousness in Das Leben Jesu will be largely included under the subsequent exposition of Christ's uniqueness, it is in order to point out that his concern with Jesus' life-unity and sense of identity undoubtedly led him to maintain that the writer of the Fourth Gospel was most probably an eyewitness of Jesus' ministry.[3] John, of course, dwells upon the unity of the Son and the Father and stresses that Jesus' work was to communicate His self-consciousness.[4] Jesus' message and work centered around his teachings about Himself and the Kingdom of God which was at hand, believes Schleiermacher, and His proclamation of the Kingdom demanded an assent to it, which, in reality, was an assent to Himself as the founder and center of the Kingdom.[1] Everything else is secondary to this principal point: "the teaching of Christ about his own person and vocation."[2]

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[1] Ibid., pp. 79(S), 84f.

[2] Ibid., p. 17.

[3] Friedrich Schleiermachers sämmtliche Werke: Einleitung ins neue Testament, herausgegeben von G. Wolde (Berlin: Verlag von G. Reimer, 1838), Abt. I, Bd. 8, p. 219. Hereafter cited as Einleitung. Also see Das Leben Jesu, pp. 169, 179(S), 180(S), 255.

[4] Das Leben Jesu, pp. 225, 245, 273f, 293.

Jesus' referring to Himself as the "Son of Man" is interpreted in a non-Danielic, non-eschatological sense: "The expression υἱὸς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου signifies His connection with all men."[3] Indeed, the works and powers of Jesus, including the miracles, are regarded as fully compatible with human nature when perfected by the influence of God.[4] Thus in Das Leben Jesu we are confronted with the idea of the historical which became ideal, and Schleiermacher's endeavor to keep his Christology in correlation with his critical reading of the New Testament is ascertained.

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1. Ibid., pp. 259(S), 262.

2. Ibid. The clear affinity of Hermann Diem's position concerning Jesus' self-proclamation and the Kingdom of God with that of Schleiermacher is quite pronounced. Cf. Hermann Diem, Dogmatics, trans. by Harold Knight (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1959), pp. 146-147.

3. Ibid., pp. 287-288.

4. Ibid., pp. 214f. In Das Leben Jesu, as in Hermeneutik, Schleiermacher interprets the miracle-working of Christ to be 'natural' in the light of Christ as the head of the natural order. Cf. Das Leben Jesu, pp. 206-238f. The comment of H. L. Friess is relevant and insightful on this very point: "Schleiermacher was a supernaturalist, if it be supernaturalism to believe in the resurrection and healings of Jesus. But Schleiermacher was not a supernaturalist if it means that the world of God is not the natural world. Schleiermacher believed there is but one order of things, the order of God." See Soliloquies, Appendix, p. 160.

ii. Christ's Distinction From All Other Men

To presume to explain Christ by that which precedes Him or as the end product of the evolution of mankind threatens to make Jesus' likeness to all men so unlimited, as does the Ebionitic or Nazarean heresy, that ultimately a need for redemption must be posited in Jesus.[1] If such a need were to exist in Jesus, He could not be the Redeemer and the peculiarity and/or *raison d'etre* of the Christian religion would thereby be obviated. Schleiermacher is therefore very much concerned to clarify the distinction of Christ from all men.

(1) *Absolutely Potent God-consciousness*.--The Christian religion is *the* religion of redemption precisely because its Founder is "Redeemer alone and for all and is in no wise regarded as having been at any time in need of redemption Himself."[2] Because the Redeemer is in no need of redemption at any time Himself, He cannot be conceived in a purely finite sense. He must belong to the finite and the infinite. Indeed, He "must participate in the Divine Essence in the same sense in which He participates in human nature."[3] The participation or the unity of Christ with God can be best expressed by speaking of Jesus' self-consciousness as being absolutely determined by His God-consciousness.[4] Indeed, Jesus proclaimed his oneness with God in communicating His God-consciousness.[5]

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[1] *The Christian Faith*, p. 99.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 58. Schleiermacher goes so far as to say that conscience is present only along with the need of redemption, and that Christ Himself had no conscience. *Ibid.*, p. 343.

[3] *On Religion*, p. 247.

[4] *Das Leben Jesu*, pp. 79(S).

[5] *Ibid.*, pp. 84-85.

3-19

Even the expression "Son of God" means simply that Jesus was completely determined by His God-consciousness.[1] Moreover, "to ascribe to Christ an absolutely potent God-consciousness, and to attribute to Him an existence of God in Him are the same things."[2] misquote

Thus, this absolutely potent God-consciousness or absolute perfection of Christ distinguishes Him from all other men from the beginning, for He was endowed with it from birth.[3] This absolutely potent God-consciousness of Jesus cannot therefore be a product of the corporate life of human sinfulness; rather it came into existence from outside the sinful corporate life.[4] That is to say, the appearance of the Redeemer may be conditioned by natural development, it is not simply a higher stage of natural development. The very ascription of absolute perfection to Christ is to declare that nothing goes beyond Him and that much is required to overcome the sin of man.[5] Thus it would seem that this absolutely potent God-consciousness in Christ can be grasped only by one with a messianic faith in Jesus.[6]

Apparently sensing the problematical implications of the foregoing statements, Schleiermacher explains that if one maintained that faith made Jesus the Redeemer,

> . . . the arbitrary decision of the believer would have become more marked on every transference of it, since it would not have been supported by the original impression made by His person; and consequently the certainty would have become less.

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[1] Ibid., p. 287(S).

[2] The Christian Faith, p. 387.

[3] Ibid., p. 58.

[4] Ibid., p. 365.

[5] Ibid., p. 361.

[6] Das Leben Jesu, p. 79(S).

> Gradually the thought would more and more have gained ground that another might come, to whom that conception might be transferred with better right. So that in this way there could only arise a decreasing faith in Jesus, and thus an increasing un-belief.[1]

More succinctly, Schleiermacher is concerned to point out that Jesus is Redeemer by the decree of God and not by the decision of believers. He goes on to enlist New Testament support for this contention. The New Testament picture of Christ is admittedly an expression of the faith of the Christian community, but the New Testament witness also declares that it was Christ who chose the disciples and that "the very recognition of (Christ's) perfection was Christ's own work."[2] One can hardly avoid concluding that the distinctive beginning of Christianity roots in the self-proclamation of Christ which witnessed to his unvarying God-consciousness. And because this absolutely potent God-consciousness is found only in Christ,

> He alone mediates all existence of God in the world and all revelation of God through the world in so far as He bears within Himself the whole new creation which contains and develops the potency of the God-consciousness.[3]

(2) Essential Sinlessness.--"The sinlessness of Jesus is due solely to the absolutely potent God-consciousness in dwelling in His Person, which was, in essence, the living being of God in Him."[4] The real implication of such words is that Christ was able not to sin because

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[1] The Christian Faith, p. 363.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Ibid., p. 388.

[4] Das Leben Jesu, pp. 100-101. Translation my own. Also see The Christian Faith, pp. 383, 414.

His every impulse was determined by his God-consciousness.[1] Indeed, the absoluteness of this determination excluded absolutely any conflict in the inner life of Jesus.[2] Even the temptations of Jesus involved not so much as "an infinitely small amount of struggle,"[3] as He was constantly able to stop inward sin from becoming actual. And the absolute perfection of Christ guarantees that He could not have originated or accepted error.[4]

Under this heading, Schleiermacher proceeds to explain that the sinlessness of Jesus is not contradictory of human nature, "weil wir die Sünde nie zum Wesen des Menschen rechnen."[5] Again, "sin is so little an essential part of the being of man that we can never regard it as anything else than a disturbance of nature."[6] In Jesus, contends Schleiermacher, the sensuous human nature was identical with God-consciousness from the beginning,[7] because he must have been free from the corporate sin of his and earlier generations which disturbed the inner God-consciousness. For this reason Jesus "can only be understood as an original act of human nature not affected by sin . . . and because it was such an original and sin free act of nature, a filling of His nature with God-consciousness became possible as a result."[8]

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[1] The Christian Faith, p. 414.

[2] Das Leben Jesu, p. 17.

[3] The Christian Faith, p. 414.

[4] Ibid., p. 415.

[5] Das Leben Jesu, p. 100.

[6] Ibid., p. 385.

[7] The Christian Faith, p. 383.

[8] Ibid., p. 389.

3-22

(3) The Ideal Become Historical.--Schleiermacher's definitive statement of the distinctiveness of Christ, which thoroughly contradicts the interpretation that his Christology presents Jesus as the highest product of the evolution of nature, is contained in his affirmation that "the ideal became historical in Him and each historical moment of His experience must at the same time have borne within it the ideal."[1] That this should be the capstone of his presentation of the person of Christ is comprehensible in the light of his special regard for the Fourth Gospel.[2] Not only did he defend the priority in time of John over the Synoptics, as noted previously, but he wrote to his friend, Lücke, that the sole purpose of his dogmatic work was to explicate in detail John 1:14: "And the Word became flesh and dwelt among us, full of grace and truth; we have beheld his glory, glory as of the only Son from the Father."[3] And in his earliest writing on Christology, Die Weihnachtsfeier, he stated that the spiritual view of Christ, as found in the Fourth Gospel, is the higher view.

> It is the higher view because it regards the object of this festival, not as a mere child fashioned and appearing so and so, and born from this woman and that, or here and there, but as the Word made flesh, the Word which was God, and was with God. . . . The flesh, however, as we know it, is nothing

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[1] Ibid., p. 377.

[2] Das Leben Jesu, p. 293. Also see Schleiermacher's sermon on John 1:1-5 in Friedrich Schleiermachers sämmtliche Werke: Homilien über das Evangelium des Johannes, herausgegeben von K. L. A. Sydow (Berlin: Verlag von G. Reimer, 1836), Abt. II, Bd. 8, pp. 5f.

[3] Cf. Sendschreiben, p. 34. Translation of John 1:14 is that of the Revised Standard Version.

3.23

> else than our finite, limited, sensible nature. The Word, on the other hand, is the thought or consciousness; and its becoming incarnate is therefore the appearing of this original and divine thing in human form.[1]

The implications of this hermeneutical and dogmatic opinion of Schleiermacher are readily apparent in his treatment of the distinctiveness of Christ in terms of the ideal becoming historical. The ideal, or the Word, is the absolute divine thought or consciousness which was God and was with God. While Schleiermacher has indicated a preference in The Christian Faith and Das Leben Jesu for the term "absolute God-consciousness" which expresses a veritable existence of God in Christ, an ostensible equivalence may be ascertained between the terms "absolute God-consciousness," "ideal," and "Word," in his Christological presentation. The incarnation of the "Word" in the historical individual, Jesus of Nazareth, means that Jesus is not simply a great man or a man with exemplary status (Vorbildlichkeit). Rather it means that Jesus of Nazareth is the archetypal man, that His ideality (Urbildlichkeit) expresses the presence of the power of God in Him, and that this power becomes productive in and through His Lebensmitteilung.[2] "As the Father has life in Himself so he has given to the Son to have life in Himself. . . . This life which Jesus has in Himself is the life that is power to impart life."[3] Jesus' self-consciousness, therefore, involves a clear vocation to found a new community of life and of Spirit; that is, His God-consciousness includes a power to communicate His life or self-consciousness.

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[1] Christmas Eve, pp. 67-69.

[2] The Christian Faith, p. 385.

[3] Das Leben Jesu, p. 293.

[4] Ibid., pp. 130(S), 135f.

3-24

The expression "Son of God" is interpreted by Schleiermacher to mean simply the unity of Christ with God which can be understood only in terms of our unity with Christ.[1] It is precisely this unity of Christ with God from the very beginning that radically distinguishes Him from all other men. The Redeemer alone enjoys a life in which the oppositions between appearance and essence, and between time and eternity do not appear.[2] To this end Schleiermacher writes:

> Whereas He begins as a divine Child, we ourselves begin with discord and division, and we really attain to harmony by redemption, which is really nothing but the removal of these opposites; and for this reason redemption can only proceed from one in whom they did not require to be removed.[3]

Quite plainly, then, Christ is at birth what we are only by regeneration. As the archetypal man or "head of all creation," He is a compendium of humanity, one who is in no "need of a mediation for any sort of intuition of humanity. Rather He is a mediator for many."[4] He is the absolute man (Urbild), the essential Man or Man-in-himself, in contrast to every other man who is in an estranged state, "a state of fallenness and corruption, or of discord and confusion, and [who] finds his redemption only in Man as such, Man-in-himself."[5] Schleiermacher concludes this line of reasoning by saying that "Christ is nothing else but Man-in-himself, the Eternal Being in the process of change and becoming, the unity of the divine and earthly."[6]

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[1] Ibid., p. 287(S).

[2] Christmas Eve, p. 65.

[3] Ibid.

[4] On Religion, p. 79.

[5] Christmas Eve, p. 70.

[6] Ibid., p. 78.

3-26

Schleiermacher's concern to establish the perfect historicity of the ideality of Christ has been noted in his treatment of the genuine humanity of Jesus. Therein is noted his conviction that the person of the Redeemer could only develop in a certain similarity with His surroundings, and that even His God-consciousness was communicated in ideas which He appropriated from this historical context. What is important to note here, however, is that the historicity of the Redeemer is guaranteed, according to Schleiermacher, by divine fiat. He insists that only if one takes seriously the doctrine of election can one truly acknowledge divine initiation in bringing about redemption and an ordering of the Christian self-consciousness through Jesus of Nazareth.[1] While the election decree is not a direct experience of the Christian religion or of the Christian self-consciousness, it stands in closest connection with Christ. Indeed, "Christ is the mirror in which we have contemplated our election."[2] That the self-consciousness of Jesus should be absolutely determined by God-consciousness can only be understood, maintains Schleiermacher, "in so far as everything as a whole was determined in a certain way."[3] In referring to the appearance of the Redeemer in Christmas Eve he avows that "everything before Him was intimation, was related to Him, and was good and divine only on account of Him."[4]

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[1] Das Leben Jesu, p. 295(S)ff.

[2] Friedrich Schleiermachers sämmtliche Werke: "Ueber die Lehre von der Erwählung besonders in Beziehung auf Herrn Dr. Bretschneiders Aphorismen," herausgegeben von F. Lücke (Berlin: Verlag von G. Reimer, 1834), Abt. I, Bd. 2, pp. 422f. Hereafter cited as "Erwählung."

[3] The Christian Faith, p. 328.

[4] Christmas Eve, p. 72.

Thus, it seems clear that Schleiermacher utilizes the doctrine of election to establish the historical necessity of the person of the Redeemer. Also, his insistence that the ideal became historical makes it clear that the absolute power of the Redeemer is not derived from the believer's imagination, but from the historical individual who is the last Adam, Jesus of Nazareth.

iii. Criticism of Ecclesiastical Formulae of Christ

In proposition 95 of The Christian Faith Schleiermacher states that the ecclesiastical formulae concerning the person of Christ need to be subjected to continual criticism. He then proceeds to evaluate three such formulae in terms of his own view.

(1) Rejection of Two-nature Theory.--The two-nature method of expressing the unity of the divine and human in the person of Christ is woefully deficient. The term "nature" refers to that which is corporeal, divided, and conditioned, whereas God is unconditioned, beyond all existence and being.[1] It is therefore a confusing and grossly inadequate term to explain the divine in Christ. Furthermore, "person" refers to a constant unity of life, whereas two natures imply and require two wills.[2] But Christ was one person with one will.

Thus, the Chalcedonian idea of a divine nature and a human nature in the person, Jesus Christ, is replaced by an affirmation of Jesus' absolutely potent God-consciousness, which was the existence of God in Him. Although the identity of Jesus with human nature is recognized,

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[1] The Christian Faith, pp. 392-393.

[2] Ibid., p. 399.

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this clearly differentiates him from other men and establishes that He is all that men need or can lay hold of to be redeemed.[1] The human in Christ "forms only the organism for this fundamental power within Him, from which every activity proceeds, and is related to it as the system which both receives and represents it, just as in us all other powers are related to the intelligence."[2] Schleiermacher therefore is satisfied that his alternative view rests equally upon the Pauline expression, "God was in Christ," and the Johannine expression, "The Word became flesh," because, for him, "Word" is the activity of God expressed in the form of consciousness, and "flesh" is a general expression for the organic.[3]

(2) *Rejection of Alternation Theory*.--The alternation theory holds that in the Person of Christ the divine nature alone was *active* and the human nature alone was *passive*.[4] It is largely inadequate due to its confusing use of "nature" to explain the divine in Christ. However, Schleiermacher proceeds to reinterpret the theory in accordance with his own view. The idea of divine activity and human passivity is acceptable when referring to the origin of the Person of Christ, but only then if it is understood that the formation of the Person was relatively, not absolutely, supernatural. That is, the receptivity on the part of the human nature must be recognized to have been essential for the divine influence to have formed the human nature into the

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[1] *Ibid.*, p. 397.

[2] *Ibid.*

[3] *Ibid.*

[4] *Ibid.*, p. 398.

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personality of Christ.[1] Once the union of the divine and human was effected, however, every activity was the common activity of the being of God in Christ and the human nature of Christ.[2] Such a reinterpretation is absolutely necessary, contends Schleiermacher, to establish the humanity and historicity of Christ and thereby circumvent a Docetic explication of the uniqueness of the Redeemer.

(3) Rejection of Kenotic Theory.--The kenotic theory interprets the person and work of Christ in terms of His humiliation or self-emptying.[3] That this theory would be unacceptable to Schleiermacher is understandable in view of his conception of the relationship between dogmatic theology and biblical theology.[4] While he claims Scriptural support for his own Christology, he disclaims any idea of proving the being of God in Christ by citing isolated passages, such as Philippians 2:6-9.[5] Also, the unity of the person of Christ precludes, for him, the idea of a pre-existence of Christ which is presupposed in the kenotic theory. The idea of "humiliation" can refer only to a divine nature, which, of course, is found wanting. In this instance, it connotes an antithesis in the person or functions of Christ.[6] "Exaltation," which refers to Christ's reward for his humiliation, is likewise

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[1] Ibid., p. 402.

[2] Ibid., p. 398.

[3] Ibid., p. 473.

[4] Cf. Above, chap. II.

[5] Ibid., p. 423. Hermeneutically, says Schleiermacher, this passage is devotional and rhetorical, not didactic in intent. p. 475.

[6] Ibid., pp. 474-475.

unacceptable, for it can refer only to Christ's being the first fruit of the resurrection.[1]

iv. Significance of Resurrection, Ascension, and Return to Judgment

Schleiermacher straightforwardly states that "the facts of the Resurrection and the Ascension of Christ and the prediction of His Return to Judgment are not properly constituent parts of the doctrine of His Person."[2] His reasoning for such a statment is that the resurrection and ascension can only serve to attest the dignity of Christ, whereas the prediction of His return to judgment is only an accidental form of the longing to be united with Christ and cannot be invoked as a part of redemption.[3] Moreover, none of these facts may be adduced as Scriptural proof of the divinity of Christ. Otherwise it would be inexplicable how the disciples recognized in Jesus the Son of God without the faintest premonition of any of these facts.[4]

Nevertheless, from a hermeneutical standpoint Schleiermacher asserts that unless the resurrection and ascension are accepted as literal facts, the disciples will be conceived to be weak-minded and the entire New Testament witness will thereby be imperilled.[5] In conjunction with his treatment of the exegetical problems involved in interpreting the resurrection and ascension Schleiermacher reiterates that the differentiation of Christ from other men is sufficiently

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[1] _Ibid_., p. 475.

[2] _Ibid_., p. 417.

[3] _Ibid_., pp. 417-419.

[4] _Ibid_., p. 417.

[5] _Ibid_., p. 420.

3-30

accounted for in Christ's proclaiming His own sinlessness and by calling Himself the Son of God and the Son of Man.[1] Moreover, he persistently affirms that his own view of Christ is based on the total impression of Christ in the New Testament and not on details or interpretations torn out of context.[2]

3. The Work of Christ

The person and work of Christ are separated in Schleiermacher's dogmatic theology solely in the interest of clarity, because it is his central conviction that Christology and soteriology are inseparable. This conviction is rooted in his awareness of the inseparable oneness of the exclusive dignity and peculiar activity of the Redeemer in the Christian self-consciousness.[3] The exclusive dignity of Christ is His absolutely potent God-consciousness which can be ascribed to Jesus of Nazareth alone in whose person the ideal and the historical are united. This absolutely potent God-consciousness of the Redeemer is the source of increase in activity of God-consciousness within the Christian fellowship, and this constitutes His peculiar activity.[4] This means that the exclusive dignity of Christ can be seen in completeness only in terms of the totality of His peculiar activity within the corporate life He founded, whose sole concern is to continue progress in the potency of God-consciousness which was perfected only in Jesus.[5] Thus, the

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[1] Ibid., p. 422.

[2] Ibid., p. 423.

[3] Ibid., p. 374.

[4] Ibid., p. 377.

[5] Ibid., p. 378.

Christological construction of Schleiermacher comprehends the total impression of the person and activity of Christ.

i. The Effects of Christ's God-consciousness

(1) Redemption.--The peculiar activity of Christ is to increase in activity the God-consciousness among believers. Redemption takes place whenever Christ's potent God-consciousness becomes the determining source of a man's activity, replacing the sinful determination of the sensible self-consciousness by the highest self-consciousness.[1] That is, a man is redeemed or has a Christian self-consciousness whenever the entire content of his religious self-consciousness is intrinsically related to and determined by the person of Jesus of Nazareth. Redemption is effected, therefore, when Christ evokes God-consciousness in men, when men participate in God-consciousness through Him. This is possible because the Person of Christ is the Mediator with exclusive superiority or absolute perfection and essential likeness to all men.[2] Because Christ is the Founder of the Christian religion, Christianity is the religion of redemption in that it alone releases the power of the potent God-consciousness of Christ into men's lives. Schleiermacher's own conclusive words are: "The Redeemer assumes believers into the power of His God-consciousness, and this is His redemptive activity."[3] George Cross, who gives a paraphrastic translation of Glaubenslehre, sums up Schleiermacher's interpretation of the redemptive activity of Christ in these words:

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[1] Ibid., p. 60. [2] Ibid., p. 99. [3] Ibid., p. 425.

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> The whole act of Christ in redemption consists in the implanting of the governing God-consciousness in propagation of creative divine activity, as a new principle of life, in the whole of human nature and all the energies of human nature become organs for propagation of God-consciousness in those who come into spiritual contact with the communion in which that consciousness is operating.[1]

How this redemption of Christ is effected among believers can be explained only by recognizing "the communicability of Christ's self-consciousness by means of speech, and, similarly, [by recognizing that] Christianity has always and everywhere spread itself solely by preaching."[2] Here again we encounter Schleiermacher's emphasis upon the self-proclamation of Christ and its continuity with the proclamation of Him by the apostolic witnesses. That preaching should have an indispensable role in producing the experiencing of redemption is understandable, since, in reality, Christ is present in the preaching of the kerygma.[3] Also, it is in congruity with Schleiermacher's Johannine identification of Jesus' person and His word with a consequent stress that Christ's work was to communicate Himself.[4] For Schleiermacher

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[1] George Cross, The Theology of Schleiermacher, p. 214.

[2] The Christian Faith, p. 77.

[3] Apparently the presence of Christ in preaching is sufficient to establish that the Redeemer alone is responsible for the new life or heightened and harmonized self-consciousness. For in Christmas Eve Ernestine declares: "However insufficient the historical traces of His life may be when the subject is critically examined in a lower sense [apparently he means in a Chronik sense], the festival does not depend on the condition of the case, but on the necessity of a Redeemer as well as on the experience of a heightened sense of existence which can be referred to no other beginning than the one in question." (Christmas Eve, p. 66.)

[4] Cf. Das Leben Jesu, p. 130f.

3 33

"word" (logos), "life" (zoë), and words (rhēmata) are understood as three aspects of the Person of Christ, who, as the Word, is Life, possesses the power to impart life, and in proclaiming and founding the Kingdom of God proclaims and gives Himself.[1] Thus, Schleiermacher states that "Christ's redemptive work is simply the communication of the life He has [Lebensmitteilung]. . . . And through this communication a community of believers is effected."[2]

This redemptive activity of Christ is both person-forming and world-forming, as the pervasive God-consciousness of the Redeemer is taken up into the life stream of the believer.[3] Christ's work is "person-forming" in that through the communication of His own life in deed and word and in the subsequent preaching of the church he brings into focus in other selves the feeling of absolute dependence (or a heightened highest self-consciousness), the consciousness of sin and the overcoming power of God. That is, men participate in God-consciousness through Christ and are brought by Him into complete existence as human beings and as particular men who have particular identities. Through Christ men are raised to life from the dead mass of spiritual passivity and confusion. It is "world-forming" in that man's relations to God and the world are put into their proper order and harmony, by

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[1] Ibid.

[2] Ibid., pp. 303(S), 304(S). In view of this Lebensmitteilung Gustaf Aulén's interpretation of Schleiermacher's view of redemption as primarily Lebenserhöhung, or moral uplift, does not appear wholly justified. Cf. Gustaf Aulén, Christus Victor, trans. by A. G. Hebert (New York: Macmillan and Co., 1957), p. 153.

[3] Ibid., pp. 304-310.

3-34

virtue of the determination of his self-consciousness by the God-consciousness communicated by Christ. This "world-forming" aspect of Christ's work of redemption is spelled out more clearly in Schleiermacher's treatment of reconciliation.

(2) Reconciliation.--In no way is reconciliation to be understood in isolation from Christ's redemptive activity. Versöhnung is seen by Schleiermacher only through the experience of Erlösung. Redemption is treated first as that which develops our God-consciousness. Reconciliation is the fellowship of blessedness in Christ which is an effect of the impulse and influence of Christ's communication of His God-consciousness. "The Redeemer assumes the believers into the fellowship of His unclouded blessedness and this is His reconciling activity."[1]

This consciousness of blessedness, which is a concomitant effect of Christ's reconciling activity, involves the dissolution of the connection of sin and evil. The redeemed and reconciled individual is completely determined by God-consciousness through participation in fellowship with Christ. Consequently, hindrances to God-consciousness no longer appear as evil or painful punishment for sin to this individual. They appear as indications of what is to be done. This consciousness of blessedness, then, is essentially a consciousness of forgiveness of sins.[2] It is really a putting off of the old man and a putting on of the new, as Christ becomes the soul in the individual fellowship and the person becomes the organism through which the soul works. This is the Redeemer's soul-bestowal (Beseelung),[1] which gives the form of his own spiritual life to those assumed into fellowship with Him. In this state of blessedness Christ is in the believer as the center of his life, and this is truly the person-forming work that takes place in and through the corporate life He founded.

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[1] The Christian Faith, p. 431.

[2] Ibid., p. 432.

The "world-forming" nature of Christ's redeeming and reconciling work is more than just establishment of proper order and harmony within the believer's relations to God and the world. For Schleiermacher, the activity of the Redeemer is "world-forming" not simply for the individual believer but ultimately for the world itself; that is, all human nature is to be the object of Christ's work. This conviction of Schleiermacher is founded upon the doctrine of election or God's good-pleasure which he takes with utter seriousness, as is evident in his explication of the Person of Christ and the absolute superiority of Christianity as the religion of redemption. His universalistic leanings in soteriology are at one with His Christology in that "the incarnation of Christ is analogous to the regeneration of the whole race considered as a unity."[2] He believes firmly that Christ was sent for the whole human race, and that at some time or other some trace of His redemptive activity is felt in everyone. "The universality of redemption," he maintains, "demands that the totality of the new creation be equal to the whole human race."[3]

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[1] *Ibid.*, p. 428. [2] *Ibid.*, p. 540. [3] *Ibid.*, p. 558.

3-36

Thus, it is only through an acknowledgment of the import of the doctrine of election, which is grounded in the divine government of the world, that Schleiermacher's view of the "world-forming" aspect of Christ's redeeming and reconciling work can be grasped in its completeness.[1]

Schleiermacher maintains that this account of the redeeming and reconciling activity of Christ is based solely on the inner experience of the believer, and its purpose has been to describe and elucidate that experience.[2] He calls his view of Christ's redeeming and reconciling work a mystical view, in that it rests on the unique experience of receiving Christ's powerful God-consciousness and being assumed into fellowship with Him in and through the Church.[3] His mystical view mediates between what he calls the magical view and the empirical view.

The magical view is objectionable, because it denies that Christ's God-consciousness is mediated naturally in and through the corporate life He founded; it espouses an absolutely supernatural conception of redemption as initiated and carried through by God with no concern for its receptivity in space and time.[4] Schleiermacher rejects this view, just as he rejects an absolutely supernatural view of the Redeemer.

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[1] Ibid., p. 549. For Schleiermacher there is but a single divine foreordination, which is that all of the human race will eventually be taken into fellowship with Christ. Perhaps it is Brunner's own denial of universalism that is responsible for his sharp criticism of Schleiermacher's viewing of human nature as the object of Christ's redeeming and reconciling work. Cf. Emil Brunner, The Christian Doctrine of Creation and Redemption, trans. by Olive Wyon (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1952); Die Mystik und das Wort, pp. 112f.

[2] The Christian Faith, p. 428.

[3] Ibid., p. 249f.

[4] Ibid., p. 360.

The empirical view denies the supernatural origin of redemption by insisting that the Redeemer was only an exemplary teacher who increases our perfection but produces no state of blessedness, no severance of sin and evil.[1] Just as Schleiermacher rejects the Ebionitic view of the Redeemer, so he rejects this empirical view of His work. He holds that the new corporate life, though it arose in a natural way from the influence of the presence of Christ, when related to the old corporate life of sin is supernatural.[2]

Furthermore, Schleiermacher disagrees with those who make the suffering of Christ the sum total of His redeeming activity. He says that one might be assumed into fellowship with Christ through the impression he has received of His perfection and blessedness quite apart from His suffering.[3] The suffering of Christ simply gives full confirmation of belief in the Redeemer's blessedness, that is, that in Him no activity proceeding from God in Him was hindered by any resistance of His human nature.[4] Christ's absolutely potent God-consciousness, or "perfection, does not lie properly and immediately in the suffering itself, but only in His giving up of Himself to it."[5] Schleiermacher does say, however, that the suffering of Christ made His blessedness emerge in its perfect fulness, and he states that it constitutes a climax

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[1] _Ibid_., p. 435.

[2] _Ibid_., p. 365.

[3] _Ibid_., p. 436.

[4] _Ibid_., p. 432.

[5] _Ibid_., p. 436.

3-34

to his sympathy with misery. This means that it belongs immediately to reconciliation (Versöhnung) and mediately to redemption (Erlösung).[1]

Undoubtedly Schleiermacher refuses to make the sufferings of Christ the climax of His career for this would be to leave out of view the founding of the Church and would be a concession to the magical view of redemption. Hence, just as Schleiermacher bases his Christology upon the total impression of Christ's person and work in the New Testament and in the church, so he bases his soteriology on Christ's redeeming and reconciling work as a whole and as a unity. The separating out of any element and ascribing to it any peculiar reconciling value is deplored.

ii. The Activity of Christ

In order to make clear the difference between the work of Christ in the corporate life founded by Him and the theocracy of the Jewish people, Schleiermacher divides the whole activity of Christ into three offices: the prophetic, the priestly, and the kingly.[2] In the Old Testament the kings were representatives of God to Israel and regulated the common life of the nation; the priests were representatives of the people of God and regulated the forgiving and blessing of the people; and the prophets belonged both to God and the people and stood in times of crises to be the *vox Dei*. Christ united all three offices in Himself, and in Him they are interdependent, thus relating the Kingdom of heaven to the Kingdom of earth.[1]

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[1] *Ibid.*, pp. 436-437.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 439. Also see George Cross, *The Theology of Schleiermacher*, pp. 219f.

(1) Prophet.--Just as the Old Testament prophetic office consisted in teaching, prophesying, and working miracles, so did Christ's prophetic office. All three aspects of the prophetic office, however, were one from the outset in Christ, because His preaching of the Kingdom of God involved both teaching and prophecy and the miracle consisted in the Kingdom of God being accomplished in Himself.[2] Christ's teaching, therefore, consisted in self-proclamation or in communicating the God-consciousness that was in Him.[3] The source of His teaching was not the Law or the Old Testament, but simply the "absolutely original revelation of God in Him."[4] Through teaching and communicating Himself Christ assumed men into fellowship with Him. Thus, His priestly and kingly offices appeared in His teaching, "since He proclaimed His mission to raise men to fellowship with God and to rule spiritually."[5]

Because He was the archetypal person, there could be no imperfection in Christ's teaching or direct utterance of His whole being, and there can be no relationship with God apart from Him since the original revelation of God in Him is adequate and inexhaustible.[6] The absoluteness of Christ's revelation leads Schleiermacher to declare that Christ is not simply another prophet, but that He is the end and climax of prophecy.[1] His prophesying consisted wholly in proclaiming Himself and the Kingdom of God.

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[1] Ibid., p. 440.

[2] Ibid., p. 442

[3] Ibid., p. 444.

[4] Ibid., p. 443.

[5] Ibid., p. 445.

[6] Ibid., pp. 445-447.

Unlike the Old Testament prophets who used miracles to evoke faith in their prophecies, Christ's Person was all He used to evoke faith in Himself. Schleiermacher admits that the miracles of Jesus were performed out of compassion and may have helped make true recognition of Him possible, but he insists that Christ never used miracles to support the demands He made or statements about Himself. Therefore, Schleiermacher says: "So far as our faith is concerned, they cannot but be altogether superfluous."[3] The primary reason for their superfluity is that historical distance has directed our attention away from the individual, more physical miracles, to the general spiritual miracle, which begins with the person of the Redeemer and is completed with the completion of His Kingdom.[4] "What takes the place of miracles for our time is our historical knowledge of the character as well as the scope and the duration of Christ's spiritual achievement."[5]

Christ, then, is the real spiritual miracle. To focus on individual spiritual miracles or achievements would be more a matter of faith in Scripture than faith in Christ.[6] Schleiermacher considers this

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[1] Ibid. Also see George Cross, The Theology of Schleiermacher, p. 220.

[2] Ibid., p. 448. Also see Das Leben Jesu, pp. 293f.

[3] The Christian Faith, p. 448. [4] Ibid., p. 449. [5] Ibid., p. 448.

[6] Ibid., p. 449. Cf. "Hermeneutik" in Schleiermachers Werke. Auswahl in vier Bänden, herausgegeben und eingeleitet von O. Braun und John Bauer (Leipzig: Verlag von Felix Meiner, 1911), Vierter Band, pp. 204-206.

3-41

position on miracles to be consistent with Luther's conviction that the Church did not need the support of miracles and that whenever new miracles are presented the Church must assume the presence of superstition.[1] He therefore concludes that Christ is the end of miracle, in that no such spiritual miracle can be achieved by spiritual nature as we know it.[2]

From a Christological perspective the significance of this conclusion is that the absoluteness of Christ is asserted in Schleiermacher's thinking on miracles. And again the interpreter is reminded that Christ can be understood as the climax of miraculous activity only by one who sees beyond the "parts" to the "whole," to the total spiritual miracle. That is to say, "His miracles pertained to His prophetic office because they were a setting forth of God in Him."[3]

(2) Priest.--"The priestly office of Christ includes His perfect fulfillment of the law (His active obedience), His death (His passive obedience), and His intercession with the Father for believers."[4] The high priest in the Old Testament was an agent of the people before Yahweh, who fulfilled the Law and served as their sacrificer. By contrast Christ was both the sacrificer (active obedience) and the sacrifice (passive obedience). His active obedience constituted the perfect fulfillment of the divine will, not law, for law implies a higher and

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[1] Ibid., p. 450.

[2] Ibid., p. 449.

[3] George Cross, The Theology of Schleiermacher, p. 219.

[4] The Christian Faith, p. 451.

lower will and struggle.[1] The latter is inapplicable to Christ because His God-consciousness was absolutely in control of His human nature, and by His self-communication He assumed believers into fellowship with Him and animated them to an ever more perfect fulfillment of the divine will.[2] In no way is Christ's active obedience to be understood as that of being our substitute who relieves us of the necessity to fulfill the divine will. "For only that which is perfect can stand before God; hence even Christ Himself had (to put it so) nothing to spare, which could be distributed among us."[3]

The active obedience of Christ whereby He assumed believers into fellowship with Him and created the Church could not have been redeeming without His suffering and death.[4] His suffering and death or passive obedience was inseparable from His active obedience, for suffering accompanied His whole life due to His sympathy with the sin and misery that prevailed in the corporate life of men into which He entered. Only by this suffering-participation in the corporate sinfulness of men was (and is) Christ able to assume us into the fellowship of His blessed life and set us free from evil, the punishment for sin.[5] His passive obedience is redemptive because it causes us to see God in Christ and to "envisage Christ as the most immediate partaker in the eternal love which sent Him forth and fitted Him for His task."[6]

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[1] Ibid., p. 455.

[2] Ibid., p. 456.

[3] Ibid.

[4] Ibid., p. 453.

[5] Ibid., p. 458.

[6] Ibid., p. 459.

3-43

Apparently three basic convictions are responsible for Schleiermacher's rejection of a substitutionary-satisfaction interpretation of Christ's suffering death. First, he points out that only God could suffer infinitely, but that the divine element in Christ was incapable of suffering.[1] Second, he opposes the Moravian "wounds theology" which focuses on the sensuous details of Christ's suffering and death, because it leaves out of view the inseparableness of His active and passive obedience.[2] And third, he objects to any conception which sets forth Christ's surrender in such a way that He ceases to be an example or an ideal, because, in reality, "His self-surrender was identical with His persistence in redemptive activity."[3] That is, Christ's self-surrender or self-sacrifice is that which made perfect the full dominion of the spirit over nature.[4]

Schleiermacher prefers to speak of Christ's intercession with the Father for believers in terms of vicarious satisfaction. By "vicarious" he means the passive obedience of Christ in that he had sympathy for corporate sin and suffered for it. By "satisfaction" he has in mind Christ's active obedience of assuming believers into fellowship with Him, which is made redemptive by his suffering and death (passive obedience).[5] Christ, then, is to be understood as our satisfying representative in a two-fold sense:

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[1] Ibid., p. 460.

[2] Ibid., p. 459.

[3] Ibid., p. 462.

[4] Ibid., p. 463.

[5] Ibid., pp. 460-461.

3-44

> First, that in virtue of His ideal dignity He so represents in His redemptive activity the perfecting of human nature, that in virtue of our becoming one with Him God sees and regards the totality of believers only in Him; and second, that His sympathy with sin, which was strong enough to stimulate a redemptive activity sufficient for the assumption of all men into His vital fellowship, . . . perpetually serves to make complete and perfect our imperfect consciousness of sin.[1]

Christ, then, is truly our High Priest because "God sees us, not each of us for himself, but only in Christ."[2] He is truly our representative before God by establishing our fellowship with Him and by supporting our prayers before the Father.[3] Only through His total activity are we made the object of God's good-pleasure.[4] This means that Christ exhausts the priesthood as its climax, for He is the one perfect mediator between God and man. No other sacrifice or priesthood is made. However, Christ's high-priesthood "has passed over to the fellowship of the faithful, so that Christians as a whole are called a priestly nation."[5] The implications of this for the Christian Church are: (a) the distinction between priests and laity in the church must be abolished, for there is only a vital relationship between the Redeemer and the redeemed; (b) the Christian Church should stand in a priestly relation to the rest of humanity, for it must represent the whole human race before God.[6]

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[1] Ibid., pp. 461-462. Mozley says that in "discarding the doctrine of penal satisfaction he (Schleiermacher) describes Christ in language which echoes Irenaeus . . . as our satisfying representative." See J. K. Mozley, The Doctrine of the Atonement (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1916), p. 165.

[2] The Christian Faith, pp. 453-454.

[3] Ibid., p. 464.

[4] Ibid., p. 453.

[5] Ibid., p. 465.

[6] Ibid.

(3) *King*.--The kingly office of Christ consists in the fact that everything which the community of believers requires for its well-being continually, proceeds from Him.[1] Schleiermacher maintains that Christ did intend to found the Church, and that only by submitting to Christ's Lordship can one enter the corporate life of believers. This latter volitional acknowledgment of His Lordship indicates that His kingdom is not of this world, for it is concerned only with the inner life of men, individually and in their relation to each other.[2] More specifically, His kingly power is effective *only* in the lives of believers, and His power over the world increases as believers are taken out of the midst of the world.[3] Only in the kingdom of glory which follows the kingdom of grace, the community of believers, will Christ's kingship or Lordship be exercised without limitation.[4] But it must be clearly understood that this in no way defers His kingly power to a superhistorical existence. His kingly power, being of a spiritual nature, was mediated through His bodily appearance just as "even now His spiritual presence is mediated through the written word and the picture it contains of His being and influence."[5]

There is, then, a sharp contrast between the rule of Christ and the rule of secular government. The latter is legal and exists everywhere, springing out of corporate sinfulness. As such, it has absolutely no authority in the society founded and governed by Christ.[6] In

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[1] *Ibid*., p. 466.

[2] *Ibid*., p. 467.

[3] *Ibid*., p. 469.

[4] *Ibid*., pp. 466-467.

[5] *Ibid*., p. 467.

[6] *Ibid*., p. 471.

3-46

Schleiermacher's thinking, therefore, an increasingly distinct separation between church and state is imperative. It is imperative because as Christ's kingdom becomes stronger and more extensive the more definite will become the severance between Church and state, and only in the proper separation can their agreement be more perfectly worked out.[1]

Hence, under the kingly office of Christ Schleiermacher requires that the absoluteness and uniqueness of Christ be acknowledged. He is truly the climax and end of all spiritual kingship. All others are on a vastly lower level and cannot call the whole human race under their lordship. Christ stands as the one absolute king.

iii. The Creation and Composition of the Church

(1) Creation and Purpose.--In the preceding exposition of Christ's work it is clearly evident that for Schleiermacher the Christian Church began only with the personal action of Christ.[2] Christ's work consisted in a Lebensmitteilung, a communication of His life, and through this a community of believers was effected.[3] Hiw work was at once person-forming and community forming.[4] In other words, Schleiermacher firmly contends that an integral part of any adequate presentation of Christ is an acknowledgment that Christ gave Himself up for the foundation of the new corporate life, and not simply for the sake of suffering.[5]

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[1] Ibid., p. 473.

[2] Ibid., p. 693.

[3] Das Leben Jesu, pp. 303-304(S).

[4] Ibid., pp. 304-310.

[5] Undoubtedly Schleiermacher's rejection of the idea that individuality and religion develop in isolation is contributive to his rejection of any isolation of parts of Christ's activity to which absolute redemptive value is ascribed and to his refusal to believe that

It is clear then that Christ was so filled with God-consciousness that He created the Church, a community of believers assumed into fellowship with Him, which He sought to govern by His God-consciousness in order to realize the Kingdom of God here on earth. Only those who submit to His creative and preservative Lordship may enter into the corporate life He founded and thereby experience redemption and reconciliation. While Schleiermacher insists that our relationship to the Church is contingent upon our relationship with Christ, in contrast to Roman Catholicism, which makes our relationship to Christ contingent upon relationship to the Church, he nonetheless almost echoes Cyprian's declaration that outside the Church there is no salvation. He writes:

> The salvation which we may have through Christ is located in the social power of the Christian community to transmit from generation to generation the God-consciousness which is possible because of the moral courage and spiritual insight created by our acquaintance with Christ.[1]

For Schleiermacher, the fellowship of believers is all that exists in the world through redemption, and the new life of an individual springs solely from the Redeemer.[2] The Church exists therefore to prolong the personal action of Christ. It arose because of the disciples' common apprehension of Christ which changed, at his departure, into a

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redemption for the individual can be received in isolation from the community of the redeemed in fellowship with the Redeemer. It will be recalled that religion as the feeling of absolute dependence exists only within a nexus of dependent relations apprehended by the self-consciousness, and that individuality can only be maximized or actualized within the totality of one's relationships to God, world, self, and other men.

[1] The Christian Faith, p. 436.

[2] Ibid., p. 525.

spontaneous prolongation of His fellowship or community-forming activity.[1] And this fellowship or community of believers serves as the extension of the Incarnation of Christ, for in and through it the Being of God, the Holy Spirit, continues the communication of the perfection and blessedness of Christ.[2]

(2) The Composition of the Church.--The composition of the Church may be ascertained only in terms of the effect this continuing communication of Christ's perfection and blessedness has on the individual souls within the fellowship of believers and in terms of the means whereby this occurs. In order to explicate the continuing effect of Christ's God-consciousness and redeeming work upon those assumed into fellowship with Him, Schleiermacher utilizes the two doctrines of regeneration and sanctification.

Regeneration refers to the turning-point in which a man's earlier life breaks off and the new life begins, which is explicable only by the redeeming activity of Christ in which at some time new life is implanted in the soul.[3] The "earlier life" is characterized as man's being involved in a corporate life of sinfulness, "a state of becoming, a state of fallenness and corruption or of discord and confusion,"[4] which results from the determination of the self-consciousness by the sensible consciousness. The "new life" may be characterized as the new religious personality attained through the entrance of the living influence of Christ which makes dominant the feeble God-consciousness in man.[1] The "new life" may also be characterized as man's perceiving his own finitude and all other becoming as grounded in the eternal being that has united itself with time in the Redeemer, who was born as the Man-in-himself.[2] That is to say, the "new life" is simply man's attaining true, essential man-in-himselfness through the communication of the Man-in-himself by the Church; it is man's being "born again through the Spirit of the Church, and this Spirit comes from Christ, who requires no new birth but is born originally from God."[3]

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[1] The Christian Faith, pp. 569f.

[2] Ibid., p. 535.

[3] Ibid., p. 478.

[4] Christmas Eve, p. 70.

The beginning of this "new life" in fellowship with Christ is commonly called conversion, which involves a turning away from the old life and a desiring to receive the impulses coming from Christ--a dawning of faith.[4] Faith here consists in an appropriation of the perfection and blessedness of Christ, and this occurs solely as a result of Christ's self-impartation. Nevertheless, although this activity proceeds from Christ, the self-revelation of Christ today is mediated by the preaching of the Word. To deny this, writes Schleiermacher, is to maintain that

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[1] The Christian Faith, p. 476.

[2] Christmas Eve, p. 70. In the Monologen Schleiermacher states it similarly: "Only man's inmost nature is free and eternal, and in contemplating it I feel myself grasped as an element of eternity and transmuted into a higher and freer life." See Soliloquies, p. 16.

[3] Ibid., pp. 71-72. Schleiermacher has another speaker, Ernestine, in the Christmas Eve dialogue state: "He was at birth what we are only by regeneration. We ourselves begin with discord and division, and we really attain to harmony by redemption, which is really nothing but the removal of these opposites; and for this reason redemption can only proceed from one in whom they did not require to be removed." See Ibid., p. 65.

[4] The Christian Faith, pp. 480-485.

> . . . there are divine workings of converting grace in no actual historical relation to the personal efficacy of Christ (even though it is as workings of Christ that they come to consciousness), (and then) there would be no security that this inward mystic Christ was identical with the historical Christ.[1]

For Schleiermacher the preaching of the Word embodies the indwelling divine power of Christ Himself, and therefore the divine workings of grace are to be acknowledged as supernatural. Yet, "they are natural in so far as they have a natural connection with the historical life of Christ; and in detail each working [of grace] that establishes a new personality is bound up in its efficacy with the historical totality of Christ's effects."[2]

Thus, while emphasizing the important mediative role of human communication of the Word in conversion, Schleiermacher makes it clear that Christ alone can communicate such a beginning of a higher form of life and that "no causal agency can be attributed to the person who is taken up into fellowship."[3] He qualifies this ostensibly monergistic statement, however, by acknowledging that an individual has reasonable perception and is spontaneously active, and that "in general there is never in any living being a complete moment wholly devoid of spontaneous activity."[4]

With conversion and faith there is a simultaneous consciousness of forgiveness and adoption.[5] In fellowship with Christ the self-consciousness of guilt and evil in relation to God's justice and holiness is immediately removed and a person has a changed relation to God, that is, he is made a child of God. This transformation of one's relation to God which results only from true faith in the Redeemer is justification.[1] It is this experience of justification that causes a man to become an object of pleasure for God and to experience blessedness in union with Christ.[2] This means that for Schleiermacher faith, forgiveness, and justification are simultaneous and inseparable.

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[1] _The Christian Faith_, p. 492.

[2] _Ibid._

[3] _Ibid._, p. 493.

[4] _Ibid._

[5] _Ibid._, p. 503.

In living fellowship with Christ all of man's natural powers are placed at His disposal as a means of approximating His blessedness and perfection. This is the state of sanctification.[3] It involves a progressive turning away from evil to a greater harmony with the impulses of God-consciousness issuing from Christ. There can only be an approximate conforming to the image of Christ, because there is never a moment in which a believer is not conscious of sin. However, this does not prevent union with Christ from being operative. Like Christ, a believer can determine each moment to live not for self but in fellowship with God.[4] Consequently, in the state of sanctification one may commit sins, but forgiveness is present with them.[5] Also, a regenerate man performs good works as a consequence of his unwillingness to remain in the corporate life of sin, and his good works are but natural effects of faith. As such, they are objects of divine pleasure.[6] Sanctification, then, refers to every activity in the kingdom of God and every development of personality that proceeds from the living power of faith.

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[1] Ibid., pp. 496-501.

[2] Ibid., p. 480.

[3] Ibid., p. 505.

[4] Ibid., pp. 506-510.

[5] Ibid., pp. 510-514.

[6] Ibid., p. 518.

The Church, then, was founded by Christ as a fellowship of regenerate persons and His redemptive activity was and is possible only in such a fellowship. There is an absence of uniformity within the community of believers precisely because no one apprehends Christ absolutely perfectly. For this reason an interchange of impulses of the spirit is needed.[1] Those in the state of sanctification may be said to form the inner fellowship, and those on whom preparatory grace is at work comprise the outer fellowship.[2] Preparatory grace refers to the "universal desire for fellowship with God . . . which is part of the original perfection of human nature."[3]

Despite this lack of absolute uniformity within the Church, the Christian consciousness of believers includes a common awareness of an antithesis between the Church and the world. Such an awareness persists because the believers have been called out of the corporate life of sin into the corporate life of fellowship with Christ. It is this separation from the world that is expounded by the doctrine of election.[4] Since the doctrine is grounded in divine government of the world and in the Incarnation, in the fullness of time everyone will be called out of the world, laid hold of by the divine operations of grace, and brought within the fellowship of the Church.[5] The abrogation of this antithesis between

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[1] The Christian Faith, pp. 532-533.

[2] Ibid., pp. 626-527.

[3] Ibid., p. 495.

[4] Ibid., pp. 529-560.

[5] Ibid., p. 540.

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the Church and the world constitutes the consummation of the Church. This cannot be attained in this earthly life, because sin is ever being created anew as worldly elements are admitted into the Church.[1] Furthermore, we can only faintly imagine in our Christian consciousness an unbroken fellowship of human nature with Jesus Christ.[2] This antithetical relationship to the world, therefore, determines the shape and identity of the Church in a negative sense.

In a positive sense the shape and identity of the Church persist because of the vital unity of the Christian fellowship.[3] This vital unity is nothing else but the common spirit of the Church, the innermost impulse in each member to impart and manifest the power of Christ working in him, which results in good works and cooperative activity.[4] This "common spirit" of the Church is virtually a description of the Holy Spirit, the Being of God in the Church, which continues the communication of Christ.[5]

The common spirit or Holy Spirit is derived solely from Christ, but could be fully communicated and received only after Christ's departure.[6] It creates a susceptibility to Christ and prolongs the personal action of Christ by causing believers to desire a spontaneous imitation of Christ.[7] Every regenerate person partakes of the Holy Spirit so that there is no living fellowship with Christ without the indwelling of the Spirit and vice versa.[8] In its purity and integrity the Church

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[1] The Christian Faith, pp. 696-698.
[2] Ibid., p. 698.
[3] Ibid., p. 535.
[4] Ibid., pp. 536, 560-562.
[5] Ibid., pp. 535-565.
[6] Ibid., pp. 565-567.
[7] Ibid., pp. 568-569.
[8] Ibid., p. 574.

3-54

is the perfect image of Christ, and each regenerate person is an indispensable constituent of this fellowship. But no individual is the perfect image of Christ, and the Church will attain its "integrity"--the inclusion of all men--only in its consummation.[1]

This much, then, can be said concerning the Holy Spirit and its relation to the Church: "The Holy Spirit is the union of the Divine Essence with human nature in the form of the common spirit animating the common life of believers."[2] The outpouring of the Holy Spirit, according to Schleiermacher, is not to be understood as a new divine revelation but as a fact wholly dependent upon the appearance of Christ and as a natural consequence of His appearance.[3] What then is the difference between the union of the Spirit with believers and the union of the divine and human in Christ? The difference, replies Schleiermacher, is that the union of the Divine Essence with human nature which is realized in the form of a common spirit is not conclusively person-forming, because the "new life" is not a self-identical whole and that in each regenerate person there is a co-mingling of separation and union of the divine and human.[4] Furthermore, the Holy Spirit takes possession of the individual solely with a view to fellowship and to mold him so that he may contribute to the well-being of that fellowship.[5] In summation, Schleiermacher concludes that the relation of the Holy Spirit to the Church as its common spirit remains ever the same, that the Church is ever self-identical as the locus of the Spirit in the human race, and that the Church always seeks approximation of Christ-likeness.[1]

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[1] The Christian Faith, p. 696.

[2] Ibid., p. 571.

[3] Ibid., p. 577.

[4] Ibid., p. 573.

[5] Ibid., p. 574.

(3) Continuation of Christ's Activity in the Church.--While it is beyond the scope of this dissertation to treat fully Schleiermacher's ecclesiology, his theological method requires an acknowledgment that everything essential in Christ's activity is reflected, continued, and apprehended in the Christian consciousness of the Church.

The prophetic office and activity of Christ are continued in the witness of Scripture and the ministry of the Word. Scripture is a work of the Holy Spirit as the common spirit of the Church which moved the apostles to proclaim Christ through speaking and writing, or, what is the same, to let Christ proclaim Himself through their speaking and writing that took place in the Church.[2] The Holy Scriptures guarantee the identity of the Church's witness to that originally given, for they are the first in a series of presentations of the Christian faith which result from a direct impression of Christ.[3]

The authority of Scripture is founded upon faith in Christ and not vice versa, for the Scriptures are proclamatory messages by Christ and the Apostles.[4] As a whole they are sufficient as a norm of Christian doctrine, because they have been written and collected within the Church and therefore result from the guidance and inspiration of the Holy Spirit, the source of all good works and spiritual gifts.[5] The original bestowal of all that Scriptures contain resides in Christ, and the Scriptures are not to be understood to possess uniform influence of the Holy Spirit.[1] This statement points to Schleiermacher's critical approach to Scripture, and it reinforces his hermeneutical conviction that the written Word stands under the living Word. Also, it affords us an insight into the priority of Christian experience in Schleiermacher's thought. He writes:

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[1] Ibid., p. 583.

[2] Ibid., pp. 588-590, 598-600.

[3] Ibid., pp. 592-593.

[4] Ibid., p. 600.

[5] Ibid., pp. 597-598.

> We trust universal Christian experience as the testimony of the Holy Spirit that the canon we have received by church tradition has not by deceit or ignorance had introduced into it such constituent parts as belong to either an apocryphal or heretically suspect zone of Christianity.[2]

The affirmation just quoted grows out of his conviction that there is an essential continuity between Christ's self-proclamation and the proclamatory messages about Christ by the Apostles. The ministry of the Word simply continues this prophetic activity of Christ in that it proclaims Christ in a way that harmonizes with Scripture and is traceable to Christ Himself.[3] This ministry of the Word is carried on by those who are mainly spontaneous in the communication of Christ within them. Through this ministry a communication of power and life is effected in the presentation of the Word of God within the worship and service of the Church.[4]

The priestly activity of Christ is continued in the Church through the administration of the sacraments of Baptism and the Lord's

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[1] Ibid., p. 598.

[2] Ibid., p. 605.

[3] Ibid., p. 588.

[4] Ibid.

Supper. Baptism is not only an external sign of reception into the Church but confers salvation as conditioned by divine grace in regeneration.[1] As such it carries on the work of preaching in that it inaugurates a continuous and conscious fellowship with Christ. This means that Baptism does not confer salvation *ex opere operato* and that infant Baptism is valid and complete only when it is supplemented by confirmation.[2] The Lord's Supper nourishes the fellowship with Christ inaugurated by Baptism, for Christ has promised that every believer will find spiritual participation in Him through the sacramental action.[3] The Supper is a common action of believers that unites them with Christ and with each other. As such, it is the climax of public worship and points to the whole redeeming love of Christ as recipients find themselves in a state of completely open receptivity for Christ's influence.[4]

The kingly office of Christ is reflected in the power of the keys and prayer within the Church. The power of the keys refers to the legislative and administrative continuation of Christ's kingly power in that the Church decides what belongs to the Christian life and seeks to decide who shall and who shall not be received into the Church.[5] This power derives ultimately from the congregation, is subject to continual revision, and in no way does it invoke complete excommunication.[6]

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[1] *Ibid.*, p. 626. [2] *Ibid.*, p. 638. [3] *Ibid.*, pp. 644-647.

[4] *Ibid.*, pp. 641, 665. The decision as to who shall receive baptism and the Lord's Supper belongs to the essence of this power of the keys.

[5] *The Christian Faith*, pp. 660-662.

[6] *Ibid.*, p. 668. Schleiermacher's departure from the Roman Catholic understanding of the power of the keys is here clearly evident.

Prayer also reflects Christ's kingly power in that it results from the concern of the Church for the increase and progress of the Kingdom of God.[1] Every prayer of the Church is uttered in Jesus' name and has the promise that it is heard as it hopes for the absorption of the world into itself.[2]

Schleiermacher makes no clear-cut separation of these church-forming acts from the person and work of Christ, ostensibly in order to establish a semblance of consistency between his Christological construction and his theological method. He seems to be very much concerned to show the manner in which these church-forming acts flowed from impressions left by Christ and to indicate how they supplement the direct utterances of Christ Himself. For these reasons this rather cursory ecclesiological treatment has been included under the work of Christ with the ultimate objective still in mind, that of giving a clear and sympathetic exposition of Schleiermacher's Christology.

4. The Central Significance of Christology in Schleiermacher's Theology

Failure to acknowledge that Schleiermacher's entire system evolves out of his attempt to give an account of the person and work of Christ would be to gloss over the overarching purpose of his *magnum opus*--to explicate in detail John 1:14: "And the Word became flesh and dwelt among us, full of grace and truth; we have beheld his glory, glory as of the only Son from the Father." It is appropriate, therefore, to conclude this exposition of Schleiermacher's Christology by calling attention to some of the rather clear evidences of Christological implications in his dogmatic theology.

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[1] *Ibid.*, p. 671.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 668.

The first thirty-one articles in the preface of The Christian Faith are somewhat apologetic in nature, as Schleiermacher attempts to explicate his religious construction and his theological method by borrowing propositions from apologetics, ethics, and the philosophy of religion. The preface, however, is not unrelated to his Christology and his avowedly unapologetic and dogmatic Christian theology. Inherent in his treatment of religion as the feeling of absolute dependence is his conviction that only in Christianity is religion fully actualized, because Christianity alone has a Founder who is the Redeemer. Only if a man is redeemed is his immediate self-consciousness properly determined by his highest self-consciousness or God-consciousness, which is mediated in and through his sensible self-consciousness or world-consciousness. And only if this proper ordering of the self-consciousness takes place can there be a genuine and enduring feeling of absolute dependence. The person and work of Christ are therefore not wholly out of view even in Schleiermacher's psychological and empirical analysis of religion.

This is also true with respect to his theological method, which is not simply a by-product of his psychological and empirical analysis of religion. While the nature of his theological method is psychological in that it focuses on the religious self-consciousness, its religious character is decisively Christian and dogmatic in that it is the self-consciousness of the living, historical community of Christian believers that provides the data for the dogmatic theologian, Schleiermacher. When attention is paid to the application of his method and the resulting dogmatic system Schleiermacher may be recognized not as a speculative identity philosopher but for what he is, a kerygmatic church theologian who sought to protect the authentic transmission of the Christian faith from every encroachment of purely philosophical ideas.[1] Such a recognition carries in its train an appreciation of the centrality of Christology for Schleiermacher's dogmatic theological method.[2] In reality, his method and resulting system have but one function: to supplement the direct life-communication of Christ as it is mediated by the common spirit of the Church. Thus, in Schleiermacher's magnum opus his dogmatic method is geared to serve his over-riding concern with the person and work of Christ.

Schleiermacher's affinities with Spinoza in developing his mature philosophical doctrine of God, as developed in the Dialektik, are self-admitted and apparent at several points. His dogmatic doctrine of God, however, receives its foundation not from philosophy but from the feeling of absolute dependence and the Christian religious self-consciousness. That is, the form and purpose of God as the divine causality or Divine Essence are apprehended only by the immediate self-consciousness as it is determined by the antithesis of sin and grace. The resulting attributes of justice, holiness, wisdom, and love may be grasped in relation to redemption, but love alone is a genuine predicating attribute of God, that is, an expression of the Divine Essence itself. This conclusion of Schleiermacher is founded upon his affirmation that in the work of redemption there is a divine self-impartation of love effected in Christ and the Holy Spirit. Even his understanding of the doctrine of the Trinity stems from this same affirmation. He maintains that the original intent of the doctrine was simply to defend the truth that the Divine Essence was united with human nature in the Person of Christ and the common spirit of the church. It behooves the interpreter, therefore, to acknowledge the implications of Christology in Schleiermacher's treatment of the doctrine of God.

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[1] Having arrived at this conclusion independently, the writer was reassured to learn later that it is shared by Terrence Nelson Tice. Cf. Terrence Nelson Tice, "Schleiermacher's Theological Method: with special attention to his production of church dogmatics" (unpublished Th.D. thesis, Princeton University, 1961), p. 5.

[2] Ibid., p. 16. Tice maintains that only one of Schleiermacher's students recognized this truth, Horst Stephan. Cf. Horst Stephan, Die Lehre von der Erlösung (Tübingen and Leipzig: J.C.B. Mohr, 1901).

In direct correlation with the preceding it is imperative to recognize the centrality of Christology in Schleiermacher's dogmatic treatment of revelation. Through the connection of all revelation with the originating fact of a religious communion, divine revelation for the members of the Christian Church is necessarily connected with the appearing of the Redeemer, who conditions the content of the religious emotions of the community of believers. The mutual interdependence of Schleiermacher's treatment of revelation and Christology is evident in his insistence that the divine self-impartation is effected only in the work of redemption, that the supernatural can be mediated only in and through the natural, and that, while the Founder of Christianity alone is the Redeemer, the Incarnation of the Son of God is a natural fact in so far as it is appropriated in the Christian self-consciousness. Thus, he concludes that neither Christ nor revelation can be explained completely

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in terms of natural human knowledge or in an absolutely supra-rational or supernatural sense.

Schleiermacher's anthropological statements subserve his treatment of soteriology, which is a constitutive element of his Christological construction. The psychological and empirical nature of his theological method predisposes Schleiermacher to be concerned with man and individuality. But he is always concerned with "man-in-relation," that is, man in relation to himself, to the world, and to God. The centrality of Christology in his dogmatic method has already been noted, and it may now be discerned in his anthropology.

Schleiermacher's stress upon man's individuality is congruent with his affirming that man is an image of the universal *logos* who reflects the *logos* in a unique way. This declaration seems to be a restatement of his conception of the original perfection of man as the possibility residing in his human nature to be determined completely by God-consciousness and as the ability to recognize that he has failed to realize this possibility and is in need of redemption. There is no hint here of original sin with a consequent total depravity of mankind, precisely because this would preclude the recognition of the appearing of the Redeemer who could participate fully in human existence, be fully determined by His God-consciousness, and yet not be absolutely supernatural.

As the image of the universal *logos* who is capable of being determined completely in his self-consciousness by God-consciousness, man recognizes his very definite likeness to Christ. But universally man

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has failed to be determined by his God-consciousness and is in a confused and disordered relationship with himself and the world. This universal state of man constitutes his sinfulness and is experienced as painful, because man is caught in the state of becoming, the state of tension between the real and the ideal. Herein lies man's radical difference from Christ, and herein lies man's universal need of the redemption which Christ alone can fulfill. Only by receiving Christ's communication of Himself as the Man-in-himself can man realize his true man-in-himselfness, the overcoming of the disorder and polarities of opposites within his own human self-consciousness. It seems quite clear, therefore, that Schleiermacher's concern to establish the likeness and uniqueness of Christ as the Redeemer permeates his anthropological statements.

Very little needs to be added to the foregoing exposition on the creation and composition of the Cburch to establish the centrality of Christology in Schleiermacher's ecclesiology. For Schleiermacher there can be an ecclesiology only because Christ founded the Church through his Lebensmitteilung, which is at once person-forming and community-forming, and as a result salvation through Christ is located in the community of the regenerates. The Church is all that exists in the world through redemption because it alone constitutes the Kingdom of God on earth. Its common spirit prolongs Christ's redemptive activity by communicating His perfection and blessedness to those called out of the world into its fellowship. The church-forming acts of the ministry of the Word, the sacraments, and administration reflect and continue everything essential in Christ's activity as they promote regeneration and sanctification. In a

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real sense Christ proclaims Himself and continues His self-communication in and through these church-forming acts and the common spirit of the Church--the Holy Spirit. For this reason, Schleiermacher insists that the work of Christ is not completed with His crucifixion and resurrection. Rather it is by virtue of its continuance in and through the Church He founded that the Christian believer is able to grasp the Person and work of Christ.

In contrast to the somewhat customary procedure of theologians to treat eschatology in the final section of their systems, Schleiermacher devotes no separate section of his system to eschatology. The rationale for this omission is that ecclesiastical doctrines of the last things are not immediately present in the Christian self-consciousness and do not have the same value as other doctrines.[1] However, the doctrine of election, which Schleiermacher takes very seriously in his treatment of Christology and ecclesiology, despite the fact that it too cannot be apprehended in the Christian self-consciousness, has very definite eschatological overtones. The appearance of the Redeemer was "kairotic" in that He came in the fulness of time or according to the eternal decree of God, and He was sent to be the Redeemer for the whole race. This universalistic strain in Schleiermacher's Christology and soteriology is thoroughly eschatological, because he believes that the antithesis between the Church and world will not be abrogated completely in this earthly life. He believes that the world will not be absorbed into the Church in this earthly life, because sin is ever being created anew as each person admitted into the Church carries with him a part of the world.[1]

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[1] The Christian Faith, p. 703.

[2] Ibid., p. 558.

Just as the consummation of the Church is outside the realm of the Christian consciousness, which can only faintly imagine an unbroken fellowship of human nature with Jesus Christ, so the consummation of the Redeemer's work will be effected beyond this earthly life. Thus, while disclaiming the possibility of a doctrine of eschatology, since it is outside the realm of Christian consciousness, Schleiermacher nonetheless believes that all men are conscious of the need to be redeemed and that ultimately all men will be taken up into fellowship with Christ.[2]

Even the idea of immortality is not completely by-passed by Schleiermacher. He concedes that the union of Divine Essence with human nature in the Person of Christ contains in it the belief in the persistence of human personality. As he puts it: "Belief in the survival of personality is bound up with faith in the Redeemer."[3] The genuine likeness of Christ to humanity requires such an affirmation: "If the soul of the Redeemer were imperishable but our souls perishable, it could not justly be said that as a man He was like us in all points except sin."[4]

As for the state of the souls in future life there can be no conception, contends Schleiermacher, but his reinterpretation of the traditional eschatological doctrines sheds further light upon the central role of Christology in his thinking on eschatology. The doctrine of the return of Christ who will come at the end of all earthly things signifies that ultimately all humanity will be united with Christ in light of the Divine Essence being united with human nature in Christ.[1] The resurrection of the flesh gives no clear conception of the relation of the future life to the present, but it does imply an identity of life after death with the life before death in the same personality.[2] The idea of the last judgment denotes an ultimate and final separation of the church from the world. However, it contains no idea of an exclusion of non-believers from redemption.[3] The idea of the last judgment is conjoined with the idea of eternal blessedness in that both express the idea that believers will be perfected only in fellowship with Christ and by participating in His unclouded blessedness.[4]

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[1] Ibid., p. 697.

[2] Ibid., p. 565.

[3] Ibid., p. 700.

[4] Ibid., p. 701.

Schleiermacher's central eschatological conviction, then, is that ultimately, through the power of redemption, there will be a universal restoration of all souls.[5] And this conviction is thoroughly consistent with and is supplementary to the universalism that clings so closely to his treatment of the Person and work of Christ.

In the final analysis the central significance of Christology for Schleiermacher's dogmatic theology cannot and must not be overlooked. Failure to consider the implications of Christology upon the constituting

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[1] Ibid., pp. 707-709.

[2] Ibid., pp. 709-710.

[3] Ibid., pp. 714-715.

[4] Ibid., pp. 718-722.

[5] Ibid., p. 722.

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elements of his system of thought can result only in distortion and misinterpretation. Briefly it has been indicated that in treating Schleiermacher's theological method, concepts of God, revelation, man, soteriology, ecclesiology, and eschatology one must reckon with his Christology. The light of Christology is reflected and not indiscernibly refracted through the prism of his entire magnum opus.

CHAPTER IV

TILLICH'S CHRISTOLOGY

Tillich's definitive and mature statement on Christology in the second volume of his Systematic Theology will serve as the primary source of and normative guide for this account of his Christology. Because of a concern to let Tillich state his Christological position in and through the following analytical exposition, no attempt at radical restructuring of his thought will be made. Thus, the sections of this chapter will parallel Tillich's own outline and express his method of correlation.

1. Analysis of Man's Existential Self-estrangement

In order to state and make relevant the answers provided by the symbols of the Christian message to the questions of ultimate concern implied in the human situation, Tillich begins the Christological portion of his Systematic Theology with an analysis of man's existential self-estrangement.[1] Due to the existential nature of this analysis,

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[1] In an interview Tillich is quoted as saying: "I often say to ministers and theologians, 'don't throw stones at the heads of people, but try to make understandable to them what you say. If you throw your dogmas and doctrines like stones at them they will turn away. They cannot take them. But if you make understandable what the symbols mean, then they will see [sic] suddenly . . . 'This is something that concerns us directly.' Now, that's what I mean by

Tillich is obliged to explain at the outset his conception of the relationship between existentialism and Christian theology.

i. Existentialism and Christian Theology

The explication of Tillich's conception of the relationship between philosophy and theology within his own system disclosed that Tillich is an existentialist in attitude and in method but that his ontology leads him ultimately to an essentialist position. Apparently he is concerned to correct the one with the other and transcend them both. It is therefore important not to brand Tillich or his system "existentialist," because there simply is no acceptable definition of existentialism that could be applied alike to Tillich, Kierkegaard, Marx, Nietzsche, Sartre, Bultmann, Heidegger, Jaspers, and others.[1]

Tillich makes known, however, his intent to identify himself with the existentialist opposition to Hegel's attempt to absorb the whole of reality in its existential and essential aspects into the dialectical movement of pure thought.[2] The mystical *a priori* beginning point of his system and the centrality of the microcosmic principle in his

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correlation." Part of a conversation with Paul Tillich for NBC at Harvard University in 1955. His conversation companion is Werner Rode. (Vertical File on Paul Tillich, Andover-Harvard Theological Library, microfilm, 1955, p. 166.)

[1] Bernard Martin entitled his work on Tillich, *The Existential Theology of Paul Tillich* (New York: Bookman Associates, 1963). Yet in his second chapter he concludes that Tillich is primarily an ontologist!

[2] Paul Tillich, "Existential Philosophy," *Journal of the History of Ideas*, Vol. V (January, 1944), p. 48.

ontological construction indicate Tillich's acceptance of the existentialist approach to reality or being-itself through the door of immediate personal experience. Tillich especially acknowledges his indebtedness to Heidegger, who holds that Dasein, "self-relatedness," is the only door to being-itself,[1] and he contends that Heidegger gives the most important treatment on finitude.[2] Undoubtedly this judgment is prompted by the fact that Heidegger points the way to ontology through a doctrine of man, which, of course, is basic to Tillich's own position. By placing stress on Innerlichkeit and immediate personal experience as the door to the creative "Source" of being, Tillich points out that the concepts which existential philosophy uses to describe this immediate experience necessarily are descriptive of the structure of being-itself.[3]

The existentialist view that being or reality may not be identified with objects of thought is fully accepted by Tillich. For him, God ought not to be perceived as a being; rather God is totally Unconditioned, beyond the subject-object structure as being-itself, and in him essence and existence are identical.[4] Furthermore, because "God" or being-itself can be approached only through immediate personal experience, symbols must be employed to explain that which is experienced.

Another salient self-confessed affinity of Tillich with the existentialist movement is his emphasis on time as "existential" or immediately experienced, as opposed to measured time or clock time. He aligns himself with Kierkegaard, who sought to escape from measured and objective time through his doctrine of the *Augenblick*, the pregnant moment in which eternity touches time and demands a personal decision, and through his idea of *Gleichzeitkeit*, which takes all history to be contemporaneous with the pregnant moment.[1] Tillich absorbs these ideas into his own doctrine of "kairos," which, as will be seen, is quite significant in his view of the place of the historical Jesus in Christology.

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[1] Ibid., p. 57.

[2] Paul Tillich, "The Conception of Man in Existential Philosophy," The Journal of Religion, Vol. XIX (July, 1939), p. 60.

[3] "Existential Philosophy," p. 58.

[4] Ibid., p. 47.

Tillich believes that Christian theology can profit greatly from "existential thinking," primarily because it rejects Hegel's dialectical identity of the finite and the infinite and "re-establishes the consciousness of the divorce of the finite from the infinite."[2] This results from the fact that existentialism, to use Heidegger's words, focuses on the "*sum*," in Descartes' dictum, *cogito ergo sum*.[3] Of Kierkegaard's dialectic description of such basic elements of human existence as dread, despair, individuality, etc., Tillich writes: "Man's finiteness and sin have never been analyzed psychologically in a more penetrating way."[4] Indeed, Tillich's insistence that to exist is to be estranged[5] seems to

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1. "Man in Existential Philosophy," p. 61.

2. "Existential Philosophy," p. 59.

3. *Ibid.*, p. 52.

4. "Kierkegaard as Existentialist Thinker," p. 6.

5. *Systematic Theology*, Vol. II, p. 45.

be paralleled in Kierkegaard's statement: "The rationalistic idea is the identity of subject and object, the unity of thought and being. Existence on the other hand is their separation."[1] Likewise, Tillich's conception of the Fall is quite similar to Jaspers' doctrine of the necessary Scheitern (shipwreck) of the finite in its relation to the infinite.[2]

The preceding statements gleaned from Tillich's own statements on existentialism provide an understanding of his conviction that "existentialism is a natural ally of Christianity."[3] By this he means that existentialism renders an invaluable service to the Christian theologian who attempts to present the Christ as the answer to the questions implied within existence. In a real sense, contends Tillich, the Christian theologian and the existentialist philosopher complement each other in so far as they maintain "that man's existential situation is a state of estrangement from his essential nature."[4] In this regard both are indebted to Plato's contrast between existential and essential being, and both are aligned against Hegel's basic belief that existence is the logically necessary actuality of essence with no gap between them.[5] It

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1. Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript, p. 112.

2. "Existential Philosophy," p. 59.

3. Systematic Theology, Vol. II, p. 27. Also see, "The Present Theological Situation in the Light of the Continental European Development," Theology Today, Vol. VI (Oct., 1949), pp. 299-302.

4. Systematic Theology, Vol. II, p. 25.

5. Ibid., pp. 22-24.

is against this existential background that Tillich proceeds to interpret the symbol of the Fall.

ii. The Symbol of the Fall

The Fall is a central Christian symbol because it points to the universal human situation--a situation in which man in his existence is "fallen" from his essence. Although the symbol cannot be completely demythologized, it is best to interpret it as the transition from essence to existence. Man's finite freedom makes possible such a transition.[1] This freedom consists in man's use of language to create universals and be liberated from the concrete and particular, his ability to ask questions about the world and transcend the conditions of the world, morally and logically, his power to deliberate and decide, and his creativity.[2]

What makes man's freedom finite is his destiny, which ultimately resides in the frame of a universal destiny. This latter polar element, universal destiny, is critically important, for it means that the Fall is not simply attributable to the weakness of man. Rather the Fall is possible only because God has implanted his image in man, symbolically speaking, giving man the power to contradict himself, to separate himself from his essential being.[3] The rationale for this affirmation is as follows:

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[1] _Ibid._, p. 31.

[2] _Ibid._, p. 32. Apparently it is this understanding of freedom that Tillich means in defining it as "that faculty of man by which he is able to determine his being through history." _Freedom: Its Meaning_, ed. Ruth N. Anshen (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1940), p. 124.

[3] _Systematic Theology_, Vol. II, p. 33.

> It is impossible to do justice to the concept of the image of God and to the perfection of that image before the Fall without making a distinction between the essential nature of man and the virtue of conformity to that nature. Nothing can change the essential nature and structure, just as blindness of the eye does not remove the eye from the human anatomy. . . . On the other hand the freedom of man creates the possibility of actions contrary to and in defiance of the requirements of this essential nature.[1]

This state of essential being from which man falls is a state of "dreaming innocence," or a state of "pure potentiality." This is not an actual stage of human development, however, for the essential nature of man is present in all stages of human development, although in existential distortion.[2] The word "innocence" points to the state of non-actualized potentiality. "Dreaming" indicates a state of mind which is real and non-real at the same time, that is, the actual is present in the potential in terms of anticipation. Herein lies the source of "anxiety" or awareness of finitude which is one of the driving forces toward the transition from essence to existence.[3]

The symbol of "Adam before the Fall" does not mean perfection, therefore, but a state of undecided potentialities which necessarily involves anxious freedom (*sich ängstigende Freiheit*), a temptation or desire to actualize finite freedom. In fact, the divine prohibition in the Genesis story presupposes a kind of split between creator and creature. In words reminiscent of Kierkegaard's "despair" Tillich states that in the state of temptation man experiences a double threat--"the anxiety of losing himself by not actualizing himself and his potentialities and the anxiety of losing himself by actualizing himself and his potentialities."[1] What does man do? Universally he actualizes himself or he would cease to be. But this entails his fall from essential being, which, according to Tillich, constitutes the fall into sin.[2]

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[1] Paul Tillich, "Review of The Nature and Destiny of Man, Vol. I, by Reinhold Niebuhr," Christianity and Society, Vol. VI (Spring, 1941), p. 36.

[2] An abiding contribution of Catholic thought to theology is its retention of the imago Dei, the integrity of human nature with its powers of reason and free will, even after original sin. Cf. Paul Tillich, "The Permanent Significance of the Catholic Church for Protestantism," Protestant Digest, Vol. III (1941), pp. 25-29.

[3] Systematic Theology, Vol. II, pp. 33-35.

While attributing the Fall to finite freedom, Tillich adds that this in no way implies that the Fall is a historic happening. He writes: "The Fall is the work of finite freedom but it happened universally in everything finite and therefore unavoidably."[3] By these words Tillich tends to move toward Plato's myth of the transcendent Fall of the souls which stresses the tragic-universal character of existence. That is, he seeks to accentuate man's personal and moral responsibility for his existential estrangement as an act of freedom in conjunction with a recognition that man's individual act of existential estrangement is imbedded in the universal destiny of existence.[1] This leads to the question of creation and the Fall.

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[1] *Ibid.*, pp. 25-26.

[2] *Ibid.* This appears to be a variant expression of his basic position that "the possibility of self-contradiction is rooted in the self-determination of man." *The Protestant Era*, p. 242.

[3] "A Reply to Interpretation and Criticism," p. 343. Cf. Reinhold Niebuhr, "Biblical Thought and Ontological Speculation in Tillich's Theology," *The Theology of Paul Tillich*, pp. 222-224.

In treating the relation of the Fall to creation Tillich reiterates that the Fall is transcendent in that the very constitution of existence implies a transition from essence to existence.[2] The implication to be grasped here is that man and nature participate in each other and in the estrangement of existence from essence. The critical issue to be confronted, therefore, is whether this understanding of freedom and destiny makes sin and the Fall ontologically necessary as a part of creation. If so, this would mean that creation is no longer good.

Tillich counters that in its essential character creation is good. But once it is actualized, it falls into universal estrangement through freedom and destiny. This means that the goodness of creation cannot be said to exist, actually, and that "actualized creation and estranged existence are identical. Only biblical literalism has the theological right to deny this assertion."[3] By insisting that the leap from essence to existence is the original fact Tillich quite clearly reveals his sharing of the existentialist thrust--the insistence that existence cannot be derived from essence.

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[1] Systematic Theology, Vol. II, pp. 37-39.

[2] Ibid., p. 38.

[3] Ibid., p. 44. This appears to be a restatement of his earlier insistence that the Fall is the presupposition of existence and that there is no existence before or without it. Cf. "A Reinterpretation of the Doctrine of Incarnation," p. 142.

iii. The State of Estrangement

(1) Estrangement and Sin.--Tillich's first volume of Systematic Theology contains only three references to "sin."[1] In only one of these references is there any serious attempt to define its meaning:

> "Sin" is the unreconciled duality of ultimate and preliminary concerns, of the finite and that which transcends finitude, of the secular and the holy. Sin is a state of things in which the holy and the secular are separated, struggling with each other and trying to conquer each other. It is the state in which God is not "all in all," the state in which God is "in addition to" all other things.[2]

Thus the first volume prepares us to expect from Tillich a treatment of sin from a more existential than biblical standpoint in his second volume. Moreover, this brief allusion to sin indicates his preference for speaking of sin rather than of sins or immoral acts:

> Have the men of our times still a feeling of the meaning of sin? Do they, and do we, still realize that sin does not mean an immoral act, that "sin" should never be used in the plural, and that not our sins, but rather our sin is the great, all-pervading problem of our life?[3]

What, then, is this "sin?" Tillich replies in his second volume: estrangement. It is the state of existence in which man is not what he ought to be or essentially is. Although it is not a biblical term it is implied in most biblical descriptions of man's predicament.[4] The expulsion from the Garden, the killing of Abel, and Paul's classical description of "man against himself," all imply that man is separated from the ground of his being, from other beings, and from himself.

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[1] Systematic Theology, Vol. I, pp. 188, 218, 288. [2] Ibid., p. 218.

[3] The Shaking of the Foundations, p. 154.

[4] Systematic Theology, Vol. II, p. 45.

The word "sin" is reinterpreted from a religious point of view by the word estrangement; it is not completely dismissed. It retains importance in so far as it expresses most sharply what estrangement as a state does not, namely, the personal freedom and guilt of man in his estrangement. In this sense only one may say that man's estrangement _is_ sin. And if one speaks of "sins," he must be conscious of the fact that "sins" are the expression of "sin." That is to say, "sin as an individual act actualizes the universal fact of estrangement."[1] In this way Tillich avoids the use of "original sin" in the Augustinian sense, yet retains the truth that mankind as a whole lives in estrangement.

Maintaining that estrangement is a matter of both personal freedom and universal destiny, Tillich rejects the idea of collective guilt. An individual cannot be guilty of crimes committed by other members of the group or nation of which he is a part, but he can be held guilty of contributing to the destiny in which these crimes happened.[2] This is certainly not easy to understand, especially since the universal destiny of man--universal estrangement from what he is essentially--is a "given," so to speak, for all men. What is clearly understandable, however, is Tillich's pointing up the fundamental difference between an individual and a social group as a power structure in which certain individuals determine the actions of individuals as parts of the group. His point is well made in that in the event of defeat in war the conquering nation must not exploit the idea of collective guilt and overlook the fact that some persons in the conquered nation did resist the ruling group. His experiential concern cuts through here and speaks more clearly it seems than his theological language.[1]

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[1] _Ibid._, p. 56.

[2] _Ibid._, p. 59.

(2) Estrangement as Unbelief, Hubris, and Concupiscence.--Estrangement or sin as unbelief "means the act or state in which man in the totality of his being turns away from God."[2] This is similarly expressed in recognizing that in man's self-realization he turns toward himself and to the world and away from God intellectually, morally, and emotionally.

The second mark of estrangement is hubris, which is simply the other side of unbelief. Hubris refers to man's ignoring of his finitude and his self-elevation into the sphere of the divine. As such, hubris is not simply one form of sin beside the other; it is sin in its total form.[3]

Why is man tempted to become centered in himself and place himself under the control of hubris and unbelief? Because as the imago Dei he stands in a situation between actual finitude and potential infinity. He experiences therefore "concupiscence"--the unlimited desire to draw the whole of reality into himself.[4] The strivings for knowledge, sex, and power are but symptoms of this concupiscence.

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[1] Cf. "Autobiographical Reflections," The Theology of Paul Tillich, pp. 3-21.

[2] Systematic Theology, Vol. II, p. 47.

[3] Ibid., p. 50.

[4] Ibid., p. 52.

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(3) *Estrangement and Evil*.--Each mark of estrangement contradicts man's essential being, driving man toward self-destruction, toward self-loss and world-loss, which is "evil." Under the control of *hubris* and concupiscence the self attempts to become the center of everything, but in so doing it gradually ceases to be the center of anything. In other words, not only does man lose himself but he loses his world as a consequence of the disintegration of the centered self.[1] Essentially man has a world as a centered self, but in existential estrangement he becomes merely an object of his environment. This is evil in its vilest form.

(4) *Estrangement and Ontological Conflicts*.--This interdependent loss of self and world carries with it a disruption of the polar elements of being. Freedom becomes separated from destiny, thereby falling into arbitrariness, a turning to objects, persons, and things with no preference or commitment or purpose. Destiny, in turn, becomes distorted into mechanical necessity, making man a conditioned "thing" whose freedom is a matter of contingency and is under the control of determinism.

Hubris and concupiscence force a separation of dynamics and form. Dynamics becomes an end in itself, and nothing real can be created because the form is lacking. Form, abstracted from dynamics, becomes oppressive, resulting in a vacillation between legalism and chaos.

Individualization becomes separated from participation in estrangement, driving man into utter loneliness and to attempt to submerge himself in the collective. What actually happens is that man falls under the power of objects, and he tends to become "objectivized" himself, a mere object without a self.[1]

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[1] *Ibid.*, pp. 60-61.

(5) Estrangement and Finitude.--Under the conditions of existence man is poignantly aware of his finitude, of his having to die. The universal character of the inseparableness of finitude and anxiety is confirmed by the fact that even Jesus was anxious about having to die.[2] Estrangement, however, severs the relationship between the finite being and the infinite being. As a result, the categories of finitude, namely, space, time, causality, and substance, produce not simply anxiety but resistance and despair. The end result of such estrangement is inevitably nihilism and despair, a state of inescapable conflict.

Existentialism describes the dialectics of this situation in terms of restlessness, emptiness, and meaninglessness. Its analysis should therefore be acknowledged by Christianity as "bone of her bone

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[1] Tillich points out that dialectical materialism actually arose in protest against the depersonalization of the proletariat class of society. Marx rightfully challenged ecclesiastical Christianity, concedes Tillich, in so far as its alignment with political ruling and managing powers has abetted such objectivization. His error, however, consisted in seeking happiness for the individual only in so far as he belongs to the social unit, which ultimately involves the sacrifice of the individual himself. Cf. Paul Tillich, "The Attack of Dialectical Materialism on Christianity," World's Youth, Vol. XIV (Spring, 1938), pp. 147-157.

[2] Systematic Theology, Vol. II.

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and flesh of her flesh, as self-estranged theology."[1] Furthermore, modern art contributes greatly to an understanding of the widespread nihilism of our day. Tillich especially thinks that Picasso's "Guernica" portrays "what is now in the souls of many Americans--disruptiveness, existential doubt, emptiness, and meaninglessness."[2]

iv. Quest for the New Being and the Meaning of "Christ"

(1) Existence as Bondage of Will.--The polaric unity of freedom and destiny in the act of existential self-realization eliminates the idea of man's being able to break through his estrangement. Destiny keeps freedom in bondage without destroying it. In relation to God man can doing without him. Grace alone can reunite the estranged. Only a New Being can produce a reunion of the estranged with God.

(2) Failure of Ways of Self-salvation.--The ways of self-salvation express the ambiguity and distortion within religion. The legalistic way fails, because law as the divine gift revealing to man his essential nature and true relationship to God and other men is distorted into a commandment showing man what he ought to be. The ascetic method is unsuccessful, because it represses rather than removes the objects

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1. Paul Tillich, "Estrangement and Reconciliation in Modern Thought," The Review of Religion, Vol. IX (Nov., 1944), p. 19. Also cf. "Christianity and the Problem of Existence," three lectures delivered at Howard University, Washington, D.C., April, 1951 (Washington: Henderson Services, 1951), p. 14.

2. Paul Tillich, "Religion and the Visual Arts," a microfilmed lecture given at Harvard Divinity School, 1955 (Vertical File on Paul Tillich, Andover-Harvard Theological Library, 1955), p. 5.

of concupiscence. The mystical way falls short of salvation, because the bodily and mental schemes leave the conditions of existence unchanged and union with the divine is never reached. Ritualistic or doctrinal ways embroil the adherents in intellectual conflicts and questions, revealing their failure as a way of self-salvation. In summation, all these ways fail, because man is trapped in estrangement. Yet they point to the necessity and possibility of the quest for the New Being.[1]

(3) The Universality of the Quest for the New Being.--The failure of the ways of self-salvation in every religion and culture prompts the recognition of the need for and expectation of a new and saving reality that will replace the old and estranged reality. "The quest for the New Being," writes Tillich, "is universal, because the human predicament and its ambiguous conquest are universal."[2]

The two major types of quest for the New Being are non-historical and historical. In the non-historical type the New Being is sought above and beyond history in a vertical direction, as in the mystical religions in which the price paid for the New Being is the negation of everything that has being. In the historical type, as found in Judaism, Christianity, and Islam, the New Being is expected in a horizontal direction as the aim of history. Because of estrangement the New Being is expected in this latter type as a transformation of reality. Christianity affirms that this decisive event has occurred in Jesus as the Christ, the center of history.[1]

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[1] Systematic Theology, Vol. II, pp. 79-85.

[2] Ibid., p. 86.

(4) The Meaning of the Symbol of "Christ."--Christianity ascribes the symbol of "Christ" to the bearer of the New Being. The symbol is an inclusive and decisive one which confirms the universality of the quest of the New Being.[2] That is, it amalgamates the symbol of the messianic figure, who is related to history yet transforms history, with others, such as "Son of Man" and "Man from Above." Such an amalgamation includes the non-historical expectation of the New Being within the historical. In this sense Christianity claims to be the universal type, that is, "that the different forms in which the quest for the New Being has been made are fulfilled in Jesus as the Christ."[3]

Tillich recognizes the danger of such an inclusive understanding of the "Christ" symbol,[4] and proceeds to clarify some of the implications of the symbol in relation to the ideas of paradox and Incarnation. That the New Being or essential being has appeared in Jesus as

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1. Ibid., pp. 87-88.

2. That the idea of symbol should be so inclusive and decisive is understandable in view of Tillich's confession: "The centre of my theological doctrine of knowledge is the concept of symbol." "Reply to Interpretation and Criticism," The Theology of Paul Tillich, p. 333.

3. Systematic Theology, Vol. II, p. 89.

4. In response to criticism Tillich writes: "I became suspicious of any attempt to make the concept of symbol all-embracing and therefore meaningless." "Reply to Interpretation and Criticism," p. 334. Also see Wilbur M. Urban, "A Critique of Professor Tillich's Concept of the Religious Symbol," The Journal of Religion, Vol. II (Summer, 1940), pp. 34-37.

the Christ is the all-embracing paradox of Christianity. This paradox contradicts absolutely man's self-understanding and expectations, because it contradicts man's self-reliance, his self-saving attempts, and his resignation to despair. The meaning of this paradox and of the Incarnation is therefore nothing more or less than this: "In one personal life essential manhood has appeared under the conditions of existence without being conquered by them."[1]

2. The New Being in Jesus as the Christ

Christian theology, historically and systematically, is simply a corroboration and commentary on the assertion that Jesus is the Christ. The traditional expression "Jesus Christ" means "*Jesus who is said to be the Christ*."[2] Jesus of Nazareth, then, is affirmed to be the Christ by Christianity, the one who brings the new state of things, the bearer of the New Being. This is truly the sum and substance of the Christian message.

i. Jesus as the Christ

(1) *Historical Fact and Reception of Fact*.--To speak of "Jesus as the Christ" is to speak of an "event." In religious language an "event" is "a combination of something objective and something subjective, of fact and reception of fact."[3] The factual side of this event on

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[1] *Systematic Theology*, Vol. II, p. 94.

[2] *The Shaking of the Foundations*, p. 145.

[3] *Ultimate Concern*, p. 160.

which Christianity is based is called "Jesus of Nazareth," and the receptive side refers to the reception of this fact as the Christ.[1] The event under consideration, then, is the confession of Peter at Caesarea Philippi. It was with this confession, contends Tillich, that Christianity was born and not with the birth of Jesus.

In treating Peter's confession Tillich affirms that the factual side of the event consists in the actual impression of Jesus of Nazareth upon Peter that he was indeed the Christ.[2] But this "impression" belongs both on the side of fact and on the side of reception, because "Jesus as the Christ is both a historical fact and a subject of believing reception."[3] Therefore, historical research cannot divide the image and say, "this aspect is reception of the fact, while this other aspect is actual fact."[4] Because these factual and receptive aspects of the event of Jesus as the Christ are indistinguishable, Tillich declares: "I think Kierkegaard was right when he implied that the 'fact' with which faith is concerned is different from the facts of the Biblical records, even if they are confirmed by historical criticism."[5]

"Jesus of Nazareth," then, expresses the basic Christian conviction that Essential God-Manhood has actually appeared under and

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[1] Systematic Theology, Vol. II, p. 97.

[2] Ultimate Concern, p. 90.

[3] Systematic Theology, Vol. II, p. 98.

[4] Ultimate Concern, p. 145.

[5] Paul Tillich, "Review of Revelation and Reason by Emil Brunner," The Westminster Bookman, Vol. VI (Jan.-Feb., 1947), p. 7.

conquered the conditions of existence. But the acceptance of Jesus as the Christ is as important as the factual side, otherwise Jesus would have been only a preparatory segment of the history of revelation and not that of final revelation. Indeed, without the believing reception "he would not have been the Christ even if he had claimed to be the Christ."[1] Thus, it seems clear that for Tillich the historical or factual side of the event of Jesus as the Christ is the event itself.

The preceding statements illustrate Tillich's endeavor to correct any impression that he is concerned to establish the factual side of the Christ-event in a biographical sense. The Gospels themselves, argues Tillich, show not the life of a religious man but the life of "the 'God-man' who is the negation and salvation of the religious man."[2] All that we have, then, is the biblical picture; what or who is behind it is impossible for us to know. The following statement sums up Tillich's position that the historical fact on which Christianity is based is the event in which Jesus is called the Christ that in turn produces the biblical picture:

> This is the picture we have to affirm: An event has happened which has given rise to the picture of Christ in the Gospels, an event the biographical circumstances of which remain in the darkness. Therefore the fact cannot be tested by biographical attempts. . . . For this fact is the fact of our real existence as Christians and members of the Church.[3]

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1. Systematic Theology, Vol. II, p. 99.

2. Paul Tillich, "The Significance of the Historical Jesus for the Christian Faith," Monday Forum Talks at Union Theological Seminary, reprint of stenographic records of talk at Monday Forum by Ernest F. Scott and Paul Tillich, No. 5 (Feb. 28, 1937), p. 5.

3. Ibid.

(2) Biblical Witness to Jesus as the Christ.--The New Testament is the original and basic source for knowledge of the New Being in Jesus as the Christ, because it is "the book of the community whose foundation is the acceptance of Jesus as the Christ."[1] The unanimity of the New Testament witness to Jesus as the Christ so impresses Tillich that he sees no real need for an analysis of the critical and exegetical problems involved in the New Testament Christology. He does point out, however, that the contrasts between the interpretations of the Christ-event in the Synoptics and the Fourth Gospel merit delineation.

The Synoptics place an emphasis on the participation of Jesus in the negativities of existence, while the emphasis of John is on the victory of the Christ over these negativities. The Synoptics also stress the Kingdom-centered sayings of Jesus along with expressions of his messianic self-consciousness; whereas John focuses on the Christ-centered nature of his sayings. Again, in the Synoptics Jesus is portrayed as the prophetic announcer of the Kingdom to come and sometimes as the central figure within the eschatological drama. By dying and being resurrected for the sins of the people he fulfills the eschatological promises of the Old Testament, and he will return from on high to judge the world. John sometimes repeats these eschatological statements, but the central emphasis in John is upon eschatological processes which happen in Jesus' presence in judgment and salvation.[2]

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[1] Systematic Theology, Vol. II, pp. 117-118.

[2] Ibid., p. 137.

Tillich concludes that the contrasts between the Johannine and Synoptic statements are not exclusive. Yet he acknowledges that the Synoptics appear to be more concerned to give a biographical interpretation of the life of Jesus, whereas John is basically a reinterpretation of the life of Jesus and perhaps contains no authentic words of Jesus. Indeed, he maintains that

> John is a theological book, and therefore is best for theology because it answers problems. Therefore I often feel, like Luther, that this is really the chief Gospel, not because it gives a historical picture, but because it depicts in words the power in this event.[1]

Despite this preference for the Fourth Gospel, which is congenial to his method of correlation, Tillich still insists that all parts of the New Testament attest the power of the New Being in a three-fold sense:

> . . . first and decisively, as the undisrupted unity of the center of his being with God; second, as the serenity and majesty of him who preserves this unity against all the attacks coming from estranged existence; and, third, as the self-surrendering love which represents and actualizes the divine love in taking the existential self-destruction upon himself.[2]

(3) History and the Christ.--To call Jesus the Christ is to acknowledge the continuity through history of the power of the New Being. But this "history" begins whenever persons become aware of their state of estrangement and raise the question of the New Being. It ends whenever the continuity of that history whose center is Jesus as the Christ is broken. In other words, the appearance of the Christ in a personal

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1. Ultimate Concern, p. 155.

2. Systematic Theology, Vol. II, p. 138.

life presupposes the community out of which he came and the community which he creates. Thus, Jesus as the Christ is the absolute center of the historical development of the church whose beginning and ending he alone determines.[1]

The foregoing statements constitute the extent of Tillich's explication of the relation of the Christ to history in the second volume of Systematic Theology. This is rather surprising in view of his concern to demonstrate that the New Being in Jesus as the Christ is the answer to the universal quest for the Christ in various cultures and historical periods and the final revelation by which all preparatory revelation is to be judged.[2] It is also surprising against the background of his earlier conviction that "Christology describes the concrete point at which something absolute appears in history and provides it with meaning and purpose; and this is indeed the central problem in the philosophy of history."[3] It is appropriate, therefore, to include here a brief summary of his larger treatment of the relation of the Christ and history, especially in his earlier writings, and to inquire whether there is a significant evolution in this area of his thought in the second and third volumes of his Systematic Theology.

For Tillich history is not made up of a factual remembering of

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1. Ibid., pp. 100-101, 136-138.

2. Tillich himself has said: "The Church as a living reality must permanently mediate its eternal foundation with the demands of the historical situation." The Protestant Era, p. xiv.

3. The Interpretation of History, p. 243.

the past; it is composed only of what is known as meaningful to the interpreter. All history is therefore interpreted history, and an interpretation of history involves a penetration through the events of a particular period of history to the ultimate concern or problem of that period.[1] The flow of time itself is important only "if it has an unconditioned meaning, an unconditioned depth, an unconditioned reality."[2] It is possible for the interpreter as historical participant to grasp this, because time is moving toward an ultimate fulfillment and history, which may be conceived to be essentially history of salvation.[3] Within this context Tillich maintains that the problem of history is *the* problem of our era.[3]

Alongside these ostensibly idealistic statements Tillich counsels full cognizance of the "demonic," the destructive, blind, chaotic element implied in all creating movements which drives them toward final dissolution.[4] Such demonries as intellectualism with its ideal of progress, aestheticism with its identification with everything, capitalism

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1. James Luther Adams points this out in his article, "Tillich's Interpretation of History," *The Theology of Paul Tillich*, p. 303. His insight is confirmed by Tillich himself in the third volume of his *Systematic Theology*, p. 369, and in the most recent work, *Ultimate Concern*, p. 131.

2. *The Religious Situation*, p. 35.

3. Cf. Paul Tillich, "History as the Problem of our Period," *Review of Religion*, Vol. III (March, 1939), p. 256.

4. Paul Tillich, "The Kingdom of God and History," *The Kingdom of God and History*, by H. G. Wood and others, Oxford Conference Series, Vol. III (New York and Chicago: Willett, Clark, and Co., 1939), p. 117.

and nationalism with their depersonalization, are treated in The Interpretation of History, and to these is added communism with its objectivization of persons in the third volume of Systematic Theology. Nevertheless, Tillich affirms that even the "demonic" points to the abyss in the ground of being, thereby indicating that demonry is destined ultimately to break down before divinity.[1]

Against this background Tillich expounds his Christian interpretation of history. Christianity proclaims that the Christ is the center of history, the one who makes history a history of salvation, who gives history its ultimate meaning, and who offers us an expectation of an eternal future in which meaninglessness is conquered.[2] This proclamation may be explained by the concept of kairos and the symbol of the Kingdom of God.

Kairos means the right time or the qualitative moment in the time process, in contrast to chronos, which refers to clock time or measurable time. In its unique or universal sense kairos refers to the appearing of Jesus as the Christ, the event which divides history into two epochs: preparation and reception of the non-recurring kairos. The general kairos describes every turning point in history in which the eternal judges and transforms the temporal. And the special kairos is decisive for our present situation as the "coming of a new theonomy on the soil of a secularized and empty autonomous culture."[1] In Tillich's usage, therefore, the general and special kairoi are derived from and dependent upon the unique kairos in so far as the latter is present in kairotic moments.[2]

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[1] Cf. Paul Tillich, "The God of History," Christianity and Crisis, Vol. IV (May, 1944), pp. 5-6; The Interpretation of History, pp. 107-122.

[2] The Interpretation of History, p. 265.

The Kingdom of God symbolizes the ultimate fulfillment of history which transcends history yet lends meaning to the relative and conditioned fulfillment in every historical event. It also expresses the Christian eschatological conviction that God alone is the Lord of history, who acts in history toward the realization of His Kingdom--the purification and unification of all elements of meaning in historical activities.[3] Because history is carried by groups who represent the ultimate meaning of existence, one may say that the church, as the latent community of such people, is the real bearer of history.[4] But the realization of the Kingdom will always be fragmentary within history. As the church bears salvation history, so world-history is the fragmentary actualization of salvation. For Tillich, then, the dialectical tension between the divine and the demonic continues within

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1. The Protestant Era, pp. 46-47.

2. In one of his sermons Tillich proclaims: "When God himself appears in a moment of time, when He subjects himself to the flux of time, the flux of time is conquered. And if this happens in one moment of time, then all moments of time receive another significance." The New Being (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1955), p. 167.

3. The Theology of Culture, p. 37.

4. "The Kingdom of God and History," p. 125.

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history; there is and can be no religious utopianism.

In writing the third volume of his Systematic Theology Tillich returns to the major concern of his earliest work.[1] To be sure, his earlier statements on history are molded somewhat to fit into his ontological-theological structure; for example, the dimensions of life are placed under the inclusive dimension of history in terms of the ontological categories of time, space, causality, and substance. But the substance of his previous thinking on the issue is incorporated completely into the third volume of Systematic Theology.

A difference in emphasis, however, may be discerned in so far as in the later work the concept of "essentialization" occupies a position of central importance. The symbol of the Kingdom of God, which is integral to a Christian interpretation of history and which has its center in the Christ, is ontologized to mean "essentialization." That which is latent in Tillich's previous writings on the problem of history now becomes clearly manifest. To speak of the fulfillment of history or the answer to the problem of history is to speak of the reunion of existential and essential being, which is effected by the center of history, the New Being.

A similar kind of evolution in Tillich's thought may be discerned in his treatment of Christology. For example, in The Interpretation of History the problem of the two natures of Christ is transformed

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[1] Tillich's doctoral dissertation was entitled: "Die religiongeschichtliche Konstruktion in Schellings positiver Philosophie; ihre Voraussetzungen und Prinzipien" (Breslau: Fleischmann, 1910).

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into the problem of the interpretation of history--that is, the question of Christology is conceived to be the problem of history.[1] But in the second volume of Systematic Theology an ontological alternative is quite plainly offered to the problem of the two natures, namely, that in Jesus as the Christ the New Being re-establishes the unity between God and man.[2] Significantly, the word kairos does not even occur in the second volume of Systematic Theology.[3] Thus, an evolution of emphasis in Tillich's Christology may be detected in his concentration on the transhistorical New Being in his Systematic Theology. He appears to have come to insist on the ontological more than on the historical dimension of Jesus as the Christ.[4]

The preceding observation, however, must not be construed to imply that in an earlier period Tillich sought to establish the historical Jesus as the center of history or the foundation of the Christian faith. In all his writings he is concerned to establish the biblical "picture" of Jesus as the Christ, not the historical Jesus,

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1. The Interpretation of History, p. 261.

2. Systematic Theology, Vol. II, p. 148.

3. The word kairoi is used once to explain how the symbol of the Second Coming places the Christian between the times in which the eternal breaks into the temporal. This, however, is the general sense of kairos. Ibid., p. 164.

4. The writer came to this realization in writing an earlier seminar evaluation of Tillich's interpretation of history. It is now known to be shared with George H. Tavard, Paul Tillich and the Christian Message, p. 112.

as the foundation of Christian faith.[1] In this respect he learned his lessons well as a student of Martin Kähler.[2] Tillich's views on the historical Jesus and historical research must now be expounded.

(4) Historical Research and the Historical Jesus.--Historical criticism or research is a combination of analytical-critical and constructive-conjectural elements. Its analytical-critical work consists in criticizing its sources in order to separate what has less probability or is improbable from that which has more probability. The constructive-conjectural aspect involves the attempt to find the empirical truth about Jesus of Nazareth behind the biblical records.

The latter attempt has been a failure. "The historical Jesus, namely, the Jesus behind the symbols of his reception as the Christ, not only did not appear but receded farther and farther with every step."[3] But this has inconsequential significance for the Christian faith, since it has to do with an actuality that is fundamentally different from that with which historical investigation deals. Indeed, "faith could abandon research because it has nothing to do with

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[1] Tillich recalls accepting the validity of Schweitzer's work, The Quest for the Historical Jesus, at the age of twenty-five and even raising the radical question of the non-existence of the historical Jesus. Cf. The Interpretation of History, pp. 33-34.

[2] Martin Kähler writes: "Der aufgestandene Herr ist nicht der historische Jesus hinter den Evangelien, sondern der Christus der apostolischen Predigt, des ganzen Neuen Testamentes." Der sogenannte historische Jesus und der geschichtliche biblische Christus (München: Chr. Kaiser Verlag, 1953), p. 41.

[3] Systematic Theology, Vol. II, p. 102.

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historical facts."[1] Perhaps the strongest statement by Tillich on this issue is the following:

> If the Christian faith is based even on a 100,000 to 1 probability that Jesus has said or done or suffered this or that; if Christianity is based on possible birth-registers of Nazareth or crime-registers of Pontius Pilate, then it has lost completely its foundation.[2]

The theological attempt to make the teachings of Jesus into a historical foundation of the Christian faith must be discounted, because it implicitly denies Jesus' claim to have overcome the legalistic context of the Old Testament. Rudolf Bultmann, for example, identifies the meaning of the historical Jesus with His message of the Kingdom of God, which he interprets as a concrete demand by Jesus for acceptance of Himself and the Cross. Tillich observes that this approach ingeniously and rightly avoids the endeavor to reconstruct a life of Jesus. But the error of this approach and of the approach which focuses on the teachings of Jesus is the failure to explain "wherein lies the power to obey the teachings of Jesus or to make the decision for the Kingdom of God."[3] This necessary power comes from a new reality, the New Being in Jesus as the Christ.

The preceding statements provide the context for Tillich's confession: "Now you probably know that I am a great skeptic with respect to historical research into the life of Jesus."[1] They also make understandable his assertion that "Barth quite properly makes Christology and his teaching about the Word of God independent of the results of historical criticism."[2] By judiciously using the term "historical Jesus" to indicate the factual element of the event of Jesus as the Christ, Tillich insists that the term "raises the question of faith and not the question of historical research."[3] That is, faith can guarantee that reality or New Being which conquers existential estrangement, because it participates immediately in the event upon which Christianity is based. Such an immediate awareness of those who find themselves transformed into the state of faith cannot be undermined by historical research. It is self-authenticating.

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[1] Paul Tillich, "Review of The Mediator by Emil Brunner," translated from the German article by Arthur C. McGiffert, Jr., The Christian Century, Vol. LI (Dec. 5, 1934), p. 1555.

[2] "The Problem of Theological Method," p. 21.

[3] Systematic Theology, Vol. II, p. 106.

Faith can therefore guarantee that the New Being that has created faith has appeared in a personal life. But it cannot guarantee that this personal life was Jesus of Nazareth. "Historical doubt concerning the existence and the life of someone with this name cannot be overruled. He might have had another name."[4] How, then, can faith guarantee that the New Being has appeared in a personal life whose very existence, name, and life may be historically doubted?

Tillich answers that the New Being had to appear in a personal life in order to conquer existence concretely. The biblical picture of him in whom the New Being has appeared sufficiently provided the power to create and preserve the community of the New Being. One may say, therefore, that "there is an analogia imaginis, namely, an analogy between the picture and the actual personal life from which it has arisen."[1] This biblical picture, which results from the reception of the New Being and its transforming power on the part of the first witnesses, can be guaranteed by faith as an adequate expression of the power of the New Being in Jesus as the Christ, because the believer participates in that saving power.

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[1] Ultimate Concern, p. 145.

[2] "What is Wrong with the 'Dialectic' Theology?" p. 142.

[3] Systematic Theology, Vol. II, p. 107.

[4] Ibid.

But the question as to why the New Being should appear in a personal life does not seem to be answered by these statements on the necessity of the concreteness of New Being implied in analogia imaginis theory. Concreteness may be impersonal as well as personal. The deeper answer lies in Tillich's ontology. It will be recalled that for Tillich the polarities of being are complete only in man as the microcosmos, for in him the potentialities of being are completely actual. Therefore, what happens in man happens by mutual universal participation, qualitatively speaking. For this reason the New Being as the universal answer to the universal quest could appear only in a personal life.[2]

Although Tillich is genuinely skeptical about the significance of the constructive-conjectural contribution of historical research to the Christian faith, he recognizes fully that its critical-analytical function serves to liberate Christianity from an identification with a special, half-mythological world-view by distinguishing the empirically historical elements from the legendary and mythological elements in the Gospels.[1] It thereby gives systematic theology an invaluable tool for dealing with the Christological symbols of the New Testament.

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[1] Ibid., p. 115.

[2] Ibid., pp. 120-121.

Systematic theology, in its attempt to give the "logos" or rationality of the Christian message, is obliged to show how its central symbols of Christology have developed. Historical research indicates that the development of such symbols is constituted by four steps: they arise and grow in their own religious culture and language; they become answers to the questions implied in the existential predicament of the users; they are transformed by Christianity to interpret the event on which it is based; and they are distorted by superstitition, and by literalistic and supranaturalistic theology.[2] Tillich gives examples which illustrate this development process.

The symbol "Son of Man' designates an original unity between God and man. Secondly, when contrasted to the existential estrangement of man the Son of Man is expected to re-establish man's unity with God. Thirdly, Jesus reportedly called himself the Son of Man in a Danielic sense. Fourthly, the mythological symbolism of a transcendent being who is sent down from his heavenly place and transmuted into man is taken

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1. "The Significance of the Historical Jesus," p. 5.

2. Systematic Theology, Vol. II, p. 109.

literally, transforming the powerful symbol into an unintelligible and absurd story.[1]

The symbol "Son of God" expresses the fact that in his essential nature man has a filial relation to God. Secondly, hubris has caused the universal loss of this relation and the expectation that the Son of God will restore it. Thirdly, Christianity applies this symbol to Jesus as the Christ in whom the unity of God and man has occurred and is re-established. Fourthly, literalism distorts the symbol by designating Jesus of Nazareth as the Son of God, thereby projecting a human family situation into the inner life of the divine.[2]

The "Christ" symbol originally designated the historical-transhistorical figure through whom Yahweh would establish His Kingdom in Israel and, ultimately, in the whole world. Secondly, it came to be believed that the Christ would bring the new eon to man who is under demonic rule. Thirdly, Christianity believes that the new eon is brought by one who is defeated by the powers of the old eon as the Christ. Fourthly, this paradoxical messianic symbol is perversely identified with Jesus of Nazareth, who is held to have supranatural powers and to have made a voluntary sacrifice in order that God might save those who believe in him.

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[1] Tillich contends that it is this literalistic distortion of the Gospel which cannot be communicated to modern man who knows there is no such above or below. Cf. "How to Communicate the Christian Message," p. 16.

[2] Systematic Theology, Vol. II, p. 110.

The main tool for the Christological work of the church is the symbol of the logos. In both Philo and the Fourth Gospel the logos denotes first that through whom the rational structure of the universe is mediated. Secondly, the unapproachable mystery of God demands a mediating principle between God and man, which is fulfilled by the logos concept. Thirdly, the logos becomes for Christianity the symbol for the universal principle of divine self-manifestation in a personal life. Fourthly, the literalists distort this symbol by making it into a nonsensical story of the metamorphosis of a divine being into the man Jesus of Nazareth.[1] Thus, a demythologization of the symbol of the logos and of all the Christological symbols is absolutely necessary.

ii. The New Being in Jesus as the Christ

(1) Meaning of the New Being.--The eschatological symbol "Christ" implies an expectation of the coming of a new eon or state of things through him in whom the New Being appears. According to the Synoptic Gospels, the one who was supposed to bring this new eon was destroyed by the old eon, and Jesus himself reconciled his messianic claim with the acceptance of this destruction. But the disciples at first resisted this combination, because it demanded that they either give up their hope or radically transform its content. The latter alternative was taken. As a consequence of the experiences of Easter and Pentecost they made the paradoxical messianic claim that the New Being was identical

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[1] Ibid., p. 112.

with the being of Jesus, the crucified.

However, it is Paul's use of the term "new creature" and his calling those who are "in Christ" new creatures which Tillich seeks to interpret meaningfully by the expression, New Being, and by referring to believers as those who participate in the newness of being which is in the Christ. Whoever participates in the New Being who is essential being under the conditions of existence has the estrangement of his existential being from his essential being conquered in principle, i.e., in power and as a beginning. For this reason Tillich declares: "I make this phrase, the 'New Being,' the center of my theology. As a Christian theologian I believe that this new being is most visible and centrally visible in the picture of Jesus as the Christ in the New Testament."[1]

In Jesus as the Christ there is given an "undistorted manifestation of essential being within and under the conditions of existence."[2] This Being which is manifested in the Christ is new in contrast to the merely potential character of essential being, and it is new over against the estranged character of existential being. It is also new in that in conquering man's existential estrangement it conquers his situation under the law, the demands and judgments of his essential being. In a very real sense, one may say that the Christ is not only the end of the law but the end of existence, existence which is lived in estrangement, conflicts and self-destruction.

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[1] "Interview with Tillich," Wisdom, p. 171. This quote is given almost verbatim in The New Being, p. 18.

[2] Systematic Theology, Vol. II, p. 119.

Out of their participation in the revelatory situation in which Jesus is perceived to be the Christ, Christians witness to the vision of "reconciliation, reunion, resurrection . . . the New Creation, the New Being, the New state of things."[1] They claim that in Jesus as the Christ the hope of mankind for a new reality is fulfilled, that in him the preparatory period of revelation reaches its aim for he is the final revelation of the ground of being. Qualitatively speaking, then, the New Being is the end of history. That is, "nothing qualitatively new in the dimension of the ultimate can be produced by history which is not implicitly present in the New Being in Jesus as the Christ.[2]

(2) Expressions of the New Being.--That which makes Jesus the Christ is the totality of his being which has the quality of the New Being. His words, deeds, sufferings, and his "inner life" do not make him the Christ; they are only expressions of the New Being in him.

The very fact that Jesus as the Christ is metaphorically called "the Word" as the final self-manifestation of God to humanity indicates that his words as such do not make him the Christ. Rather they express His being, which is called "the Word." Only because Jesus as the Christ is the Word do his words have the power to create the New Being.

Similarly, not his deeds but the being out of which his deeds come make him the Christ. His deeds must therefore not be construed as a new law which persons should copy as in the tradition of imitatio Christi; they are simply expressions of his being in which men may participate, but not imitate.

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[1] The New Being, p. 24.

[2] Systematic Theology, Vol. II, pp. 119-120.

The suffering of Jesus as the Christ cannot be separated from his appearance as the bearer of the New Being. Yet partial justification for separating the suffering and death from the being of the Christ must be granted, since without sacrificing himself as Jesus to himself as Jesus as the Christ he could not have been the Christ.[1] Furthermore, Jesus "proves and confirms his character as the Christ in the sacrifice of himself as Jesus to himself as the Christ."[2] The latter statement appears to mean that because Jesus was the Christ he could make the ultimate sacrifice and participate completely in existence in order to conquer every force of estrangement. But the former statement has an adoptionist ring, which, as will be seen, is integral to Tillich's Christology.

The attempt to penetrate to the "inner life" of Jesus in his relation to God, men, and himself is inconsequential as a method of showing that Jesus as the Christ is the New Being. "The biblical reports about Jesus," argues Tillich, "do not psychologize. More correctly, one could say that they ontologize."[3] By "ontologize" he means that they speak of the divine Spirit in him and of his unity with the Father. As for the accounts of Jesus' loneliness, solitude, anxiety, and the like, they are expressions of the fact that the New Being is present in him under the conditions of existence. But the inner life of Jesus is out of the grip of psychological investigation or of any form of historical research, because

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[1] Dynamics of Faith, pp. 97-98.

[2] Ibid., p. 123.

[3] Ibid., p. 124.

> we know nothing about his psychological development--which is necessary to know his internal life. We do not know whether there are breaks or struggles. It doesn't seem so as far as the reports tell us; but this is just the problem: what is the relation of the reports to the objective events?[1]

(3) The Conquest of Estrangement.--Although the concrete details of Jesus' life do not prove that he is the Christ, they do confirm the biblical picture of Jesus as the Christ who is the bearer of the New Being. At every point the New Testament picture of Jesus as the Christ contradicts the life of existential estrangement, as it indicates "no estrangement from God in any moment in the life of Jesus."[2] There are no traces of unbelief; even in his death he cries out to the God who has forsaken him. There are no traces of *hubris* or self-elevation, for he combines the acceptance of himself as the Christ with the acceptance of his violent death. Paul emphasizes this in Philippians, chapter 2. Nor is there any trace of concupiscence in the picture, as the Christ rejects the unlimited desire for food, acknowledgment, and power in the temptations in the desert.

Tillich therefore is willing to say that the biblical picture of Jesus as the Christ "presents a process of union with God which shows no 'scars' or moments of separation, nor prayer for forgiveness--all this is absent."[1] Yet he is reticent to speak of the sinlessness of Jesus, because it is essentially a negative term indicating an ethical quality. Jesus' own rejection of his being described as "good" indicates that his goodness consisted only in his participation in God. Moreover, the temptations of Jesus indicate the fundamental truth that in him the tensions of finite freedom and destiny and all other polarities are actual.

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[1] "The Significance of the Historical Jesus for the Christian Faith," p. 4.

[2] *Ultimate Concern*, p. 143.

The temptations express clearly the finitude of Jesus. He is one who is anxious about having to die and lacking a definite place, who suffers bodily, social, and mental insecurity. Uncertainty is also clearly evident in Jesus' acceptance of the messianic title and his feeling of being forsaken on the Cross. And by choosing Judas to be one of his disciples Jesus implicated himself in Judas' guilt, thereby becoming tragically responsible for the guilt of those who kill him.[2] Thus, along with other aspects of the biblical picture of the Christ, the temptations illustrate vividly that Jesus as the Christ was subject to the finitude, anxiety, ambiguity, and even the guilt of existence. But they portray with equal force that the negativities of existence and estrangement are conquered by the Christ and brought into his unbroken unity with God.

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[1] Ibid., p. 145. The word "process" is significant here, for it has a rather clear adoptionist connotation.

[2] Systematic Theology, Vol. II, p. 133.

Tillich concludes that unless the temptations of Jesus as the Christ are taken with utter seriousness, his genuine humanity cannot but be undermined. But to take the temptations seriously raises the grave question as to whether the Christ is actually victorious over existential estrangement. After all, temptation presupposes desire toward that which has the power to tempt, and estrangement exists prior to the decision to succumb or not to succumb to the temptation. Moreover, one must confront the implication that the salvation of mankind is dependent on the finite, contingent decision of an individual man.[1]

Tillich deals with these problematical implications by stating first that _eros_ and _agape_ cannot contradict each other, if man is in essential unity with God (Adam) or in actual unity with God (the Christ). He may desire unity with the finite or finite fulfillment and thereby be tempted. But so long as this desire remains within the unity with God, it is not bad. Secondly, the biblical picture indicates that the Christ is the central link in the chain of divine revelations, and that his finite freedom was imbedded in his destiny. Hence, his resistance of temptation was an act of decision by himself and a result of divine destiny. "Beyond this unity we cannot go," maintains Tillich, "either in the case of Jesus or in the case of man universally."[2]

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[1] _Ibid._, pp. 128-131.

[2] _Ibid._, p. 130.

iii. Critique of Christological Dogma

The function of Christological dogma is to preserve the Christ-character or the divinity and the Jesus-character or the humanity of the event of Jesus as the Christ, the sum and substance of the Christian message. The decision of Nicea is basically Christological in that it established the identity of the power of the Christ with the power of the divine *logos*. However, the equation of the *logos* with the Father blurred the distinction between the Father and the Son, as in the Sabellian heresy. Whereas, the Arian heresy made the *logos* less in divine power so that he became a creature unable to save creation. Athanasius therefore injected the word *homo-ousios*--the same essence--to establish that God alone created the New Being. Hence, Tillich holds that Nicea succeeded in establishing that God Himself was present in Jesus of Nazareth, but that it did so at the expense of the Jesus-character of the Christ-event.[1]

The monophysitic tendency that grew out of the decision of Nicea was defeated at Chalcedon by men like Pope Leo, who emphasized the historical-dynamic character of the New Being in the Christ. Thus, the two great decisions of the early church preserved the Christ-character and the Jesus-character of Jesus as the Christ. But this happened in spite of inadequate conceptual tools. A critical and constructive task is therefore placed before the church.

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[1] *Ibid.*, p. 143.

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(1) Rejection of Two-nature Theory.--While accepting the substance of the Nicene and Chalcedonian decisions, Tillich attempts to give a constructive conceptual correction. His main criticism is levied against the word "nature." If the term "human nature" is applied to the Christ, it may mean essentially that he is a finite being. It may also imply that he has man's existential nature as possibility, but that it is taken into his unity with God. And, finally, it may indicate Jesus' involvement in the ambiguities of life. Due to this ambiguity "it is imperative to dismiss altogether the term 'human nature' in relation to the Christ and replace it by a description of the dynamics of his life--as we have tried to do."[1]

To apply the term "nature" to God is wrong. It denotes "essence"; whereas God is beyond essence and existence. Because God transcends every essence, no divine nature could be abstracted from his eternal creativity. Furthermore, if "divine nature" is used to refer to God who is beyond essence and existence, it is altogether inapplicable to Jesus as the Christ who is under the conditions of existence in a personal life.

(2) Dynamic Ontological Alternative.--Tillich proceeds to replace the assertion of the unity of the divine and human natures in Christ with the assertion that the eternal unity of God and man has become historical reality in Jesus as the Christ. The concept of "divine nature" is replaced by the concept "eternal God-man-unity," and in

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[1] *Ibid.*, p. 147.

place of "human nature" the Christ is spoken of as "essential man." "To essential man belongs the unity of his finiteness with his infinite," alleges Tillich, "and it is precisely this unity which I have called God-Manhood."[1]

Significantly, Tillich acknowledges a similarity between his interpretation of the Christ as "essential man" and Schleiermacher's description of Jesus as the Urbild ("original image") of what man essentially is and from which he has fallen. However, Schleiermacher's ascription of a God-consciousness to Jesus that is more powerful than that in other men is basically anthropological in nature. But the phrase "essential unity between God and man" has an ontological character. Furthermore, the term Urbild implies an idealistic transcendence of true humanity over human existence, while the "New Being" expresses the participation of him who is also essential man (Urbild) in existence and who conquers existence. "But these differences," concedes Tillich, "expressing variant presuppositions and consequences, should not hide the fact that similar problems and solutions arise when Protestant theology takes a path lying between classical and liberal Christology."[2]

Tillich recognizes that his alternative view to the two-nature doctrine appears to countenance a return from a Christology of Incarnation to a Christology of adoptionism. But he believes that both the incarnational and adoptionist sides of Christology must be retained, because adoptionism is clearly in accord with the biblical picture of the relationship between Jesus and God.

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[1] "A Reinterpretation of the Doctrine of the Incarnation," p. 143.

[2] Systematic Theology, Vol. II, p. 150.

> Looking at the relationship of Jesus and God as described in the Gospels we find . . . not a religious biography, but the picture of a man who is adopted by the Holy Spirit as the Messiah. . . . This is the biblical picture, but even those who try to describe the personal life of Jesus are doubtful whether he had the Messianic self-consciousness which is attributed to him in the Gospels.[1]

Actually, if we strip away the mythology, the New Testament picture of the Christ portrays a man who is driven by the divine Spirit to his function, to his message, to his work as Messiah, and who anticipates the coming of the Kingdom of God in his message.[2]

The genuine indispensability of adoptionism, therefore, consists in its ruling out the idea of a transmuted divine being and making real the living picture of the Christ in a personal life under the conditions of existence. But this leads inevitably to the question: Why Jesus? This question cannot be answered without an incarnational Christology.

The incarnational Christology helps to explain adoptionist Christology and to account for "the polarity of freedom and destiny which created the uninterrupted unity between him and God."[3] But it also needs the adoptionist side to avoid the pagan transmutation myth that the paradox of the Incarnation is that God becomes man.[4]

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[1] "The Significance of the Historical Jesus," p. 4.

[2] Ultimate Concern, p. 138.

[3] Systematic Theology, Vol. II, p. 149.

[4] "Reinterpretation of the Doctrine of the Incarnation," pp. 134-139.

> If the Christ--a transcendent, divine being--appears in the fullness of time, lives, dies and is resurrected, this is an historical myth. . . . Christianity speaks the mythological language like every other religion. . . . The task of theology is to give a radical criticism of the myth.[1]

By radical criticism Tillich has in mind a description of the Incarnation in one sense only, namely, "the manifestation of the essential God-manhood within and under the conditions of existence."[2] With these words Tillich dismisses the Chalcedonian doctrine on the grounds that it tends to involve theology in the absurd "attempt to explain the Incarnation in terms of a higher chemistry between finiteness and infinity."[3] Also, the logos doctrine is reinterpreted as the total manifestation of the eternal relation of God to man in a personal life. Tillich writes: "If the egeneto in the Johannine sentence, Logos sarx egeneto, the 'Word became flesh,' is pressed, we are in the midst of a mythology of metamorphosis."[4]

One of the implications of this revision of the concept of Incarnation is the allowance for other such incarnations in other areas and periods of history. "The manifestation of the saving power in one place implies that saving power is operating in all places."[5] In fact, everything is in such an interdependent relationship with everything else in the totality of being, so that nature participates in history and the universe itself participates in salvation.[1]

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[1] Dynamics of Faith, pp. 51-54.

[2] "Reinterpretation of the Doctrine of the Incarnation," p. 139.

[3] Ibid.

[4] Systematic Theology, Vol. II, p. 149.

[5] Ibid., p. 96.

iv. Universal Significance of the New Being

(1) Uniqueness and Universality.--All Christological assertions are fundamentally soteriological in nature, as they express the claim of Christianity that it is Jesus as the Christ who brings the New Being and saves men from existential estrangement. The uniqueness of the event of Jesus as the Christ consists in its universal significance. The individual traits ascribed to the Christ in the New Testament are important only because they are translucent for the New Being, which has universal significance.

The foregoing statements are in complete accord with Tillich's doctrine of symbols, which allows that a finite being or thing has significance as a religious symbol or medium of revelation only in so far as it is transparent to being-itself or that which is of ultimate concern. Understandably Tillich therefore believes that symbols or myths provide the decisive way for expressing the universal meaning of the whole event of Jesus of Nazareth, and that they must be criticized on the basis of their power to express the New Being in Jesus as the Christ.

(2) The Symbols of the Cross and the Resurrection.--The two central symbols of the Christian faith are the Cross and the Resurrection.

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1. Cf. Paul Tillich, "The Redemption of Nature," Christendom, Vol. X (Summer, 1945), pp. 299-306; "Redemption in Cosmic and Social History," Journal of Religious Thought, Vol. III (Autumn-Winter, 1946), pp. 17-27.

They are interdependent, as they express the subjection of the Christ to existence and his conquest of existence. The difference is that while the Cross took place "in the full light of historical observation, the stories of the Resurrection spread a veil of deep mystery over the event."[1] But this is a qualitative difference. Both combine the symbolic or mythical and the factual.

The Cross undoubtedly was an event which occurred in time and space, but it is also a symbol of universal significance. Tillich declares: "My Christology and my Dogmatics were determined by the interpretation of the Cross of Christ as the event of history in which the divine judgment over the world became concrete and manifest."[2] Because the Cross resolves the tension between the conditional and the Unconditional,[3] Tillich believes that it is a symbol which reaches above the God of theism. After all, the Crucified did cry out to the "God who remained his God after the God of confidence had left him in the darkness of doubt and meaninglessness."[4] It is within this context that Tillich contends that Protestantism alone has given the Cross its due place, since the Protestant principle is identical with the message of the Cross.[5]

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1. Systematic Theology, Vol. II, p. 153.

2. The Interpretation of History, p. 32.

3. The Protestant Era, p. 79. 4. The Courage to Be, p. 188.

5. Tillich believes that the most serious weakness of Roman Catholicism is its failure to take seriously enough the Cross. Cf. Dynamics of Faith, p. 98.

The event of Golgotha stands at the heart of history and thus transforms history. That is, it provides history with its ultimate aim and meaning, so that "you and I are no more, and should not be anymore, what we were before."[1] Actually, the message of the Cross discloses that Jesus as the Christ is the only reality "where there is not Yes and No, but only Yes."[2] The absolute centrality of the Cross in Christianity is attested by Tillich's avowal that the "greatest in power and wisdom could not more fully reveal the heart of God and the heart of man than the Crucified has done already."[3] The centrality of the Cross for Christianity may be stated with still greater force: "In the moment Christ, or Jesus, went the way of the Cross, he could become the Christ, and not before."[4] Again, "Jesus could not have been the Christ without sacrificing himself as Jesus to himself as the Christ."[5]

Tillich firmly believes that we ought to interpret the symbol of the Cross in the intricate form just delineated. This belief is congruent with his contention that the symbol of the Cross stands the double test of finality: "uninterrupted unity with the ground of his being and the continuous sacrifice of himself as Jesus to himself as the Christ."[6] The word "continuous" is significant here, because it indicates Tillich's concern to treat the Cross not as an isolated event but as one toward which the life of the Christ is directed and in which the other events of his life receive their meaning. Other reports and symbols in the New Testament corroborate this central symbol. The kenotic passage in Philippians 2, his birth, loneliness, suffering, the scene of Gethsemane--all point to the subjection of him who is the bearer of the New Being to the destructive structures of the old eon.[1]

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[1] The Shaking of the Foundations, p. 186.

[2] The New Being, p. 103.

[3] The Shaking of the Foundations, p. 80.

[4] Ultimate Concern, p. 76.

[5] Dynamics of Faith, pp. 97-98.

[6] Systematic Theology, Vol. I, p. 170.

In treating the symbol of the Resurrection Tillich's foremost concern, especially in his preaching, is to establish its interdependent relationship to the Cross. For instance, in his sermon "Universal Salvation," Tillich declares:

> Resurrection is not something added to the death of him who is the Christ; but it is implied in his death. . . . The tombs were opened and bodies were raised when one man in whom God was present without limits committed his spirit into his Father's hands.[2]

Similarly, Tillich appears to expound the view that the meaning of the Cross is the victory which is given in death and that the resurrection is also crucifixion in the sermon entitled, "Born in the Grave."

> The Christ must be buried in order to be the Christ, namely he who has conquered death. . . . The answer of Easter has become possible precisely because the Christ has been buried. The new life would not really be new life if it did not come from the complete end of the old life... . But if the new life has come out of the grave, the Messiah himself has appeared.[3]

As a systematic theologian Tillich points out that the idea of resurrection was a familiar mythological symbol in polytheistic cults and in apocalyptic Judaism which was applied to the Christ. But this does not vitiate the fact that the church was born because a group of followers were grasped by the certainty of his resurrection, the certainty that the bringer of the new eon was victorious over the old eon. "A real experience," writes Tillich, "made it possible for the disciples to apply the known symbol of resurrection to Jesus . . . it was a combination of event and symbol."[1]

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[1] Ibid., Vol. II, pp. 158-159.

[2] The New Being, pp. 178-179.

[3] The Shaking of the Foundations, pp. 166-168.

It appears, then, that the factual element which underlies the symbol of the resurrection is guaranteed by faith, just as the historical Jesus is guaranteed by faith, which means, of course, that it is beyond the grip of historical research. "It is the certainty of one's own victory over the death of existential estrangement which creates the certainty of the Resurrection of the Christ as an event and symbol."[2]

In light of this explanation Tillich rejects the physical theory which identifies the resurrection with the presence or absence of a physical body, on the grounds that it leads to absurd questions of physics and chemistry. He also discounts the spiritual theory which explains the appearances as manifestations of the soul of Jesus to his followers, because it fails to explain the factual side of his reappearance as a total personality. Likewise the psychological theory speaks of the presence of Christ mentally to his followers but fails to account for the reality of the event.

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[1] Ibid., p. 154.

[2] Ibid., p. 155.

In the wake of the affirmed inadequacy of these theories Tillich proposes the "restitution theory" as a means of explaining the reality of the resurrection of the Christ. This view holds that the resurrection is not the revival of an individual man nor his reappearance as a spirit; rather it is the overcoming of the disappearance of him whose being was the New Being from present experience. The New Being necessarily overcomes such transitoriness, but does this mean that the bearer of the New Being, Jesus, is dispensed with? The problem is resolved in an ecstatic experience in which the concrete picture of Jesus of Nazareth became indissolubly united with the reality of the New Being.

> Faith provides the certainty that the picture of the Christ in the Gospels is a personal life in which the New Being has appeared in its fullness and that the death of Jesus of Nazareth was not able to separate the New Being from the picture of its bearer.[1]

Thus, Tillich believes that his restitution theory keeps nearer to the oldest source (I Cor. 15) which focuses on the meaning of the resurrection for the disciples.

The New Testament contains other reports or events which confirm or corroborate the symbol of the resurrection. The symbol of pre-existence and the Logos doctrine point to the presence of the eternal principle of self-manifestation in Jesus of Nazareth. Post-existence is simply a corresponding symbol of pre-existence. The myth of the Virgin Birth may be seriously questioned as to its symbolic value, but it rightly points to the fact that "the New Being is independent of historical contingencies and dependent on God alone."[1] The miracles of Jesus anticipate the victory of the New Being over existential self-destruction. The Ascension is another symbolic expression of the same event the Resurrection expresses. The symbol of the Lord of history means simply that nothing can happen in history to make the work of the New Being impossible. The _parousia_ of the Christ excludes the expectation of a superior manifestation of the New Being and affirms that the power of the demonic is broken in principle--in power and beginning--in the New Being in Jesus as the Christ. The last judgment is best expressed by the Fourth Gospel as an immanent judgment going on in history "even where the name of Jesus is not known but where the power of the New Being, which is his being, is present or absent."[2] Ultimately the ambiguous elements of reality will be separated or purified and elevated into the transcendent unity of the Kingdom of God. This, too, corroborates the symbol of the Resurrection.

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[1] Ibid., p. 158.

v. _The New Being as the Power of Salvation_

Tillich concludes his correlation of the revelatory answer in the Christ with the questions of man and the universal quest for the New Being with an exposition of the doctrine of atonement and the meaning of salvation.

(1) _The Doctrine of the Atonement_.--The doctrine of the atonement is composed of a divine act and a human reaction. It describes the

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[1] _Ibid._, p. 160.

[2] _Ibid._, p. 164

manifestation of the New Being which has an atoning effect, an overcoming of the estrangement between God and man in so far as it is a matter of human guilt. But this divine act is effective only if man reacts and accepts the divine offer of reconciliation in spite of guilt. Thus, there are an objective and a subjective element in the doctrine of atonement, and the two major types of the doctrine reflect an emphasis on one or the other of these two elements.

The objective type, represented by Origen, stresses the kind of cosmic drama in which God through Christ deals a death blow to Satan and frees man from the demonic power. This is objectionable, because there can be no salvation outside of man's experience and acceptance of it.

Abelard's view stresses the subjective element in the atonement. According to this view, salvation is accomplished by man's response of answering love to the picture of Christ the Crucified in his self-surrendering love. God is thereby seen as a God of love and not wrath. Psychologically this view is insufficient to take away the anxiety about guilt and to give man a good conscience. Theologically it fails to include divine justice in God's love, and love becomes sentimentality.

A mediating view is that of Anselm which starts with the tension between God's wrath and love and shows that the suffering of Christ satisfies God's demand for justice, thus enabling God to forego the punishment of man for his sin and thereby exercise love and mercy. Only the God-Man could suffer as a man yet not for his own sins. The consciousness of guilt is affirmed, and the believer may pray for forgiveness because of the substitutional suffering of the Christ.

Integral to Anselm's view is the idea of the Mediator. So long as the Mediator is understood to represent God to man and man to God in his attempt to reunite what is estranged, the term is acceptable. The term fosters theological difficulty, however, in that it implies a third reality between God and man. The implication is that God himself must be reconciled, whereas God is actually eternally reconciled and seeks to reconcile us to him. The term "Redeemer" has a similar dangerous semantic connotation. So long as it implies a liberation of man from demonic powers, it is acceptable. But its danger lies in creating an image of someone who must pay the price to demonic power so that God may be able to free men from guilt and sin.

Thus Tillich concludes that, in the final analysis, Anselm's view fails to provide for the subjective side of the atoning process.[1] Tillich further believes that the concept of "substitution" ought to be replaced by the concept of "participation" which would balance the objective and subjective aspects of the atonement. He then offers six principles which should guide further development of the doctrine: (a) The atoning processes are created by God alone with the Christ mediating this reconciling act. (b) There can be no conflict between God's love and justice. (c) Man's sin and radical estrangement must

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1. Ibid., pp. 170-172.

be taken seriously. (d) God's participation in man's estrangement and non-being to overcome them is essential to atonement. (e) The Cross is the central manifestation of God's taking upon himself the consequences of human guilt.[1] (f) By freely participating in the New Being, which is the being of Jesus as the Christ, man participates in the atoning act of God. Only through man's participation in the divine participation does the atoning act of God in the Christ become effective.[2]

(2) The Meaning of Salvation.--Salvation means "healing" or "reuniting that which is estranged, giving a center to what is split, overcoming the split between God and man, man and his world, man and himself."[3] The term "New Being" attempts to comprehend this full meaning of salvation. Salvation may be described as healing and saving power through the New Being in all history, and all men must participate in this healing power of the New Being in some degree. If they did not and were not at least partially healed, the forces of self-destruction and estrangement would have destroyed them.

Two very serious implications of the foregoing statement are: (a) there can be salvation apart from Jesus as the Christ; (b) the New Being is manifest in Jesus as the Christ but is not identical with Jesus as the Christ. These implications are contained in Tillich's affirmation that it would be absurd to make salvation dependent on an encounter with Jesus as the Christ and the acceptance of his saving power, because this would mean that only a small number of human beings would ever reach salvation. Thus, one cannot say that there is no healing power apart from the New Being in Jesus as the Christ. But one may say that the New Being in Jesus as the Christ is the ultimate criterion of every healing and saving process, since in him the saving quality is complete and unlimited.[1]

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[1] "The paradox of the Cross [is] that God is present in an actual human body and that it is just in suffering that his majesty is revealed." The Religious Situation, p. 170.

[2] Systematic Theology, Vol. II, pp. 168-176.

[3] Ibid., p. 166.

The preceding considerations are fully understandable against the background of Tillich's doctrine of revelation. It will be recalled that there is an equivalence of salvation and revelation, and that the revelation in Jesus as the Christ is final. "Final" means decisive and complete and in no way implies that all revelation must center in Jesus as the Christ. However, in the history of revelation the event of Jesus as the Christ is central. The universal _logos_ or principle of divine self-manifestation prepares for and is identical with the _logos_ manifested in Jesus as the Christ. Revelatory events, then, do occur apart from the appearance of Jesus as the Christ, and in them the saving power of the New Being is present. To be sure, it is present in a preparatory and fragmentary way and is open to demonic distortion, but it _is_ present and heals wherever it is seriously accepted.[2]

Tillich concludes his treatment of salvation by reinterpreting the classical doctrines of regeneration, justification, and sanctification. Regeneration is interpreted as man's being "grasped" by the power of the New Being so that he participates in the New Being, in the new state of things that the Christ has brought. Regeneration thus precedes justification, since justification presupposes faith, the state of being grasped by the divine presence or Spirit.

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[1] _Ibid._, pp. 167-168.

[2] _Ibid._, p. 167.

Justification is the divine acceptance of man who is estranged from the ground of being and therefore unacceptable. Having been drawn into the power of the New Being, man is enabled to accept this acceptance in spite of his guilt. Both regeneration and justification are therefore descriptions of the reunion of the estranged, of the acceptance of the unacceptable.

"Sanctification is the process in which the power of the New Being transforms personality and community, inside and outside the church."[1] From this it follows that the doctrines of the Spirit and of the Kingdom of God are integral to Christology and *vice versa*. It is appropriate, therefore, to acknowledge the centrality of Christology in Tillich's theology and to give an over-view of the central significance of Christology in his theological system, even if in a somewhat oversimplified manner.

3. The Central Significance of Christology in Tillich's Theology

In the initial pages of his *magnum opus* Tillich confirms the central importance of Christology in his system by *the definition of his* theology as apologetic. It is apologetic because it seeks to state in meaningful terms the Christian message--the New Being in Jesus as the Christ. Believing that the universal logos has become concrete in Jesus as the Christ the apologetic theologian assumes responsibility for giving a methodological interpretation of the event of Jesus as the Christ.

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[1] *Ibid.*, pp. 179-180.

The method of correlation is subservient to the stated apologetic task. It consists in a philosophical analysis of man's situation out of which are derived the questions which Christian theology must answer. In demonstrating how the symbols of the Christian faith answer such questions, the theologian necessarily centers on Jesus as the Christ, who is the prime symbol. All other symbols simply corroborate this central symbol, just as all Christian dogmas corroborate and are commentary on the Christological dogma.

The implications of Christology are also discernible in the doctrine of religious symbols and belief-ful realism. To the eyes of faith everything that is may be symbolic, since it participates in the ground of being. In so far as a finite being or thing is transparent to the ground of being, it functions as a religious symbol. The continual search by the belief-ful realist for those symbols which point most clearly beyond themselves to being-itself finds its fulfillment in Jesus as the Christ. This central symbol of the Christian faith meets the dual test of finality--it negates itself without losing itself and is completely transparent to the ground of being. It is difficult not to believe that the symbols of the Cross and the Christ are not only the fulfillment of belief-ful realism but provide the impetus for Tillich's doctrine of religious symbols at the outset.

Tillich's *doctrine of God* is placed within an ontological framework in which there is an immediate awareness of God as being-itself. This mystical *a priori* is possible because of the *analogia entis* between God and man that depends on the *logos* structure of man and reality, and because man is the *microcosmos* whose direct encounter with the world makes possible ontological concepts which apply universally to being-itself. Thus, in man's awareness of his finitude he experiences an ontological shock which drives him to the question of being itself or the question of God. In spite of the unmistakable primacy of ontology and consequent subordination of Christian elements to ontological exigencies in the doctrine of God, Tillich insists that his discussion of God is grounded in the experience of ultimate concern. He also adds that for the Christian the object of this ultimate concern is the concrete manifestation of the universal *logos*, the nature of being-itself, in Jesus as the Christ.

The significance of Christology in the *doctrine of revelation* in Tillich's theology may be readily ascertained. To his phenomenological description of revelation as mystery, miracle, and ecstasy, terms which stress the given and reception sides of revelation, Tillich adds a critical element. This critical element is the manifestation of the universal *logos* in Jesus as the Christ. By it all other manifestations of the ground of being are judged, because the Christ-event alone provides complete transparency to the logos of being-itself. Moreover, the revelatory answer which is correlated to the antinomies of actual reason is not simply revelation but final revelation. The transparency of Jesus as the Christ to the ground of being causes autonomous reason to recognize its depth or participation in the universal logos. The sacrifice of Jesus to himself as the Christ causes heteronomy to stop elevating the finite to absoluteness. Autonomy and heteronomy thus find their common unity in the ground of being. The human and historical Jesus answers the demand of relativism, and by the sacrificing of himself as Jesus to the Christ the demand of absolutism is met. The concrete absolute resolves the conflict. Final revelation also resolves the conflict of formalism and emotionalism by manifesting the logos structure of reason and revealing the participation of persons in being-itself. As a result, salvation and revelation are inseparable from each other and from the New Being in Jesus as the Christ.

The explication of the divine Spirit or Spiritual Presence in the third volume of Systematic Theology is governed by the manifestation of the New Being in Jesus as the Christ. The Spiritual Presence which grasps man and delivers him from the ambiguities of life in all of history is mediated through sacraments and the Word of God. Both media are judged by their ability to express the New Being in Jesus as the Christ, for only in Jesus as the Christ is the divine Spirit present without distortion.[1] Because Jesus of Nazareth was entirely grasped by the Spiritual Presence, he was the Christ, the Son of God.[1] Hence, the Spiritual Presence cannot be differently manifested "before" or "after" the event of Jesus as the Christ. Indeed, "in the divine economy, the Spirit follows the Son, but in essence the Son _is_ the Spirit."[2]

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[1] Ibid., Vol. III, p. 144.

In Tillich's _ecclesiology and philosophy of history_ the normative role of Christology may be clearly grasped. The Christian church is the "manifest" Spiritual Community which results from the impact of the Spiritual Presence and whose ultimate criterion is the manifestation of the Spiritual Presence as the New Being in Jesus as the Christ. Churches are therefore representatives of the Kingdom of God in history; they are not identical with the Kingdom of God.[3] In actual life the churches are caught in the web of ambiguity, and the Christ-event on which they are based is interpreted in contradictory ways. Nevertheless, one may say that "where there are churches confessing their foundations in the Christ as the central manifestation of the Kingdom of God in history there the church is."[4] Moreover, the churches may still be considered to be the real bearers of history, because they have within themselves the criterion of judging themselves--the witness to the criterion and source of the saving power of history, the New Being in Jesus as the Christ.

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[1] _Ibid._, pp. 129-134, 146-147.

[2] _Ibid._, p. 148.

[3] The "Kingdom of God" symbolizes the universal essentialization or overcoming of the ambiguities of life which is the fulfillment of history. This goal cannot be attained within history, however, because of the ambiguities which result from existential estrangement and which are found in such functions of life as self-integration, self-production, and self-transcendence. However, Christianity believes that in Jesus as the Christ the ultimate victory over the demonic forces in history has taken place, thereby securing the ultimate aim of history and establishing that the answer to the ambiguities of life is the Kingdom of God whose foundation and central manifestation is in Jesus as the Christ. Cf. _Ibid._, Vol. III, pp. 310, 373.

[4] _Ibid._, p. 378.

This brief survey of Tillich's theological system indicates that despite philosophical-ontological tendencies Tillich has sought to take seriously his own theological dictum: "Historically and systematically everything else in Christianity is a corroboration of the simple assertion that Jesus is the Christ."[1]

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[1] *Ibid.*, Vol. II, p. 92.

CHAPTER V

COMPARISON AND EVALUATION OF THE CHRISTOLOGIES OF SCHLEIERMACHER AND TILLICH

We have seen that Tillich places himself alongside Schleiermacher in an attempt to mediate between classical and liberal Christology.[1] Like Schleiermacher, he is concerned to replace the two-nature doctrine by a doctrine of an eternal, essential unity of God and man in the Christ. This central area of convergence is corroborated by several other areas of convergence in their thought on Christology. In comparing the Christologies of these men on the basis of the preceding exposition, it is therefore appropriate to treat initially the areas in which convergence or affinity is rather clearly discernible.

1. Areas of Convergence

i. Man: His Sin and Need of Salvation

Because of a mutual concern to make meaningful and relevant the person and work of the Christ to the church immediately and the world mediately, Tillich and Schleiermacher begin their Christological constructions with an analysis of man and his situation. Their anthropological statements subserve their treatments of soteriology and

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[1] Systematic Theology, Vol. II, p. 150.

Christology, which they hold to be inseparable. For both theologians "man" means "man-in-relation" to himself as a centered self, to the world, and to God. He is the image of the universal logos, the microcosmos, the imago Dei.[1] Schleiermacher speaks of the original perfection of man and the world, thereby establishing that sin is not a part of man's essential nature and that the totality of existence is fully capable of the infinite.[2] Moreover, he asserts that the possibility resides in human nature to be determined completely by God-consciousness. Similarly, Tillich rejects Brunner's view that sin is part of man's nature and affirms the "infra Lutheranum," the view that the finite is capable of the infinite or that the infinite is present in everything finite.[3] In other words, the essential being of man is not disrupted by non-being and the negativities of existence.

These statements on the essential being of man must be affirmed; otherwise, the unity of creation would be undermined in the attempt to explain how the Christ or the Redeemer could appear within existence and share our humanity. Furthermore, to deny such anthropological declarations would involve a denial of man's capability for recognizing his need of salvation or for acknowledging Him who brings salvation. Both men recognize, however, that man in actuality is not what he is essentially, and the similarity of their descriptions of this universal and actual state of man is striking indeed.

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[1] Soliloquies, pp. 11, 82; Systematic Theology, Vol. I, pp. 23, 25, 118, 261.

[2] The Christian Faith, p. 233.

[3] Paul Tillich, "Autobiographical Reflections," The Theology of Paul Tillich, p. 5. It has been previously noted that this view is integral to his belief-ful realism and doctrine of symbols.

According to Schleiermacher, man is universally conscious of his failure to actualize the possibility of being determined by God-consciousness. He is in a disordered state of being in which the sensible consciousness has priority; the feeling of absolute dependence is attached to a worldly or finite object; the flesh has the lead over the spirit; and the underived self is in conflict with the outer-determined self. Sin is really man's alienation from his true self and from God. It is a derangement of man's nature, "a state of becoming of fallenness and corruption or of discord and confusion, and he finds his redemption only in Man as such, Man-in-himself."[1]

Likewise for Tillich sin is the state of estrangement in which man existentially or actually is separated from his essential being or nature. Man is universally in a state of unreconciled duality in which ultimate and preliminary concerns are in conflict, God is not all in all, and, as a consequence of hubris, man is in a confused state of separation from himself, God, and the world.[2]

It is significant to note that both men avoid the idea of original sin in the Augustinian sense. Schleiermacher insists that there can be no historical doctrine of the Fall of Adam, that the incapacity for good is a universal state that existed even prior to the first sin, and that Adam and all men are the same. To acknowledge the universal and corporate sinfulness of man is quite sufficient.[1] Tillich also discounts the idea of a historical Fall and interprets the Fall as a symbol depicting man's fall from his essence or the transition from essence to existence which takes place universally in all events in time and space.

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[1] Christmas Eve, p. 70.

[2] Systematic Theology, Vol. II, pp. 47, 50, 52, 56.

It is clear that Schleiermacher and Tillich believe that sins are but manifestations of sin, the universal human state of derangement and estrangement. Schleiermacher contends that sin is divinely ordained in relation to grace in order to produce in man a longing for and receptivity to the redemption communicated by the Redeemer. And Tillich conceives of man's finite freedom and personal responsibility for sin as being imbedded in the universal destiny of existence.

Such reinterpretations of the Fall and original sin serve the common intent of the two men to counteract the Pelagian error, which attributes sin exclusively to man's responsibility, which tends to deny a real need of salvation, and the Manichaean error, which views sin as independent of divine causality and solely a result of universal destiny. The latter error implies that man is so infected with sin that he is incapable of receiving or recognizing the need of salvation. This both men decry. They conjointly maintain that the universal consciousness of sin carries with it a universal consciousness of the need of salvation, a restoration of harmony within man and his relationships with the world and God. Schleiermacher declares that Christ, not Adam, produces the universal awareness of sin and that there is a concomitant consciousness of the need of the Redeemer.[1] For Tillich, consciousness of estrangement results because salvation is fragmentarily at work; thus there is a universal quest for the New Being which presupposes the presence of the New Being.[2]

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[1] The Christian Faith, pp. 98, 303.

ii. Biblical Witness

Schleiermacher and Tillich seek to develop their Christologies in accord with their critical reading of the New Testament. Although their critical reading is somewhat divergent, there are several points of agreement with respect to their understanding of the biblical witness to the Christ.

The two men share the conviction that the New Testament was written by the earliest community of believers, which was the locus of the divine Spirit. The writers were influenced by the Spirit and thus their writings may be said to be inspired. Because there could not have been an absolute uniformity of influence of the Spirit on the writers themselves, not all parts of the New Testament are of equal spiritual value. For example, both men believe that the idea of the Virgin Birth has limited spiritual or symbolic value, because it tends to undermine the humanity of Christ. Thus their preference for the Fourth Gospel with its _logos_ doctrine is unconcealed, and they contend that their Christologies rest equally on the Johannine expression, "the Word became flesh," and the Pauline expression, "God was in Christ."

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[1] _The Christian Faith_, pp. 233, 244, 247, 256.

[2] _Systematic Theology_, Vol. II, pp. 79-86.

Nevertheless, neither man believes in citing passages of Scripture to prove a Christological point. Acknowledging the interpretative nature of all New Testament accounts and reports, the passage in Philippians, chapter 2, for example, is rejected in its literal sense, as is the possibility of constructing a _Chronik_ of Jesus on the basic of the sources. Yet both men aver that the basic source of any Christological construction must be the New Testament _picture_ of Jesus as the Christ or the Redeemer. Tillich declares that the biblical picture of Jesus as the Christ is the historical foundation of _the_ Christian faith itself, and Schleiermacher says that "even now His Spiritual Presence is mediated through the written word and the picture it contains of his being and influence."[1]

The word "picture" for both men means the total, united witness of the New Testament to the Christ which focuses on the totality of his being. In a rather Johannine manner they insist that the being of the Christ makes him the Christ or the Redeemer rather than his words or teachings or even his miracles. The latter simply express or confirm who He is. His uninterrupted unity with the Father is indicated by the fact that the New Testament picture of Jesus portrays no estrangement from God in any moment of his life. Yet the New Testament makes it quite clear that the Christ participated fully in the flesh, in the corporate sinfulness of man. This is the absolute paradox of the Christian faith. The entire New Testament witness to Jesus as the Christ or the Redeemer is what Christology is concerned to explicate and make relevant to the church and to the world.

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[1] _The Christian Faith_, p. 467.

iii. Adoptionism and Incarnation

In the Christologies of Schleiermacher and Tillich the attempt to balance the adoptionistic and incarnational Christologies may be clearly discerned. Adoptionistic tendencies permeate the thought of each man on the genuine humanity of the Christ. Conversely, insofar as each man attempts to explain the qualitative difference between the Christ and other men, to establish the genuine divinity of the Christ, he espouses an incarnational Christology. It is precisely this co-ordinate attempt at mediation or dialectical balancing of the fundamental aspects of Christology that produces some major divergences between the two men, especially with respect to adoptionism. Nevertheless, points of convergence on both sides of their dialectical Christological construction must not be overlooked.

In order to counteract the docetic-monophysitic heresy both men affirm the genuine humanity of the Christ. That which is affirmed, however, bears real affinities with an adoptionistic Christology. That the Christ was absolutely supernatural and different from other men in an unlimited sense is denied, for then He could not have entered human life in order to redeem us from our corporated life of sin. This would entail a virtual undermining of the Christian faith itself. Therefore, Schleiermacher and Tillich, out of a concern to allow for the divinity of Christ while expounding His genuine humanity, commonly embrace the "*infra Lutheranum*," the view that the finite is capable of the infinite, that sin is not a part of the essential nature of man, and that in human nature resides the possibility for man's being determined absolutely by God-consciousness. In this way the idea of a transmuted divine being is excluded and the personal life of the Christ under the conditions of existence is propounded.

Certainly it is clear that neither theologian is in search of a Christ who as the absolute paradox of the finite and the infinite negates the continuity of humanity. Schleiermacher reveals rather pointedly his adoptionistic proclivity by speaking of the appearance of the Redeemer as the event in which "the historical became ideal." By this he means that the will and person of Jesus had much to do with God's choosing him to be the Redeemer as revealed in his baptismal experience. Similarly, Tillich states that if the New Testament is stripped of mythology what we have is not a religious biography but the picture of a man adopted by God as the Messiah. Indeed, he says that at Baptism his human spirit was entirely grasped by the divine Spirit.[1]

Schleiermacher and Tillich appeal to the incarnational Christology of the Fourth Gospel with its logos doctrine to explain the adoptionistic strands of their Christological constructions. The Johannine doctrine is interpreted by Schleiermacher to mean that the ideal, the consciousness or thought of God, became historical in Jesus and each historical moment of his experience bore within it the ideal.[2] To declare that Jesus had an absolutely potent God-consciousness or that in him was the veritable existence of God is the same thing. The divine decree of creation and the decree that Jesus of Nazareth should be the Redeemer in the fulness of time are one.

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[1] Systematic Theology, Vol. III, p. 144.

[2] The Christian Faith, p. 377.

These incarnational statements rather decisively offset the wholesale adoptionistic notion that Christ is a product of human development, that he is wholly natural, or that faith made Jesus the Redeemer. Schleiermacher straightforwardly proposes: "Christ is . . . Man-in-himself, the Eternal Being in the process of change and becoming, the unity of the divine and earthly."[1]

Essentially Tillich's incarnational emphasis parallels that of Schleiermacher. Just as Schleiermacher expounds the paradox of Christian message as the appearance of Man-in-himself in the process of change and becoming, so Tillich writes of the appearing in one personal life of essential manhood under the conditions of existence without being conquered by them.[2] Also, whereas Schleiermacher includes the idea of divine election to explain how it was that in the fulness of time Jesus was chosen to be the Redeemer, Tillich invokes the concept of kairos and the polarity of freedom and destiny to help make understandable the uninterrupted unity between Jesus and God.[3]

Summarily, Schleiermacher and Tillich concurrently conclude that both the incarnational and adoptionistic Christologies have biblical roots and that neither of them can be carried out without the other.

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[1] Christmas Eve, p. 78. [2] Systematic Theology, Vol. II, p. 94.

[3] Ibid., p. 149.

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iv. Alternative to Doctrine of Two Natures

Schleiermacher and Tillich accept the substance of the decisions of Nicea and Chalcedon which establish the humanity and divinity of the Christ. They are critical, however, of the doctrine of the unity of two natures in the Christ. The concept "nature" is believed to be inadequate. It implies that which is corporeal, divided, conditioned, or simply "essence." In any event it is inapplicable to God, because God is unconditioned and beyond essence and existence. Thus the idea of a "divine nature" in the Christ is dismissed.

Even the idea of "human nature" is not without ambiguity. Schleiermacher points out that to speak of a human nature alongside a divine nature implies two wills and tends to obfuscate the acknowledgment of Christ as a "person," a centered being with one will. Tillich goes a step farther by advocating that the term "human nature" should be dropped, because it may mean essential human nature or existential human nature or even an ambiguous unity of these two.

Believing that the two-nature theory inadequately explains the relationship between the divine and human in the Christ, they propose an alternative doctrine which focuses almost exclusively on the relationship itself. Their relational view purports to clarify uniquely the perfect, eternal, and essential unity between God and man that became historical reality in the Christ. Schleiermacher expresses this unity in terms of Jesus' absolutely potent God-consciousness which determines every moment of his life. This means that Jesus is the Urbild, the archetypal person or the original image of God and of what man is essentially. Tillich replaces the concept "divine nature" with the concepts "eternal-God-man-unity" or "Eternal God-Manhood" and affirms that in the being of the Christ this reestablished unity between God and man has taken place under the conditions of existence. This he calls the New Being.

While acknowledging the similarity of his alternative view with that of Schleiermacher, Tillich insists that the idea of God-consciousness has an anthropological connotation or implies a state of man, whereas the phrase "essential unity between God and man" has an ontological character.[1] However, what should not be overlooked here is Schleiermacher's insistence that to attribute to Jesus an absolutely potent God-consciousness is to attribute to him the veritable existence of God in him. Also, in rejecting the idea that the human nature was totally passive while the divine was totally active in Christ, Schleiermacher declares that the human nature was responsive to the divine in the formation of the personality of Christ. But once the union of the divine and human was effected, every activity in Christ was the common activity of the being of God in Christ and the human nature.[2]

Tillich also believes that Schleiermacher's term Urbild ("essential man") for the Christ implies an idealistic transcendence of true humanity over human existence, whereas his own term "New Being" signifies a decisive participation in existence and a conquering of it.[3] Again Tillich believes that the ontological element makes the difference. But here again Schleiermacher must be heard more completely. He maintains

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[1] Systematic Theology, Vol. II, p. 94. [2] The Christian Faith, p. 398.

[3] Systematic Theology, Vol. II, p. 150.

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that the Urbild, the Word, or the ideal became historical in Jesus of Nazareth, thereby participating in the corporate sinfulness of man. "Christ is . . . Man-in-himself," he writes, "the Eternal Being in the process of change and becoming, the unity of the divine and earthly."[1] This statement points rather decisively to the essential agreement between the two men on a relational alternative to the doctrine of the two natures. But perhaps Tillich's explanation of his concept of the essential unity of God and man re-established in the Christ most clearly indicates his basic affinity with Schleiermacher: "One can only say that it is a community between God and the center of a personal life which determines all utterances of this life and resists the attempts within existential estrangement to disrupt it."[2]

v. Soteriology

Tillich and Schleiermacher write as members of the Christian church who participate in and experience the "new life" or "new being" released by the Christ. Their discourse about Christ stems from knowledge out of experience with him rather than knowledge about him, and the resultant Christology is essentially a function of soteriology. All assertions which are then made about Jesus as the Redeemer or the Christ are basically soteriological in nature, for Christology is concerned with the one who comes to save men from their corporate sinfulness and existence in the old eon. Indeed, both men contend that the Christ has universal significance as the bringer of salvation and that ultimately all mankind is destined to participate in the salvation he brings.[1] There can be, then, no essential separation of the person and work of the Christ.

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[1] Christmas Eve, p. 78.

[2] Systematic Theology, Vol. II, p. 148.

Salvation is equated with revelation in the thought of each man, although revelation is interpreted somewhat differently by them, as will be illustrated subsequently. Schleiermacher's view of redemption as an increase of God-consciousness among believers is approximated in Tillich's view of revelation as that which produces an increased awareness of God. They concur that revelation is not self-produced but must be received by man, that salvation or redemption is solely the work of God through the Christ, and that man must participate in this God-consciousness or New Being in the Christ to experience it. It is Christ's communication of his God-consciousness which makes this "participation" possible in Schleiermacher's thinking, and it is man's being "grasped" by the New Being in Tillich's thought.

The characterizations of salvation or redemption offered by the two men are virtually interchangeable at several points. Salvation connotes healing, a reuniting of the separated, or an overcoming of the split between man and himself, other men, and God. Through participation in the God-consciousness of Christ or the New Being in the Christ, man is brought out of the old life of becoming, fallenness, discord and corruption into the new life of essential man-in-himselfness or into the New Being.[2] This experience of regeneration carries with it an experience of blessedness or forgiveness in that the connection between sin and evil

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[1] Cf. The New Being, p. 103; The Christian Faith, p. 549.

[2] Das Leben Jesu, pp. 304-310; Christmas Eve, p. 70; Systematic Theology, Vol. II, p. 166.

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as the punishment for sin is dissolved. The regenerate man is justified in that by faith he is made a child of God, an object of God's pleasure.[1] Or what is the same, man is divinely accepted in spite of his being unacceptable, and this acceptance is accepted by man only because he has been drawn into the power of the New Being in the Christ.[2] For both men, then, faith, regeneration, forgiveness, and justification are simultaneous and inseparable.

The preceding statements indicate the opposition of Schleiermacher and Tillich to some of the major disparate views of the atonement. An essentially objective view, such as that of Origen, is objectionable due to its failure to be adequately concerned with the reception of the atonement by man. The intrinsically subjectivist view preferred by Abelard is found wanting, due to its attribution of salvation to man's answering love to the self-surrendering love of the Christ. Also, Anselm's substitutionary-satisfaction doctrine of the atonement is unacceptable, although the two men have variant reasons for rejecting it, as will be seen.

In essence their negative attitude toward such traditional views of the atonement has its rootage in an insistence that Christology and soteriology must be based on the total impression of the life and work of Christ as given in the New Testament. Schleiermacher says that the suffering and death of Christ, his passive obedience, completes his active obedience or suffering participation in the corporate sinfulness of man

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[1] The Christian Faith, pp. 480, 496-501.

[2] Systematic Theology, Vol. II, p. 179.

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in order to redeem him. And Tillich speaks of the continuous sacrifice of Jesus to Jesus as the Christ. Nevertheless, the Cross is central in the thought of both men, because it causes the absolutely potent God-consciousness or the New Being in the Christ to emerge in its fulness and be completely transparent.

Significantly neither theologian conceives of salvation as an instantaneous occurrence in the life of man; rather they acknowledge that the believer is never without a consciousness of sin. Schleiermacher writes of sanctification as a progressive turning away from evil to greater harmony with the impulses of God-consciousness issuing from Christ within the church.[1] Tillich similarly interprets sanctification as a "process" in which the New Being transforms personality and community inside and outside the Christian Church.[2] Sanctification is thus conjointly held to be inseparable from the work of the divine Spirit whose self-identical locus is the church.[3]

The common spirit of the church, according to Schleiermacher, is the innermost impulse of every member to manifest and to impart the the power of Christ working in him. This common spirit is the Holy

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[1] The Christian Faith, pp. 510-514.

[2] Systematic Theology, Vol. II, pp. 179-180.

[3] The "church" is defined differently by the two men and this is one aspect of the divergence between them that will be treated subsequently. Tillich speaks of the "latent" church and the "manifest" church, with the latter alone having as its ultimate criterion the Spiritual Presence, the manifestation of the New Being, or Spiritual Presence in Jesus as the Christ.

Spirit which prolongs the presence and activity of Christ, which derives solely from Christ, and which is not a new divine revelation but a fact wholly dependent upon a natural consequence of the appearance of Christ.[1]

In Tillich's thought the divine spirit is likewise described as being inseparable from the human spirit in the latent and manifest churches. The Spiritual Community is the essence of the visible church in so far as it is the result of the impact of the Spiritual Presence, which is centrally manifested in Jesus as the Christ. This Spiritual Presence may be identified as the New Being in the Jesus as the Christ, the criterion for judging all salvation processes. Thus Tillich agrees with Schleiermacher's view that the divine Spirit derives solely from Christ by saying: "In the divine economy the Spirit follows the Son, but in essence, the Son _is_ the Spirit."[2]

2. Areas of Divergence

When the essential aspects of the Chrisologies of Schleiermacher and Tillich are placed in juxtaposition, convergences or similarities are rather clearly discernible. But these convergences must not be construed to imply that their Christological positions are identical. Quite the contrary is the case. In each area wherein convergence is in evidence divergence also may be discerned. Sympathetic and objective comparative analysis requires that these divergences be duly expounded.

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[1] _The Christian Faith_, pp. 536, 560, 562, 565, 577.

[2] _Systematic Theology_, Vol. III, p. 148.

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i. Man: His Sin and Need of Salvation

The underlying agreement between the anthropological statements of Schleiermacher and Tillich which are subservient to their treatments of soteriology and Christology may not be denied. Yet Tillich is decidedly influenced by existential ontology to go beyond Schleiermacher in his analysis of man. His description of conflicts of ontological polarities is considerably more extensive than Schleiermacher's treatment of the conflict between man's sensible and highest self-consciousness. For example, one searches in vain to find a parallel in Schleiermacher's thought for Tillich's treatment of the separation of freedom from destiny, dynamics from form, individualization from participation, or his treatment of death, finitude, guilt, doubt, meaninglessness, suffering, loneliness, despair, or the four finite categories as the structure of self-destruction. Also, while Schleiermacher affirms that man cannot save himself, Tillich unambiguously stipulates that the legalistic, ascetic, mystical, doctrinal, sacramental, and emotional ways of self-salvation are failures. On the basis of these statements it may be said that Tillich is somewhat more penetrating and precise in his analysis of the sinful state of man.

One divergence between them that is existential-ontological in nature is Tillich's insistence that the primary dilemma of man centers in his finitude and anxiety over the threat of non-being. This idea cannot be found in Schleiermacher. Certainly he does not share the view that the universal character of the relation of finitude and anxiety demands a recognition of Jesus' own anxiety in having to die. To attribute anxiety to Jesus would imply an internal struggle of a higher and lower will. This is highly culpable in Schleiermacher's eyes, for it denigrates the ideality and absolutely potent God-consciousness of Jesus.[1]

The major difference between the treatments of man and sin by the two men is to be found in their re-interpretations of the doctrine of original sin and the Fall. Schleiermacher dismisses the idea of a historical Fall of Adam on the basis that man can have no consciousness of a historical beginning. But he does allow that the first man sinned and that due to the interdependence of men in history all mankind is in the corporate state of sin and guilt. Tillich unequivocally denounced this idea of corporate guilt and his reinterpretation of the Fall is at variance with that given by Schleiermacher in that it denotes a transition from essence to existence which is transcendent. It is transcendent because it is a universal, ontological, transhistorical quality of finite being and creation itself. This means that the Fall and creation are coincident and that actualized creation and estranged existence are identical.

Recognizing that his account of the Fall implies that sin is an ontological necessity, Tillich seeks to hold the ontological element of destiny in dialectical tension with that of finite freedom. Nevertheless, the idea of sin as an ontological necessity has no parallel in the thought of Schleiermacher. Also, the idea of a coincidence of the Fall and creation hardly is congruent with Schleiermacher's contention that the totality of existence works to help God-consciousness realize itself.

As Tillich interprets the symbol of the Fall of man in a transcendental and transhistorical sense, so he interprets the universal need and expectation of the New Being in a non-historical as well as historical sense. Schleiermacher, on the contrary, speaks of the universal need of redemption and the Redeemer only in a historical sense. The men are equally concerned to correlate the Christian answer to the human predicament. This means that Tillich assumes the task of explaining how the New Being in Jesus as the Christ meets both the historical and non-historical expectations and needs of man, whereas Schleiermacher is concerned to explain how Jesus of Nazareth as the Redeemer fulfills the historical expectations and needs of man.

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[1] The Christian Faith, p. 414.

In other words, we may anticipate that Tillich's "New Being" will in some sense be conceived to be separable from and not identical with the historical event of Jesus as the Christ and that Schleiermacher's "Redeemer" will be held to be inseparable from Jesus of Nazareth.

ii. Biblical Witness

Although Schleiermacher and Tillich seek to develop their Christologies in accord with their critical reading of the New Testament, their "critical" reading is certainly not "identical" reading. Schleiermacher concurs with Tillich's judgment that the biblical accounts of Jesus' ministry are interpretative in nature so that we must speak of the New Testament "picture" of Christ. But he is not as pessimistic as is Tillich with respect to the possibility of historical inquiry into the life of Jesus on the basis of the New Testament writings. This divergence must be explored.

Schleiermacher's basic hermeneutical premise is that there is a

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fundamental continuity and agreement between Jesus' messianic self-proclamation through his teachings and message of the Kingdom of God and the responsive witness of the New Testament writers. In proclaiming the Kingdom of God, Schleiermacher believes, Jesus demanded assent to himself as its founder and center.[1] While recognizing that the judgment of the writer enters into every narrative, he nonetheless rejects the view that each writer so imported his own views into the New Testament that it is impossible to pursue the life of Jesus historically. Moreover, by interpreting Jesus' preaching as the outer-side of his pious, feeling, thinking self, Schleiermacher is led to declare that the "New Testament accounts allow us to gain access to Jesus' inner life-unity and self-consciousness."[2] This self-proclamation of Christ's consisted in the communication of his absolutely potent God-consciousness, his ideality, his sinlessness, his absolute unity with God, or the veritable existence of God in him. To deny this is tantamount to denying that Christ would have corrected his disciples if they had held wrong views of him.[3]

Tillich's position on pursuing the life of Jesus on the basis of the New Testament sources runs counter to that of Schleiermacher at almost every point. Heeding the strictures of historical criticism he maintains that the very nature of the sources obviates a recovery of the historical Jesus behind the Gospel records and symbols. Because the sources were written by those who received Jesus as the Christ, there can be no separation of the factual from the receptive aspects of the Chris-event therein portrayed.

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[1] Das Leben Jesu, pp. 259 (S), 262.

[2] Ibid., p. 13.

[3] Ibid., pp. 79 (S), 84f.

Thus Tillich is genuinely skeptical of Schleiermacher's contention that Jesus had the messianic self-consciousness attributed to him by the Gospels. Moreover, he disdains focusing on Jesus' teachings and message of the Kingdom of God as expressions of his messianic self-consciousness on the grounds that it places Jesus in the legalistic context of the Old Testament and fails to explain wherein lies the power of Jesus' hearers to obey his teachings or make the decision for the Kingdom.[1]

As for the "inner life" of Jesus which Schleiermacher takes with utter seriousness, Tillich asserts that it is beyond the grip of historico-psychological investigation. The New Testament reports do not indicate any break between Jesus and God, but the problem of the relation between the reports and the objective events remains. If anything, contends Tillich, the New Testament writings ontologize rather than psychologize. By "ontologize" he means that they are ontological affirmations that the New Being appeared under the conditions of existence without being conquered by them.[2] This precise definition refrains from verifying that Jesus of Nazareth was actually ideal or perfectly good, as does Schleiermacher, on the basis of the New Testament record.

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[1] Schleiermacher's rejoinder, as mentioned previously, is that Jesus' self-proclamation in his teaching and preaching of the Kingdom carries with it a communication of his absolutely potent God-consciousness which supplies the vital power of which Tillich speaks.

[2] Systematic Theology, Vol. II, p. 124. Schleiermacher certainly would have no difficulty accepting the first part of this explanation of the "ontologizing" function of the New Testament accounts. The latter part of the statement, however, cannot be equated with his affirmation that Jesus of Nazareth was actually ideal.

Undoubtedly the mature discipline of historical criticism has some bearing on Tillich's divergence from Schleiermacher with respect to the biblical witness to the Christ. But the more decisive cause for their divergence on the _possibility_ of historical inquiry into the life of Jesus on the basis of the New Testament is their dissimilar opinions on the _importance_ of such inquiry in the first place.

Schleiermacher does not believe that to substantiate the existence of Jesus is altogether sufficient. He advocates grasping Jesus' life-unity. Only by so doing can one lay hold of the absolute paradox upon which Christianity is founded, namely, that Jesus of Nazareth actually was ideal or that the ideal became historical in him.[1]

Disparately, Tillich is ostensibly satisfied with the _analogia imaginis_ theory that there is an analogy between the biblical picture of Jesus as the Christ and the actual personal life from which it has arisen.[2] For him the picture is altogether sufficient as the factual foundation for the Christian faith. It is beyond the grip of historical research, being guaranteed only by faith. The New Testament writers were not at all interested in the biography of the Messiah, and even the name "Jesus" which is attached to the personal life in which the New Being manifests itself may be historically doubted. Thus, the results of historical research into the life of Jesus are of inconsequential value for the Christian faith.

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[1] _Das Leben Jesu_, pp. 13, 41

[2] _Systematic Theology_, Vol. II, p. 115.

The Christological divergence between the two men with regard to the biblical witness becomes somewhat more vivid when their applied interpretation of the "historical Jesus" are noted. For Schleiermacher the term refers categorically to the life and character of the person, Jesus of Nazareth, who was Christ or Redeemer. Tillich critically and precisely uses the term to describe the factual character of the event of Jesus as the Christ, that is, the reception of Jesus as the Christ. While not denying the historicity of the Christ event, Tillich's usage lends no credibility to the notion that we have a history of Jesus' life in the sense that his life was photographed and his words recorded.

Despite Tillich's reservations concerning the historical Jesus he is concerned to counteract the docetic-monophysitic heresy by emphasizing forcefully the humanity of the Christ. He repudiates the view held by Schleiermacher that Jesus' temptations involved not even an infinitely small amount of struggle for Jesus, because he was absolutely determined by his God-consciousness. For Tillich this threatens to undermine Jesus' humanity by placing him somehow above error in judgment, above the anxiety, ambiguity, and the tensions of finite existence. Not only does Tillich accept the reality of the temptations as an index of Jesus' finite freedom and full participation in existence, but he allows that Jesus participated in the guilt of existence by mistakenly choosing Judas to be one of the disciples and thereby implicating himself in Judas' guilt.[1]

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[1] Ibid., p. 133.

It is reasonable to conclude that the divergence between the hermeneutical approaches of Schleiermacher and Tillich contributes greatly to their divergent Christological positions, especially in relation to the biblical witness. For example, Schleiermacher's preference for John's Gospel with its logos doctrine stems in large part from his contention that it is most likely an eyewitness account and a valuable source for inquiry into the life of Jesus.[1] Tillich rejects such a view but prefers John's Gospel nonetheless, because it theologically reinterprets the life of Jesus and portrays symbolically the subjection to and conquest of existence by the Christ whose being is the New Being.[2]

The foregoing example tersely elucidates Tillich's basic disinterest in historical research into the life of Jesus, and it reveals his conviction that the biblical symbols and myths provide "the decisive means of expressing the unique and universal significance of the whole event of Jesus of Nazareth."[3] Indeed, Tillich gives the impression that the primary value of the biblical writings is that they contain permanently valid symbols which express the way Jesus was received by those who received him as the Christ.[4] This much at least is clear: the

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1. Einleitung, p. 214. Das Leben Jesu, pp. 169, 179(S), 180(S), 255.

2. Ultimate Concern, p. 155.

3. Systematic Theology, Vol. II, p. 151. See Tillich's article, "The Present Theological Situation," Theology Today, VI (1949-1950), p. 306.

4. This is the conclusion of Gustave Weigel, "Myth, Symbol, and Analogy," Religion and Culture, ed. W. Leibrecht (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1959), pp. 120-130.

historical concreteness of the biblical accoumts, which Schleiermacher takes seriously, is relatively unimportant to Tillich. This is clarified in his demythologization of the Christological symbols of the New Testament.

Whereas Schleiermacher believes that Jesus referred to himself as υἱὸς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου in the sense that he was like all other men.[1] , Tillich interprets this appellation as a symbol in the Danielic sense and doubts Jesus' self-application of the symbol. "Son of God," according to Tillich, symbolizes the reunion of God and man established in Jesus as the Christ, but to say, as does Schleiermacher, that Jesus of Nazareth was the Son of God is literalistic distortion. The same judgment is passed by Tillich on Schleiermacher's affirmation that Jesus of Nazareth was the Messiah or Christ, because the symbol "the Christ" describes the function of one who brings the new eon rather than being an individual.[2]

In spite of the divergences delineated the two theologians concur that the main tool for Christological work in the church is the "Logos" concept, and they reject the idea of a the metamorphosis of a divine being into the man Jesus of Nazareth. Their interpretations of "Logos" are different, however. Tillich defines it as the universal principle of divine self-manifestation that is fully disclosed in and through a personal life or the event of Jesus as the Christ.[3] For

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[1] Das Leben Jesu, pp. 287-8.

[2] Systematic Theology, Vol. II, p. 111.

[3] Ibid., p. 112.

Schleiermacher the "Logos" or "Word" means the thought or consciousness of God which is fully present in Jesus of Nazareth. However, in Tillich's eyes Schleiermacher would again be guilty of literalistic distortion due to his implying that the "Logos" is identical with Jesus of Nazareth.

Tillich's proclivity to interpret the biblical reports symbolically is plainly manifested in his treatment of the Cross and the Resurrection as the central symbols in the New Testament and as central for Christology. The two symbols are interpreted as interdependent expressions of the subjection of the New Being to the conditions of existence and his conquest over them. Thus, such biblical reports of Jesus' lowly birth, loneliness, temptations, Gethsemane, and the like are corroborative symbols of the Cross, the symbol for Jesus' sacrificing of himself to the Christ or the subjection of the New Being to the conditions of existence. Likewise, such passages as Philippians, chapter 2, which implies both pre-existence and post-existence, the Virgin Birth, the *logos* doctrine,[1] the miracles, the parousia, the last judgment, the

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[1] We have noted in the exposition that the primary meaning of "*logos*" for Tillich is that of the universal *logos*, the principle of divine manifestation or the power of being present in everything. In treating preparatory revelation he makes it clear that the universal *logos* is the necessary propaedeutic for man's acknowledgment that Jesus as the Christ is the concrete place where the *logos* became visible. In other words, Jesus as the Christ is not in himself the Word; He is the medium by which the Word may be clearly known by us. Quite plainly he writes: "Only against the background of the universal Logos is the Incarnate Logos a meaningful concept." *Biblical Religion and the Search for Ultimate Reality*, p. 75.

Perhaps it may be helpful to contrast Tillich's view of *logos* doctrine with that of Karl Barth. For Barth Tillich's view is based on an *analogia entis* which is objectionable in so far as it implies a version of natural theology. For him the Word of God *is* Jesus Christ.

Kingdom of God are corroborating symbols of the Resurrection in so far as they establish the independence of the New Being from historical contingencies.[1]

These symbolical hermeneutical illustrations of Tillich are radically removed from Schleiermacher's concern with the historical factuality of the biblical witness to Christ. For example, the Cross is central in Schleiermacher's Christology and soteriology, but he interprets it as a factual account of Jesus' active and passive obedience and not simply a symbol as Tillich is wont to do. As for the resurrection, Schleiermacher does not consider it to be a constituent part of Christology and his exposition of it is not symbolical but literal. Failure to take the resurrection and even the ascension in a physical and literal sense, he contends, would be to render the judgment that the disciples were weak-minded and virtually undermine the New Testament. Tillich sardonically counters that Schleiermacher's view lends itself to absurd questions of physics and chemistry. He

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And this Word is made known in a threefold form: as proclamation, as written, and revealed. "It is Jesus Christ Himself who speaks for Himself in it, and needs no witness save His Holy Spirit, and is glad of the faith of His own in the promise received and grasped. It is this independent and unsurpassable origin for the Word of God which comes to us that we mean when we speak of its third . . . form, its form as the revealed Word of God." Church Dogmatics, trans. by G. T. Thomson (2nd ed., Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1936), I/1, p. 98f.

[1] Systematic Theology, Vol. II, pp. 156-164.

replaces it with his "restitution" theory, a view of the resurrection as a symbol for the overcoming of the disappearance of him whose being was the New Being from present experience.[1]

iii. Adoptionism and Incarnation

If one were to pinpoint the core of the adoptionistic emphasis in the thought of Schleiermacher, one could not do better than to center on his treatment of Jesus' Vorbildlichkeit or exemplary status. As he explains it, God's choosing Jesus to be the Redeemer or Christ ought not to be construed as an arbitrary divine act; rather, Jesus' will and person, his Vorbildlichkeit, prompted God's choosing of him. This stress on the Vorbildlichkeit of Jesus entails an explication of his total activity, including his prophetic, priestly, and kingly offices, and it causes Schleiermacher to seek diligently to lay hold of the inner-life unity of Jesus and to grasp the importance of the historical individual, Jesus of Nazareth. After all, the miraculous fact about the Redeemer is that the man Jesus was really ideal and that the ideal became historical in him. For Schleiermacher, then, to speak of Christ is to speak of his Urbildlichkeit and his Vorbildlichkeit; the two cannot and must not be separated in Christological thought.

Such stress on the Vorbildlichkeit of Jesus is not altogether warranted, scripturally, insists Tillich. In the Fourth Gospel Jesus said that he had nothing in himself but that he had received everything from his father, and he rejected his disciples' attempt to elevate him as the medium of revelation "to the dignity of revelation itself."[2]

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[1] Ibid., pp. 156-157.

[2] Ibid., Vol. 1, p. 133.

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The real danger involved in emphasizing the Vorbildlichkeit of Jesus, therefore, is that it paves the way for Jesusology, which is a variant form of idolatry.

The fear of idolatry which prompts Tillich's refusal to think of God as a being is reflected in his refusal to think of the Christ or the New Being as a being--Jesus of Nazareth. Indeed, he says that we "must overcome the tendency to focus on the so-called personality of Jesus instead of the New Being that he expresses in his person."[1] Whereas "Jesus Christ" for Schleiermacher signifies that the ideal and historical are one in Jesus of Nazareth so that "Jesus" and "Christ may be used interchangeably, Tillich is careful to insist that "the Christ" is a symbol expressing how Jesus was received or the New Being that was manifested through him. Tillich's feelings on this differentiation are so strong that he cannot bring himself to pray to 'Jesus Christ' because of "the fear of becoming idolatrous . . . the fear of looking at two faces instead of at the divine face."[2] The idea he seems to be trying to express here is that we are to look at the Christ so that nothing is left in his face which is Jesus of Nazareth.

The line between the two men with respect to the adoptionist strands of their Christologies seems to be rather clearly drawn. Tillich's adoptionism countenances no focus on the Vorbildlichkeit of Jesus, although the fact that the New Testament picture indicates no moments of estrangement of Jesus from God is accepted. It centers instead on Jesus' becoming the Christ because he surrendered completely his finitude--"not only his life but also his finite power and knowledge and perfection."[1] One may say that Jesus of Nazareth is the Christ or is the medium of final revelation only because he "sacrifices everything in him and of him which could bring people to him as an 'overwhelming personality' instead of bringing them to that [New Being] in him which is greater than he and they."[2] This total self-sacrifice of Jesus to the Christ allows for complete transparence to the ground of being and is made possible by his uninterrupted unity with that ground. The decisive trait in the New Testament picture of Jesus as the Christ is precisely this continuous self-surrender of Jesus as a man to Jesus as the Christ. The adoptionistic side of Tillich's Christology, then, is that Jesus became the Christ by this "process" of continual surrender which was consummated on the Cross. "To the Crucified alone," he proclaims, "can we say, 'Thou art the Christ.'"[3]

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[1] The Protestant Era, pp. 124-125.

[2] The New Being, p. 98.

It appears that Tillich is content to explain why Jesus was divinely adopted as the Messiah not by appealing to his Vorbildlichkeit but by pointing out that his destiny included within it his freedom.[4] Such a Christological affirmation is for him essentially incarnational in nature. Although the two men have somewhat divergent interpretations

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[1] Systematic Theology, Vol. I, p. 133.

[2] Ibid., p. 136.

[3] The Shaking of the Foundations, p. 148.

[4] Systematic Theology, Vol. II, p. 149.

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of "Logos," as mentioned previously, the Johannine doctrine of "Logos" is congenial to their concern to avoid the pagan idea of metamorphosis and to their concern to provide an incarnational alternative to the two-nature theory. Basically Tillich's re-interpretation of the Incarnation is that in Jesus as the Christ essential manhood, God-manhood, the New Being, the Logos, or the eternal God-man-unity has become historical reality, and that it has appeared under the conditions of existence and has conquered them.

This incarnational view of Tillich's is not antithetical to Schleiermacher's own divine-human relational view of Christ as the Urbild, the essential Man-in-himself, the ideal, the Word, or the original image of what man essentially is. Indeed, the essential agreement between them with respect to their replacement of the two-nature doctrine by a doctrine of a divine-human relation has been delineated. Yet Schleiermacher does appear to go somewhat beyond and at certain points to be divergent from Tillich in his attempt to explicate the full import of the idea of Incarnation.

Schleiermacher, for example, denounces the idea that by emphasizing Jesus' Vorbildlichkeit he is thereby content to view the Redeemer as an exemplary teacher who increases our perfection.[1] In his thought the Urbildlichkeit of Christ is given equal if not greater stress than the Vorbildlichkeit of Christ. He even declares that Christ must "participate in the Divine Essence in the same sense in which he participates in human nature."[1] Tillich, of course, would oppose his speaking at all of Divine Essence. Similarly, when Schleiermacher says that the Redeemer came into existence from outside the sinful, corporate life of man,[2] this to Tillich would imply an objectionable postulation of a third mediating reality between God and man.

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[1] The Christian Faith, pp. 361-367.

Also, Tillich may well intend to leave the impression that to speak of the "complete transparency" of the Christ to the _logos_ of being is to express the truth that God was in Christ or that God actually reveals himself in Christ, but he does not say this explicitly, as does Schleiermacher. By the absolutely potent God-consciousness of Christ Schleiermacher means the veritable existence of God in Him. Indeed, he says straightforwardly that "every activity in Christ proceeded from the being of God in Him"[3] and that the original revelation of God in Christ is adequate and inexhaustible.[4]

The major divergence between the incarnational emphases of these two men cannot be stipulated in an unequivocal manner due to the highly dialectical nature of their approaches to Christology. Yet it does appear that Tillich is decidedly reluctant to declare anything more than that the New Being has appeared in a personal life or in the event of Jesus as the Christ under the conditions of existence and conquering them. The idea of connecting the incarnation with the birth of Jesus is clearly excluded, for Tillich allows that the very name of the personal life in which the New Being has appeared may be historically doubted. Moreover, that the New Being appeared in a personal life is assured, as has been noted, not by the biblical witness but primarily by the ontological fact that man alone is the microcosmos. As such, man or a personal life is the most adequate medium, potentially at least, for such a revelation of that which has universal significance. The "fact" of the Incarnation itself can be guaranteed by faith alone, by our participation in the New Being.

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[1] _On Religion_, p. 247

[2] _The Christian Faith_, p. 365.

[3] _Ibid._, p. 432.

[4] _Ibid._, p. 445.

The rather uncertain status of Jesus of Nazareth in the incarnational emphasis of Tillich is not found in Schleiermacher's Christology. In his view it is clear that the ideal became historical and actual in Jesus of Nazareth.[1] In fact, Schleiermacher avers that every moment of Jesus' life was determined by his God-consciousness, that is, from birth onward;[2] he was at birth what we are only by regeneration--essential Man-in-himself.[3] He even goes so far as to say that Jesus of Nazareth must be understood as "an original act of human nature not affected by sin . . . and . . . a filling of His nature with God-consciousness became possible as a result."[4]

These statements of Schleiermacher doubtless would not be fully acceptable to Tillich. He would assert that they lend support to docetic tendencies as well as to a form of Jesusology. Thus, these fundamental disparities between their incarnational emphases require our critical

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[1] The Christian Faith, p. 380.

[2] Ibid., pp. 58, 377, 389.

[3] Christmas Eve, pp. 70, 78.

[4] The Christian Faith, p. 389.

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acknowledgment alongside our apprehension of their affinities which are somewhat more easily ascertained.

iv. Soteriology

Salvation or redemption results from the communication of the total being of the Christ which Tillich calls the "New Being" and which Schleiermacher terms the "whole new creation." Nevertheless, a Christological-soteriological divergence obtains between the two men and must be treated.

In Schleiermacher's thought the "whole new creation" is conceived to be inseparable from the actual being of Jesus of Nazareth, the Redeemer. Although he is the Founder of Christianity, he is also the sole Redeemer whose _Lebensmitteilung_ is destined to regenerate the whole human race. The "New Being" of Tillich, however, is not totally inseparable from Jesus of Nazareth or even the event of Jesus as the Christ. It is a power or quality of being that reunites man with the ground of being and is present in all periods of history and in all religions. All men participate in the healing or saving power of the New Being, at least fragmentarily. Otherwise, they would have no being. One cannot say, then, that there is no saving power apart from Jesus as the Christ. What can be said is that the saving power of the New Being in Jesus as the Christ is the ultimate criterion for judging every healing and saving process.[1]

This Christological and soteriological incongruity between

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[1] _Systematic Theology_, Vol. II, pp. 165-168.

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Schleiermacher and Tillich has its origin in the fact that they equate revelation and salvation yet have dissimilar interpretations of revelation. Schleiermacher's dogmatic position on revelation confines all revelation to the Redeemer: "In truth he alone mediates . . . all revelation of God through the world in so far as he bears within Himself the whole new creation which contains and develops the potency of God-consciousness."[1] Conversely, Tillich insists upon a history of revelation of which the center is the manifestation of the New Being in Jesus as the Christ. Revelatory events or manifestations of the universal logos of being, then, do occur apart from Jesus as the Christ, and they are saving events in which the power of the New Being is present.[2]

This soteriological and revelatory position of Tillich is very much in accord with Schleiermacher's predominantly philosophical position on revelation as it is expounded in On Religion. In this work, which was prior to The Christian Faith, revelation is apprehended to occur in every contact between man and the world, and even the possible existence of more perfect Mediators or Redeemers than the Founder of Christianity is postulated. Although Tillich thinks the terms "Mediator" and "Redeemer" pose theological difficulties in that they connote a kind of third reality between God and man, he does allow for the possibility of other incarnations. Also, the acknowledgment of revelatory events and salvation processes apart from an encounter with Jesus as the Christ is fully in line with his own thinking. If, however,

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[1] The Christian Faith, p. 388.

[2] Systematic Theology, Vol. II, p. 167.

Schleiermacher's dogmatic position on revelation is accepted as his definitive theological position, the soteriological and Christological divergence between them must be admitted.

The divergence just delineated prefigures the lack of agreement between the two men with regard to the relation of salvation and the church. Salvation or redemption can take place only within the Christian church, contends Schleiermacher, because the redemption of Christ is effected solely through the preaching in the Christian church. The preaching of the Word continues the self-proclamation of Christ through which God-consciousness and redemption are communicated to believers. It has this efficacy because Christ is present in and through the preaching. Believing that the New Being and saving processes take place apart from an encounter with the Christ, Tillich distinguishes between latent and manifest churches. The former are churches which result from the impact of the New Being or Spiritual Presence without having the ultimate criterion of the manifestation of the New Being in Jesus as the Christ, as is true in the manifest churches. Thus, he speaks of salvation inside and outside the Christian church, and it is not solely attributed to Christian preaching.[1]

For both men sanctification is a process whereby the believer turns away from self and the world and turns toward God as a result of the impact of the divine or Holy Spirit. Apart from the lack of agreement on the precise location of where the sanctification process takes place, the basic difference to be noted is in their interpretation of the divine

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[1] Systematic Theology, Vol. III, pp. 139-152.

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or Holy Spirit. Schleiermacher explicitly states that the Holy Spirit proceeds solely from Christ and is wholly dependent on the "absolutely original revelation of God in Him."[1] He also maintains that the common spirit of the church, which is the innermost impulse of each believer to impart the work of Christ in him, is the Holy Spirit. Moreover, he says that the Holy Spirit is the Divine Essence united with the human nature of believers in the Christian church. Tillich also conveys the idea that the divine Spirit is inseparable from the human spirit, but his doctrine of God rules out the idea that the Spirit is the Divine Essence united with the human nature of believers. Furthermore, the New Being or the Spiritual Presence may not be confined to Jesus as the Christ or the corporate life he founded, the Christian church. The divine Spirit is "God present" in the latent and manifest churches in all periods of history.

Other soteriological nuances of difference are discernible and may be mentioned briefly in conclusion. The suffering and death of Christ cause us to see God in Him and to "envisage Christ as the most immediate partaker in the eternal love which sent Him forth and fitted Him for His task."[2] As a result, Christ, for Schleiermacher, is truly the High Priest and the one perfect Mediator between God and man. He is our satisfying representative whose passive obedience causes God to regard believers as children of God, as objects of divine favor.[3] In statements such as these

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[1] The Christian Faith, p. 443.

[2] Ibid., p. 459.

[3] Ibid.

Tillich envisions the Abelardian error of focusing too much on the "self-denying love"[1] of Christ the Crucified. Such an error causes love to become weakness and sentimentality rather than an ontological concept expressing reunion with being or being-itself, which includes justice and thereby removes the anxiety about guilt. As for the idea of "Mediator" Tillich points out that it poses real theological difficulties, semantically and ontologically, especially since Schleiermacher speaks of justification as the experience in which we are viewed by God with divine favor because of Christ. Such a view tends to move toward the Anselmic error of actually dispensing with the subjective side and positing a need of reconciliation in God who is eternally reconciled.[2] Tillich himself expresses justification as the eternal acceptance of God which man needs only to accept to experience salvation--reunion with the ground of his being.

The divergence just noted is carried over intotheir reasons for dismissing the substitutionary theory of the atonement. The theory is opposed by Schleiermacher due to its implication that by virtue of his passive obedience Jesus became the Redeemer, which, of course, undermines the Vorbildlichkeit of Jesus and implies that Jesus was not really an example to be emulated. Not only does Tillich not focus on the Vorbildlichkeit of Jesus but Schleiermacher's reason for rejecting the substitutionary theory is the core of the adoptionistic emphasis in his

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1. The Christian Faith, p. 458; Systematic Theology, Vol. II, p. 172.

2. Systematic Theology, Vol. II, pp. 172-173.

own Christology. Moreover, he speaks not at all of the need for imitatio Christi but only of the need for participation in the New Being.[1]

3. Critical Evaluation

In setting forth a critical evaluation of the Christologies of Schleiermacher and Tillich a concerted effort will be made to be engaged in internal criticism. The intention is that the criticisms will deal with the positions of both men so as to expose the actual situation, the ambiguities or unsettled questions, the inconsistencies between affirmation and performance, and the apparent implications of taking the positions seriously.[2]

This internal critical approach seems to be warranted by the fact that both men enunciate their concern to present theologians that exhibit methodological and rational consistency. This concern is combined with their acceptance of the genuine apologetic tasks of theologians within the Christian Church, that of stating the content of the Christian faith in meaningful terms to contemporary audiences. They are therefore unafraid of an edifying relationship between philosophy and theology, and at various points they resort to extra-biblical and extra-ecclesiastical language to accomplish their purpose.

Quite obviously, then, it would be an egregious procedure to object to their presentations merely on terminological grounds. Tillich

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[1] Ibid., Vol. II, p. 122.

[2] For this internal critical approach the writer is indebted to John B. Cobb, Jr., Living Options in Protestant Theology, pp. 14f. As stated on page 4 of Chapter I, the section dealing with the status of the historical Jesus in the two Christologies will depart, at least partially, from the internal critical approach in so far as the author is influenced by the interpretation of the New Testament witness to Christ advocated by James M. Robinson and other representatives of the new quest of the historical Jesus.

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himself says, "I cannot accept criticism as valuable which merely insinuates that I have surrendered the substance of the Christian message because I have used a terminology which consciously deviates from the biblical or ecclesiastical language."[1] This means that the door is left ajar for an examination to discern whether or not the Christian message is actually communicated in his and Schleiermacher's thought. Tillich himself ostensibly invites such an endeavor by adding that the theological enterprise is unavoidably ambiguous and that his own method and system are not safe from distortion.[2]

Indeed, one observes in the Christologies of the two men that Schleiermacher tends to "take both sides on every question,"[3] and that Tillich has the capacity for "affirmation and negation which makes him simultaneously fascinating and frightening."[4] Consequently, they expose themselves to one-sided interpretations and criticisms. For example, one can cite passages to support or deny that they espouse either adoptionistic or incarnational Christologies. Thus, the dialectical

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[1] Systematic Theology, Vol. II, p. viii.

[2] Ibid., p. 16. "There is even in a well-organized work such as my Systematic Theology a certain inconsistency and indefiniteness of terminology; that is the influence of different, sometimes competitive motives of thought, and there is a taking for granted of concepts and arguments which have been dealt with in other places." "Autobiographical Reflections," The Theology of Paul Tillich, p. 15. In this same volume see "Reply to Interpretation and Criticism," pp. 330-331.

[3] H. R. Mackintosh, Types of Modern Theology, p. 99.

[4] Gustave Weigel, "The Theological Significance of Paul Tillich," p. 41.

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character of their Christological positions seems also to validate and even call for an internal critical approach to evaluation.

i. Man and Soteriology

Because both men treat Christology as a function of soteriology, it is advantageous to examine first their correlation of soteriology to man's need of and quest for salvation. This will afford an opportunity to discover whether or not they accomplish their intention to expound the Christian message in meaningful terms, to expose internal problems, and to evaluate their methodological approach to Christology.

(1) Man: His Sin and Need of Salvation.--On the positive side, Schleiermacher's allegation that sin is not an essential part of man's nature and that man is capable of being determined absolutely by God-consciousness substantiates his contention that man can recognize his need for and receive redemption and that the unity of creation need not be undermined in order to acknowledge the sinlessness and absolutely potent God-consciousness of the Redeemer. Negatively, it lends credibility to the conclusion that Schleiermacher reduces sin to proportions consonant with an evolutionary naturalism or monism.[1] This requires some explanation.

Schleiermacher establishes the solidarity of sin and guilt among mankind by stating that man's sin consists in his disordered and confused self-consciousness. And this sinful condition prevails from birth onward, since the flesh or sensuous nature of man has the lead over the spirit and the latter never overcomes it. Herein lies the basis for Brunner's charge that Schleiermacher has an impersonal and evolutionary concept of sin and that a stricken consciousness of sin is absent from his life and thought.[1]

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[1] Richard R. Niebuhr, Schleiermacher on Christ and Religion, p. 200; H. R. Mackintosh, Types of Modern Theology, p. 83.

In other words, Schleiermacher does not make a careful distinction between sin and finitude, and he fails to characterize sin as individual disobedience to God and as infidelity. Undoubtedly this may be attributed in large measure to the unimportant role that divine law plays in his theology and to the omission of any serious consideration of Israel and its Scriptures from his view of the divine economy of creation and redemption.[2] Surely this contributes to

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1. Emil Brunner, Die Mystik und das Wort (Tuebingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1924), p. 271. Significantly, a student named Wichern noted in the margin of his notes as a comment on one of Schleiermacher's lectures on April, 1831: "Nach dieser Lehre das Böse seine schwarze Farbe mit der grauen vertausche." R. Newton Flew, The Idea of Perfection (London: Oxford University Press, 1934), p. 186. This quote is taken from J. Wendland, Die religiöse Entwicklung Schleiermachers (Tuebeingen: Verlag von J. C. B. Mohr, 1915). A possible translation of the quote: "He changed the color of sin from black to gray." Literally, Böse means evil, but evil is inseparable from sin as its consequence in Schleiermacher's thought. Thus the translation is not unjustified.

2. Richard R. Niebuhr, Schleiermacher on Christ and Religion, p. 200. Schleiermacher, like Tillich, believes that the love of Christ is the climax and end of the Law. He writes: "The Law does not even suffice to produce the recognition of sin in those who are sanctified. . . . In the Christian Church it is neither necessary nor admissible to begin instruction about sin with the Law. . . ." The Christian Faith, p. 523. For Schleiermacher's view on the Law and the Old Testament, see ibid., pp. 279, 608-611.

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an impoverishment of his doctrine of sin.

From a Christological perspective Schleiermacher's doctrine of man is replete with problematical implications. For example, if one takes seriously his view of man in the state of "becoming," it would seem that the spirit is destined to subjugate its weaker counterpart, the flesh.[1] Inherent in this implication is a Pelagian lessening of the real need of the Redeemer. Schleiermacher responds to this in dialectical fashion by insisting that the spirit can never completely overcome the flesh in human development. But implicit in this countering assertion is a denial of the genuine humanity of Christ in so far as Schleiermacher insists that Jesus had an absolutely potent God-consciousness and was without sin.

It would seem that Schleiermacher recognizes the vexatious Christological implication just stated, for he maintains that in the final analysis sin is divinely ordained to produce in man the longing for redemption. But this contention unfortunately throws the onus of sin back on the Creator. And his equation of this divine ordination and human freedom does not nullify this inference. Apart from saying that sin has its source partly in man and partly outside man, he says almost nothing more on the role of human freedom in man's sinful state.[2]

An additional perplexity is created by Schleiermacher's embracing the Christian view of man as a sinner who is utterly alienated from God, because he simultaneously holds that man as the microcosmos is capable of the infinite and can recognize and receive the Redeemer. When this is coupled with his referring to the feeling of absolute dependence as "a universal element of life,"[1] man's real need of the redemption accomplished in Jesus becomes tenuous and ambiguous. This may be due in part to the elusive meaning of the "feeling of absolute dependence,"[2] and in part to Schleiermacher's equating revelation and salvation yet failing to explain the relation between his philosophical and dogmatic positions on revelation and God.[3] The consequent parallelism exposes him to the adverse criticism that the body of The Christian Faith is alien to his whole perspective and religio-psychological method.[1]

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[1] Edward Arthur Litton, Introduction to Dogmatic Theology (London: James Clark and Company, Ltd., 1960), p. 142.

[2] Ibid.; cf. The Christian Faith, pp. 132, 326-340.

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[1] Cf. *The Christian Faith*, pp. 133.

[2] Richard R. Niebuhr rightly points out that Schleiermacher has been charged with ultra-subjectivism by such men as Barth and Brunner because he fails to distinguish between the formal and material aspects of the feeling of absolute dependence. At times he is referring to the absolute dependence of the self, and at others he is referring to the underived individuality of the person. *Schleiermacher on Christ*, pp. 123-124. F. R. Tennant seriously questions if the "immediate experience of absolute dependence" denotes an experience that anyone has ever had. *Philosophical Theology* (London: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1928-1930), Vol I, p. 13. And J. M. Moore believes that the idea is indefensible that there is an "absolute distinction. . . between our religious feelings and all other different feelings," *Theories of Religious Experience* (London: Round Table Press, 1937), p. 87.

[3] See Chapter Two of the dissertation, pp. 21-25. Richard B. Brandt concludes that Schleiermacher "preferred to let the inconsistency remain rather than to retract either conflicting position where he felt it necessary to maintain it." *The Philosophy of Schleiermacher*, pp. 242.

Thus it is fair to state that Schleiermacher, as a dogmatic theologian, is obliged to make a philosophical concession in order to allow for the Christian doctrine of sin. That is, he acknowledges a residual conflict between man's highest and sensible self-consciousness, thereby disavowing that the feeling of absolute dependence is a universal element of life after all. From a Christian standpoint this sacrifice of methodological consistency deserves approbation. Otherwise man's need for redemption and the Redeemer would be left hanging in the philosophical and theological balance, and Schleiermacher's professed dogmatic task of relating the contents of the Christian faith to the Christian church would be vitiated.

Undoubtedly one of the major contributions of Tillich to Christian thought is his penetrating analysis of man's state of existential estrangement which paves the way for his correlative Christological solution. Yet the shadow of an over-arching monism falls across this portion of his thought. Tillich refers to himself as an "idealist"[2]

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1. Cf. Emil Brunner, Die Mystik und das Wort, Chapters I-III; The Mediator, trans. by Olive Wyon (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1947), pp. 16f.

2. "I am an idealist if idealism means the assertion of the identity of thought and being as the principle of truth." The Interpretation of History, Part I trans. by N. A. Rosetski; Parts II, III, IV trans. by Elsa L. Talman (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1936), p. 60.

and an "essentialist,"[1] and he insists that "all reality stands in God"[2] and that his theology follows a "methodological monism."[3] In his Systematic Theology all ontological elements and categories are ultimately resolved into or disappear into the undifferentiated unity of being-itself. Nothing that exists can be really separated from the ground of being and still exist at all.[4] Thus, Tillich seems to be committed to a monistic Weltanschauung.[5] If this is an erroneous interpretation, Tillich himself must accept the blame for failing to speak more plainly on this issue.

This basic monism is problematical because it renders the Incarnation unintelligible by muffling the note of transcendence.[6]

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[1] In an article he writes: ". . . my own inquiries are predominantly essentialist." "On the Boundary Line," Christian Century, (Dec. 7, 1960), p. 1437.

[2] "Theological Method., p. 30.

[3] "Revealed and Natural Theology," p. 167.

[4] "The unity of being embraces itself and separation, just as being comprises itself and non-being." Love, Power, and Justice, p. 25.

[5] One of the central conclusions of Martin Luther King's dissertation is that "Tillich is an absolute qualitative and quantitative monist." "A Comparison of God in the Thought of Paul Tillich and Henry N. Wieman," p. 309. Jack Boozer comes to the same conclusion in his dissertation, "The Place of Reason in Paul Tillich's Conception of God" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Boston University, 1952), p. 62f.

[6] Nels Ferré contends that monism placed Tillich outside the Christian tradition. This indicates that traditional supernaturalism is for him the sine qua non of Christianity. Cf. "Tillich's View of the Church," The Theology of Paul Tillich, p. 262. Ferré certainly has discerned an inherent danger in accepting Tillich's theology completely,

The immediate problem is that Tillich's monistic tendencies imperil his own idea of sin as a real estrangement of man from God. Moreover, man's freedom becomes lost in the freedom of God, thereby undermining any normal understanding of sin or estrangement. This critical contention may be substantiated by an appeal to Tillich's interpretation of the Fall as the transition from essence to existence.

Tillich's basic affirmation that actualized creation and estranged existence are identical can hardly be reconciled with the biblical account, which he claims to be interpreting. Biblical mythology places creation before the Fall and focuses on the specific disobedience of Adam to the command of God, whereas Tillich implies that estrangement is an ontological necessity.[1] On Tillich's terms, for man to renounce his sin he "would have to give up his actuality and return to being a potentiality within the undifferentiated unity of God."[2] Reinhold Niebuhr is doubtless correct in stating that Tillich's emphasis "falls upon the fatefulness of sin rather than upon our responsibility."[3]

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but he seems to go too far in branding Tillich as "the most dangerous theological leader alive." Quoted in Time, Vol. LXXII (March 16, 1959), p. 51.

[1] Even if the creation and the Fall are non-temporal events, this does not make them identical. Cf. Bernard Martin, The Existential Theology of Paul Tillich, p. 135.

[2] Bernard Loomer, "Tillich's Theology of Correlation," Journal of Religion, Vol. XXXVI (July, 1956), p. 156.

[3] Reinhold Niebuhr, "Biblical Thought and Ontological Speculation," The Theology of Paul Tillich, p. 219.

This equation of finitude with sin or estrangement by Tillich,[1] and by Schleiermacher, as stated earlier, stems from a failure to take seriously enough the biblical teaching that the nature of sin is revealed by the presence of the divine law.[2] That man may and does fall into sin Tillich rightly insists, but his thought is impoverished insofar as man's responsibility to God and the idea of sin as individual disobedience fade into the background.

Tillich attempts to rescue his discussion of sin and man's need of the New Being from the aforementioned perplexities by dialectically insisting that sin is not only ontological but volitional in nature. However, his insistence that *hubris*, man's turning away from the divine center to the self, is the root and essence of sin means little more than that man loses his essential unity with the ground of being in the process of actualizing himself.[3] Moreover, this actualization results from man's inability to escape anxiety, the threat of non-being.[1] Although finite man inevitably confronts this ontological anxiety, it is questionable whether anxiety or the question of being is the receptacle into which all other human questions may actually be poured.[2]

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[1] This is certainly not a private opinion. Cf. J. Heywood Thomas, *Paul Tillich: An Appraisal* (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1963), pp. 126, 132; R. H. Daubney, "Some Structural Concepts in Tillich's Thought and the Pattern of the Liturgy," *The Theology of Paul Tillich*, p. 277; David E. Roberts, "Tillich's Doctrine of Man," *The Theology of Paul Tillich*, p. 126.

[2] Tillich speaks of the "law" as man's essential being. But this results in a "spiritualization" of the law, according to Wingren, as the law comes from within the individual who is independent and can make his own laws. Guilt is therefore given an egocentric character--lack of self-realization. And salvation is given an equally egocentric character--self-realization. Tillich, along with Bultmann, is indebted to Heidegger for this position. Cf. Gustaf Wingren, *Theology in Conflict*, trans, by Eric H. Wahlstrom (Philadelphia: Muhlenberg Press, 1958), pp. 51, 69, 141, 147.

[3] *Systematic Theology*, Vol. II, pp. 46-47. Cf. Kenneth Hamilton, *The System and the Gospel* (London: SCM Press, 1963), p. 148.

The foregoing statements prompt the critical assertion here that Tillich's existential ontology is the recalcitrant element in his attempt to demonstrate man's need of the New Being or the Christ. That his theological system is predicated on an ontological mystical *a priori*, an immediate awareness of being-itself or the Unconditioned virtually obviates the real need for the Christ. Such an awareness contains healing properties and supports the view that the saving power of the New Being may be fragmentarily experienced apart from Jesus as the Christ in all religions and all parts of history. Indeed, for Tillich the universal *logos* and the mystical *a priori* serve as a propaedeutic for recognizing the *logos* in the Christ as the final revelation. And this finality is apprehended because the Christ event meets the ontological and symbolical specifications of a concrete absolute in which the finite medium is negated without losing itself.

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[1] Allan Killen helpfully points out that Tillich says the same thing about "non-being" in *The Courage to Be* and *Systematic Theology* that he said earlier about the "demonic" in *The Protestant Era* and *The Interpretation of History*. Cf. *The Ontological Theology of Paul Tillich* (Kampen: J. J. Kok, 1956), p. 183f.

[2] Nels Ferré certainly does not think so. Cf. *Searchlights on Contemporary Theology* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1961), p. 130. John Randall not only doubts that it is, but recalls hearing Tillich himself say after an evening with a Russian: "Wunderbar! Sie hat keine Angst!" "The Ontology of Paul Tillich," *The Theology of Paul Tillich*, p. 159.

This means that even the material, Christological norm of Tillich's theology is largely controlled by ontological philosophy and "entry into the circle of faith seems to follow from a philosophical and historical argument as an indicated next step."[1] But how man can apprehend directly the Unconditioned, that which is beyond the subject-object structure of reality, is not at all clear.[2] Actually, if the Subject-object structure of reality is transcended, so is in fact the Subject-subject relationship which is revealed so clearly in the Christ.[3]

From a Christological standpoint, it is hard to avoid the conclusion that Tillich does not really avoid the stigma of natural theology. The object of the mystical _a priori_ is obviously believed to be identical with the God of Christian revelation prior to such a revelation.[4] The critical point is this: the ultimate object of confidence is God as being itself rather than God as he reveals himself in Jesus as the Christ.[1] In any event, man's need of and quest for the salvation of the New Being in Jesus as the Christ is placed in jeopardy by Tillich's own words: "Man is able to answer the ontological question himself, because he experiences directly and immediately the structure of being and its elements."[2]

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[1] John B. Cobb, Jr., _Living Options_, p. 280. Cobb rightly points out that this tends to falsify the existential element in Tillich's understanding of faith. James A. Martin echoes his sentiments by stating that Tillich's "ontology is not simply an ontology of the New Being." "St. Thomas and Tillich on the Names of God," _The Journal of Religion_, Vol. XXXVII (October, 1957), p. 256.

[2] James Luther Adams, _Paul Tillich's Philosophy of Culture, Science, and Religion_, p. 211.

[3] Cf. Nels F. S. Ferré, _Searchlights on Contemporary Theology_, p. 127.

[4] Alexander McKelway accurately discerns that Tillich does not name the object of this awareness. "But insofar as he maintains that this awareness is the basis for the question of 'God,' it is certainly implied that the object of the question of man's awareness is known." _The Systematic Theology of Paul Tillich_, p. 139.

(2) Soteriology.--Schleiermacher describes Christ's work as a Lebensmitteilung, a communication of His absolutely potent God-consciousness which causes man's highest self-consciousness to assume priority over his sensible self-consciousness. In this process man becomes aware of his absolutely dependent relationship to God. While the correlation of soteriology to Schleiermacher's version of sin is effected by this formulation, Christ is depicted therein not so much as a Redeemer as a reformer of man's self-knowledge and knowledge of his relationship to the world and to God.[3]

On the one hand, the foregoing implication provokes the adverse criticism that for Schleiermacher redemption is little more than a

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[1] Thomas Langford, "A Critical Analysis of Paul Tillich's Method of Correlation," pp. 46-47.

[2] Systematic Theology, Vol. I, p. 169.

[3] At this point Schleiermacher seems to have an affinity for portions of Origen's soteriology. Origen contends that to the real Christians, the Gnostics, Christ appeared as a priest to open the depths of knowledge and make them participants in his divine life. Cf. J. L. Neve, A History of Christian Thought (Philadelphia: Muhlenberg Press, 1946), Vol. I, pp. 85-90.

"Weltanschauung which brings harmony, peace of mind, and self-reconciliation."[1] On the other hand, because Schleiermacher's soteriological statements are correlated to a seemingly evolutionary view of sin, the objectionable consequence is that Christ's redemptive efficacy is for Adamic human nature rather than for the individual.[2]

Also it may be questioned whether the Christian is as vitally concerned with his dependence on the Absolute as he is with confidence in God's forgiving grace. Yet it is difficult to see "how Schleiermacher could have fitted such a religious experience into his system and he probably would not have thought highly of it because of the anthropomorphic personal idea of God which goes with it."[3]

Profound tensions and vacillatory connotations are contained in Schleiermacher's soteriological statements. In one instance redemption is monergistically defined as man's being "assumed" into fellowship with Christ solely as a result of Christ's implanting His God-consciousness into man. It is also synergistically explained as Christ's stimulating man's feeble God-consciousness to turn progressively away

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1. Gustaf Aulén, Christus Victor, p. 168.

2. This is one of main faults which Emil Brunner finds in Schleiermacher's Christology and soteriology. He cites Schleiermacher's affirming that humanity becomes a new creation because of Christ's entering humanity, and that with His entrance the entire human race is regenerated. Cf. Die Mystik und das Wort, pp. 112f; The Christian Faith, pp. 477, 487.

3. Richard B. Brandt, The Philosophy of Schleiermacher, p. 279.

from evil to greater harmony with the impulses of God-consciousness issuing from Him. In addition to the tension between these two definitive soteriological statements the latter implies that the communicated God-consciousness can never be fully received by the believer. This is surely irreconcilable with Schleiermacher's apologetic contention that the feeling of absolute dependence is a universal element of life.[1]

The doctrine of the atonement is clearly of central importance to any soteriology. An objective connotation may be detected in Schleiermacher's stating that the passive obedience of Christ revealed that He was the High Priest or Mediator who caused and continues to cause God to view man with divine favor. His subjectivist tendencies are manifest in his declaring that on the Cross Jesus must be seen as the most immediate partaker in the divine love that sent Him forth. This prompts us to participate in His participation in God, thereby experiencing atonement and reconciliation.

Thus on the doctrine of the atonement Schleiermacher is invulnerable to the critical charges for having either a subjectivist or an objectivist view. The truth is he holds both views in dialectical tension and there is no sufficient basis for declaring which view is more conclusively definitive in his thought.

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[1] Such apparent disparities call forth the harsh criticism that "Christology is unmistakably a source of embarrassment and concern to Schleiermacher." Karl Barth, From Rousseau to Ritschl, p. 341. Emil Brunner shares Barth's sentiments by saying: "Das Wort von Christus ist in seinem religiösen und philosophischen Gedankenkreis ein Epeisodos, eine Episode, eine Störung." Die Mystik und das Wort, p. 145. Our treatment of the central significance of Christology in Schleiermacher's theology precludes our going along completely with these criticisms. Yet it cannot be contended that they are wholly without foundation due to the noted eclecticism.

Similarly, the experience of justification can mean simply man's becoming conscious of his relation of sonship to God, which he has already;[1] or it can mean that unless a man believes in Christ, he is not a child of God and not an object of divine favor.[2] Again, the redemptive activity of Christ is believed to be effected solely through the preaching of the Word in the church; yet Baptism and the Lord's Supper are equally channels of justifying and sanctifying activity.[3] While both sides on these issues can be and ought to be stressed, the constructive reconciliation of the polarities is passed over and they remain in the perplexing state of juxtaposition in Schleiermacher's thought.

With regard to his method of Christological construction Schleiermacher avows that all of his soteriological and Christological statements are derived from an analysis of the Christian religious self-consciousness of the church. Quite simply, the redeemed person perceives that the cause of his empowered God-consciousness is no less than the existence of God in the living Christ. Therefore, Christology is ancillary to any description of how the Christian faith is experienced in the present and how it originated. Schleiermacher's argument establishes "the historicity of the Christ on the ground that the religious self-consciousness vitiated by sin could not of itself produce the impression of a sinless redeemer."[4]

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1. The Christian Faith, p. 502. 2. Ibid., p. 503. 3. Ibid., pp. 626-642.
4. Richard R. Niebuhr, Schleiermacher on Christ, p. 217.

While the development of Schleiermacher's soteriology and Christology may be in accord with his dogmatic method, one can understand why he has been charged with resorting to artifice to achieve his apologetic purpose.[1] His theological performance is far more inferential and deductive as it moves from effect to cause than it is empirical and inductive. The strain of necessity, which is unmistakably discernible in his handling of sin and soteriology, is at variance with his affirmation that to prove the truth or necessity of the Redeemer is not his concern. His attempt to blend dogmatic and apologetic motives in this portion of his thought is fraught with tension and several inconsistencies.

Perhaps the major difficulty with his fully developed soteriology and Christology is that he projects an inseparableness between Christ and the Church. As a result, "the Son of Man is rendered incapable of expressing a true criticism of his community's stewardship of humanity."[2] What eludes Schleiermacher's thinking is that "the Head of the Church is more than the apotheosis of human nature, but also is its judge, both within and without the Church."[3]

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[1] Karl Barth, From Rousseau to Ritschl, pp. 343-350. Barth maintains that Schleiermacher's intentions were right, solus Christus and sola fide, but that his method made him more a philosopher of religion than a Christian theologian. He erred in looking at the Christian life from the inside up instead of beginning above with the Word of God.

[2] R. Niebuhr, Schleiermacher on Christ, p. 68.

[3] Ibid., p. 69.

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This fluid distinction between Christ and the church is reflected in his equation of the Holy Spirit with the common spirit of the believers. That the unity of the Divine Essence with the believers is the Holy Spirit and that it "lacks conclusiveness" due to the co-mingling of separation and union of the divine and human nature in regenerated believers is highly questionable. Certainly there is no hint of a "lack of conclusiveness" in the apostolic accounts of the Holy Spirit in the New Testament.

Tillich's soteriological statements classically illustrate how his view of the Christ fits his existential-ontological analysis of the human situation. For him Christology is clearly a function of soteriology. The work of the Christ as the New Being is to overcome the inevitable gap between man's essential and existential being, thereby effecting "essentialization." The unfortunate consequence, however, is that forgiveness of sins, which is at the center of the Christian message and has to do with restoring a personal relationship instead of a rather Neo-platonic reunion with the ground of being, does not fit wholly into Tillich's system. Moreover, it is hard to reconcile salvation as an impersonal "reintegration" of ontological reason with that which Tillich claims to be interpreting--the biblical message of God's gracious action in seeking out the lost and receiving them.[1]

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[1] Tillich's failure to refer to the Bible more explicitly at points such as this"leads some of his readers to deny that at crucial points his theology is really based upon the Bible." George F. Thomas, "The Method and Structure of Tillich's Theology," The Theology of Paul Tillich, p. 95.

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The impersonal character of Tillich's soteriology may be traced to the material norm of his theological system, the New Being. As a power or quality of being in which all men participate at least fragmentarily, the New Being is independent of every symbol or form in which it appears. The problem of the significance of the historical Jesus looms into view and must be treated subsequently. The troublesome implication here is that salvation is simply the conquering of existential estrangement and the Christian message, on occasion, can do without the appearance of the Christ. This squarely conflicts with the biblical claim that "there is salvation in no one else . . . , there is no other name . . . by which we must be saved."[1] Yet it is precisely this Christian message which Tillich claims to be interpreting.

Tillich's rejoinder that he proposes no other name than Jesus as Savior has an almost hollow ring in view of his open doubting of the name of the Christ. And in explicating the experience of justification Tillich states that man is simply to accept the fact that he is accepted and he is not to ask for the name of that which accepts him.[2] How a man can accept the "acceptance without somebody or something that accepts"[3] is lost upon us. This much at least can be stated: in Tillich's system "the New Being has effectively displaced the name of

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[1] Acts 4:12.

[2] The Shaking of the Foundation, p. 162.

[3] The Courage to Be, p. 185. Tillich's primary concern here is to avoid any objectification of God. Thus justifying faith appears to be indistinguishable from faith as ultimate concern.

Jesus as the only Savior."[1]

An additional inherent weakness in Tillich's soteriology is that it lends itself so easily to a distorted interpretation of the Christian faith. For example, few Christian theologians would agree that the idea of justification has "the same import as the stress of modern psychotherapy on the fundamental importance of self-acceptance in the integration and fulfillment of personality."[2] Yet this is precisely the way a Jewish interpreter understands Tillich's view of justification, and he rightly points out that Tillich occasionally suggests that "acceptance of being accepted" is possible apart from faith in Jesus as the Christ.[3]

In a paradoxical parallelism to the foregoing statements Tillich correlates the saving power of the New Being to man's unbelief, *hubris*, and concupiscence by appealing to the biblical picture of Jesus as the Christ. He notes Jesus' essential unity with God and his utter lack of unbelief, *hubris*, or concupiscence. Thus, if we take seriously his insistence that the New Being is independent of Jesus as the Christ, two thorny problems must be faced. First, the soteriological correlation becomes less than complete, for it is unclear as to how the New Being really does appear under the conditions of existence and overcome them. Second, the saving power of the New Being necessarily becomes virtually indistinguishable from that which is attributed to being-itself. And since man can have an awareness of being-itself which is unmediated, the status of the New Being itself is rendered tenuous and ambiguous.

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[1] Kenneth Hamilton, *The System and the Gospel*, p. 150.

[2] Bernard Martin, *The Existentialist Theology of Paul Tillich*, p. 179. Significantly, the same type of interpretation has offered on Schleiermacher's view of redemption and justification.

[3] *Ibid.*

Like Schleiermacher, Tillich exhibits no real concern to develop a careful doctrine of the Trinity. In treating the process of sanctification in the church he equates the New Being with the Spiritual Presence as responsible for the saving transformation of lives. At most the New Being manifested in Jesus as the Christ serves as a criterion of the Spiritual Presence which is simply "god present" in every religion and culture. From a Christological standpoint this means that for Tillich the kerygmatic emphasis on the Spirit as the power of Christ among believers is clearly deferential to his apologetic insistence that the Christ symbolizes the New Being or the Spiritual Presence which is at work in latent as well as manifest churches, in all religions, and in all history. This is precisely the opposite kind of imbalance to that which was noted in Schleiermacher's thought.

Tillich declares that the Cross largely determines his Christology, soteriology, and theology as a whole.[1] He makes a genuine attempt to interpret the _kerygma_ meaningfully by treating the Cross and the resurrection as interdependent symbols for the subjection to and conquest of existence by the New Being. But the consequent interpretation is caught in the snare of his ontology and is ontologized to fit the categories of his system.[1] For example, the Cross appears to deserve its central position in his system, because it passes the dual test of finality for revelation and religious symbolism: self-negation and transcendent self-affirmation. Although he rightly points out that the continuous self-sacrificing love of Jesus as the Christ led him to the Cross, his fundamental conclusion is that this made him completely transparent to the ground of being. This unavoidably obscures the New Testament truth that this love is identical with God's love that sent Jesus forth,[2] and that "the Atonement is something within the life of God, wrought by God, and applied by Him to men in every age."[3]

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[1] _The Interpretation of History_, p. 75.

In spite of Tillich's belief that his "participation" theory balances the objective and subjective sides of the atonement, his doctrine of symbolism seems to place him among those with an essentially subjectivist view of the Cross and the atonement. For him a symbol has eternal significance only for one with the eyes of belief-ful realism. Instead of apprehending the complete transparency of Jesus as the Christ to the logos of being through the symbol of the Cross, the belief-less realist sees only a man who died as a criminal. Just as the balance between "the given" and the "ecstatic" or receptive sides of his revelational view tends to swing toward the latter side, so his view of the Cross is weighted toward the subjectivist side.[1]

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[1] George H. Tavard, Paul Tillich and the Christian Message, p. 79.

[2] L. Harold DeWolf says that we would be truer to the biblical conception of God if we affirm that God does suffer (Is. 63:9). To deny that God suffers with Jesus is to deny the uninterrupted unity of the Father and the Son which Jesus reported. Cf. A Theology of Reality (New York: Collier Books, 1962), p. 66; Daniel Day Williams What Present-day Theologians are Thinking (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1958), pp. 112f.

[3] D. M. Baillie, God Was in Christ (London: Faber and Faber, Ltd., 1961), p. 192.

In retrospect, Tillich's method and approach to Christology as a function of soteriology give the impression that Jesus as the Christ is significant only as a bearer of the New Being. Whether or not this view takes seriously enough the Incarnation must be explored later. What is of concern here is that at various points Tillich's statements about salvation tend to shade into a message different from the Christian message which he claims to be interpreting. This may be attributed to the fact that experience is not merely a medium but a transformer of the theological sources in Tillich's system. That is, for Tillich, the existential-ontological questions control the form but not the content of the revelatory answers in the method of correlation. But this means that a shifting of the question can change the answer,[2] and that the

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[1] His affinity at this point with Bultmann, whom he admits he follows, cannot be overlooked: "I am of the New Testament tradition, of the tradition of my great teacher, Rudolf Bultmann." Ultimate Concern, p. 37. Bultmann's classic statement on the Cross is: "The saving efficacy of the cross is not derived from the fact that it is the cross of Christ; it is the cross of Christ because it has saving efficacy." Kerygma and Myth, ed. by Hans Werner Bartsch; trans. by Reginald Fuller (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1961), p. 41.

[2] Cf. Robert C. Johnson, Authority in Protestant Theology (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1959), pp. 119-122.

Christian message is interpreted symbolically and translated into terms that fit the system.[1]

What may be doubted is that such a division between the form and content of the Christian message can be made. It appears that the form of the content of the Christian message cannot be changed by experience or existential questions without the message itself becoming something different. Now in the expression of ideas there is a translation of the thought of one into the thought of another, the analysis of which involves semantics and the symbolic function of language. However, "this is not to say that the form of the content has changed, rather the form of our expression of that content."[2]

The central issue at stake here is whether or not the existential questions or experience can alter or determine the form of the Word made flesh, the final revelation, the criterion and content of the Christian message. If it is the absolute paradox, which Tillich insists it is,[3] it is against and counter to human expectations and its form can hardly be determined by the questions of men. Ultimately this

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[1] The resulting artificiality in the structuring of questions and answers in the system has been pinpointed by John Dillenberger: "The marvel of Paul Tillich's theology is not that theological answers and philosophical . . . . questions fit together so well. After all, why shouldn't they? Tillich has forged the questions, and he has formed them in the light of the answers." "Man and the World," The Christian Century, LXXXVI, No. 22 (June 3, 1959), p. 669.

[2] Alexander McKelway, The Systematic Theology of Paul Tillich, p. 68.

[3] Systematic Theology, Vol I, p. 57.

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issue involves Tillich's cavalier attitude toward the historical Jesus in whom the Logos became flesh. This must be examined subsequently.

ii. Christological Alternative

Schleiermacher and Tillich acknowledge that the humanity and divinity of the Christ are substantially preserved in the Nicene and Chalcedonian decisions. Yet the idea of a "divine nature" in the Christ is found to be inadequate, because God is beyond essence and existence. Furthermore, they declare that the major difficulty in the Christology of the church is its inclination toward the docetic-monophysitic heresy. In place of the doctrine of two natures, united in Christ, therefore, they propose a doctrine of an essential and eternal God-man unity in the Christ. By holding in dialectical tension and balance adoptionistic and incarnational emphases, they believe that they are able to establish the genuine humanity and divinity of the Christ while avoiding the pitfalls of Ebionism and Docetism. Hence our primary critical concern will be to determine whether internal difficulties inhibit or perhaps even prohibit the accomplishment of what they affirm.

(1) The Divinity of the Christ Imperilled.--Our initial critical attention focuses on those points in which the divinity of Christ is placed in jeopardy in the Christological constructions of both men. The concept of "divine nature" is replaced by the idea of a perfect, eternal, and essential unity between God and man that became historical reality in the Christ. However, Tillich himself criticizes Schleiermacher for failing to do justice to the divinity of Christ by expressing

this unity in terms of Jesus' absolutely potent God-consciousness. Although Schleiermacher eventually equates the absolutely potent God-consciousness of Jesus with the existence of God in Him, which Tillich seems not to take seriously enough, it is undeniable that Schleiermacher gives the impression that Christ was just a man more conscious of God than the average man. What disturbs Tillich and others is that in his thought there is a quantitative but not qualitative difference between Christ and other believers.

This anthropological connotation is contained in Schleiermacher's insistence that the Redeemer cannot be wholly supranatural. But one wonders if He is "supranatural" at all in light of his unqualified avowal that Jesus of Nazareth actually became ideal, that he became determined absolutely by his God-consciousness. Moreover, this occurred in full accord with natural human development, contends Schleiermacher, because such a possibility resides in human nature itself. Thus, the will and person of Jesus, His Vorbildlichkeit or exemplary status, prompted God's choice or adoption of Him to be the Redeemer.

Tillich rejects this version of adoptionism on the grounds that it tends to countenance a Jesusolatry that points toward a "moral" rather than an "essential" union of God and man in the Christ. Certainly in Schleiermacher's Christology there is the Antiochean penchant so to emphasize the humanity of Christ at certain points that unintentionally His divinity becomes ancillary. Even when Schleiermacher says that the "Word became flesh" or that the "ideal became historical" in Jesus of Nazareth, one gets the feeling that the Logos entered into an intimate relationship with Jesus, ostensibly at Baptism, because it was pleased with Him. This adoptionistic side of his dialectical treatment of Christology prompts some to conclude that"the Incarnation, for Schleiermacher, is for a moral, not a metaphysical purpose, and its nature must be moral."[1]

Tillich's indictments against Schleiermacher for failing to account adequately for the divinity of the Christ are incisive and penetrating. Unfortunately, his own Christology does not surmount completely the very same weaknesses and difficulties. His doctrine of the Christ begins at the same place as that of Schleiermacher. Whereas Schleiermacher insists that the possibility resides in human nature to be determined completely by God-consciousness, Tillich espouses the "*infra Lutheranum*" which maintains that the finite is capable of the infinite. Thus, he can maintain that Jesus was a human person wholly immersed in the tensions, ambiguities, and even guilt of finite existence. He can also hold that Jesus so partook of the infinite that he was enabled to surrender everything finite in himself and become completely transparent to the *logos* or ground of being. In this way Jesus became divine, that is, the final revelation, the Christ, the transmitter of the New Being.

The Christ for Tillich, then, appears to be a man who was "more transparent" to the divine than any other man, and he is only quantitatively different from other believers. Indeed, his doctrine of symbols affirms that every personality can be transparent to the ground of being. "What distinguishes Jesus from the prophets and the saints is that he had a complete and they only a partial transparency. It is a quantitative difference."[1]

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[1] P. T. Forsyth, *The Person and Place of Christ*, (Naperville, Ill.: Allenson Pub. Co.Inc., 1955), p. 218.

Thus, the divinity of Christ is threatened by Schleiermacher's treating Him as a man with a greater God-consciousness than others and by Tillich's treating Jesus as the Christ as one who is more completely transparent to the ground of being than other men. Despite Tillich's charge of Jesusology against Schleiermacher, he seems to have an inverse Jesusology. After all, for him the process of self-surrender that is consummated on the Cross is what made Jesus the Christ, and this very self-negation which occupies Tillich's concern cannot but draw our attention to the self of Jesus. Moreover, this view of Tillich's, which may be described as an inverted kenotic and adoptionistic theory, contains the connotation of a moral rather than the affirmed essential union between God and man in the Christ.[2]

Similarly, if Schleiermacher's somewhat fluid distinction between Christ and other believers tends to endanger the divinity of Christ, the same may be said of Tillich's assertion that Jesus could not have been the Christ unless he had been received as the Christ. Indeed, he explicitly declares that the fact of the Incarnation is guaranteed by faith alone, by our participation in the New Being. In spite of his protestations, Tillich leaves us with the impression that the Christ-character of the event of Jesus as the Christ is attributable to the faith of believers.

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[1] Allan Killen, The Ontological Theology of Paul Tillich, p. 150.

[2] In a letter of reply to Gustave Weigel's criticism and interpretation Tillich writes: "You are further right that I am more in sympathy with the Antiochean rather than the Alexandrian Christology, although I have often been accused of Docetism which is certainly nearer to Cyril than to Theodore." Cf. Gustave Weigel, "Contemporaneous Protestantism and Paul Tillich," Theological Studies, XI (June, 1950), p. 202. In this same article Tillich is charged with having a Nestorian Christology, two beings in the Christ. Yet Tillich replies: "This is the best analysis of my thought that I have ever seen." Ibid., p. 201. It seems to me that Tillich let this pass. Actually, essential manhood and essential Godhood appear to be revealed as one in the Christ in his Christology.

(2) The Humanity of Christ Imperilled--We have seen that the adoptionistic emphases and the co-ordinate attempt to establish the genuine humanity of the Christ of Schleiermacher and Tillich at several points tend to undermine the divinity of Christ. Our correlative critical concern is to discern whether or not the declared incarnational emphasis of the two men imperils the genuine humanity of Christ. At whatever points this appears to be the case, the Incarnation concomitantly will be endangered.

Alongside his contention that Jesus of Nazareth actually became ideal and that this is the miraculous fact about the Redeemer, Schleiermacher affirms the sinlessness of Jesus. To attribute sinlessness to Jesus is to declare that every moment of His life was determined absolutely by His God-consciousness. Yet Schleiermacher equally affirms that there is never a moment in man's life which is devoid of spontaneity and sin or which is determined absolutely by God-consciousness. How Jesus could have shared our common humanity, therefore, becomes an open question, especially in view of his added assertion that Jesus was at birth what we are only by regeneration. This is illustrative of

Schleiermacher's penchant for dialectical statements which shade imperceptibly into inconsistency. Indeed, he himself acknowledges that to say that Jesus was absolutely determined by his God-consciousness at birth would be to make his childhood Docetic. In this instance he is perhaps his own best critic.

The incertitude encircling the participation of the Redeemer in existence and His sharing of our humanity assumes still graver proportions when Schleiermacher's treatment of the temptations is considered. Their reality is virtually denied. They could not have involved even an infinitely small amount of moral struggle for Jesus, because that would imply a higher and lower will within Him. Moreover, Christ could not have originated real error or even have accepted the error of others, because His God-consciousness was absolutely in control of his human nature,[1] and His human nature gave absolutely no resistance to the activity of God in Him.[2]

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[1] *The Christian Faith*, p. 454. Heresy-hunting is not our critical intention, but the proximity of Schleiermacher's position to that of Apollinaris at this point is rather striking. Apollinaris held that the humanity of Christ consisted of the body (σῶμα) and animal soul (ψυχή), whereas the mind (νοῦς) was taken by the *Logos*. "From this point of view the elimination of a human psychology had the advantage of excluding the possibility of there being two contradictory wills and intelligences in Christ. It also ensured the Saviour's sinlessness." John Norman D. Kelly, *Early Christian Doctrines* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1958), p. 293. The Cappadocians rightly perceived that this denied the real humanity of Christ, for a man without a mind is inconceivable. Because it paved the way for monophysitism and Docetism, Apollinarianism was explicitly rejected at Chalcedon. Perhaps by adhering more closely to the substance of the Chalcedonian Decree, Schleiermacher could have averted what seems to be a Docetic-monophysitic tendency in his own thought.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 432.

Such statements imply that Jesus was little more than a colorless medium or channel through which God worked. They unavoidably conflict with Schleiermacher's own denunciation of the alternation theory which holds that the human was passive and the divine alone was active in Christ. Thus, by placing Jesus above moral struggle and error his Christology unintentionally but inevitably takes on a Docetic-monophysitic form.

Such expressions as the ideal, the Word, *Urbild*--essential or original or archetypal man, Man-in-himself, the absolutely potent God-consciousness, and the existence of God in Christ are applied interchangeably by Schleiermacher to Jesus and to Christ. This is highly objectionable to Tillich because of Docetic implications. The term *Urbild* is especially disturbing, he contends, because it connotes the idealistic transcendence of true humanity over human existence.[1]

Tillich seems to have overlooked the inseparability of the *Vorbildlichkeit* and *Urbildlichkeit* of Christ in Schleiermacher's thought, which allows for a participation of the *Urbild*, indeed, of the Eternal Being, in time and space. However, Tillich's criticism is not wholly invalid, because Schleiermacher's use of rather slippery terminology exposes him to such a criticism. For example, the participation of Christ in the sinfulness of man is explained as His "sympathy" with the sin of man, and the *Urbild* shares an "essential likeness" with all men. But "essential likeness" implies that Christ shares not our

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[1] *Systematic Theology*, Vol. II, p. 150.

humanity of becoming but only the human nature that is "yet to become" or that is completed. For this reason Schleiermacher speaks of Christ not just as the Second Adam but as the second creation and the completion of creation. But this removes the idea of a personal Incarnation from the center of his thought.[1] Thus, insofar as Jesus of Nazareth fits awkwardly into this incarnational segment of Schleiermacher's Christology, his Christology necessarily becomes diluted with Docetic tendencies.

Tillich's admitted preference for Theodore of Mopseustia signifies his laudable concern to avoid a Docetic-monophysitic Christology. He also seeks to balance his adoptionistic tendencies with an incarnational emphasis on the New Being as essential being that appeared in a personal life and conquered the conditions of existence. The New Being also denotes the divinity of Jesus as the Christ as it expresses the essential unity between God and man that appeared in him.

This reinterpretation of the incarnation avoids any idea of a transmutation myth or Jesusology, but the price is surely too high. It renders the status of Jesus of Nazareth extremely uncertain.[1] Indeed, according to Tillich, the Incarnation may be guaranteed by participation in the New Being, but faith cannot establish that the personal life in whom the New Being appeared was Jesus. Moreover, the "personal life"

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1. Cf. Karl Barth, From Rousseau to Ritschl, p. 342; Emil Brunner, Die Mystik und das Wort, Chapter III.

2. On one occasion Tillich says quite plainly: "New Being is essential being under the conditions of existence, conquering the gap between essence and existence." Systematic Theology, Vol. II, pp. 118-119.

appears to be obsequiously confirmed by the sheer ontological exigency that the final revelation of being-itself be through the most adequate finite medium, the human microcosmos.

What is perplexing here is that if one were to ask Tillich, "What is the Christ?" he would reply, "The New Being." But if one were to ask, "Who is the Christ?" his answer would be, "Although I give no other name than Jesus in my system, the question must be left open." Thus it appears that what really matters in his Christology is the New Being, and his ontology of the New Being is clearly indifferent toward the historical Jesus. But in the biblical "picture" of Jesus as the Christ, which Tillich claims to take seriously, there is no implication "to the effect that Jesus, the man, was at any given moment unimportant or less important than Jesus, the Christ."[1] If his Christology can spare the historical Jesus, it unavoidably tends to focus not on the historical event of Jesus as the Christ but on a philosophico-religious principle.[2]

In spite of this apparent lack of interest in the historical Jesus Tillich declares that the historical foundation of the Christian faith and Christology is Peter's confession that Jesus was the Christ. Yet his own doctrine of symbolism threatens to deprive this event of its historical concreteness and import. He himself warns that it would be heteronomous to absolutize a moment of symbolic apprehension in the past and make it authoritative in the present.[1] Also it will be recalled that Tillich refuses to identify "the Christ" with Jesus of Nazareth, because this would be literalistic distortion of the symbol for the New Being. He is even reluctant to pray to "Jesus Christ" for fear of idolatry, for "fear of looking at two faces instead of the divine face."[2] The major difficulty here, and at several points in Tillich's thought, is that in the process of propounding the necessity of dismissing idolatrous worship of Jesus, he leaves the impression of the real possibility of dispensing with the historical Jesus altogether. Indeed, he himself has entertained such a possibility.

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[1] Maria Fuerth Sulzbach, "The Place of Christology in Contemporary Protestantism," Religion in Life (Winter, 1953-1954), p. 212. Quoted in George Tavard, Paul Tillich and the Christian Message, p. 132.

[2] Ibid., p. 167.

Such a separation between the Christ or the New Being and the man Jesus hardly is correlative to the apostolic proclamation that "God has made him both Lord and Christ, this Jesus whom you crucified."[3] Although Tillich contends that the New Being expresses the divine or Christ-character of Jesus as the Christ, he equally allows that the New Being is "independent of historical contingencies and dependent on God alone."[4] This cannot but make doubtful his own version of the incarnation as the essential unity between God and man that became reality in Jesus as the Christ. If the New Being or the Christ is "essential being" that is actualized under the conditions while remaining inseparable from the ground of being, its "newness" is assured. But its genuine participation in and sharing of our humanity remains problematical, thus paving the way for Docetic connotations to creep into Tillich's Christology.

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[1] Systematic Theology, Vol. I, pp. 148-149.

[2] The New Being, p. 100.

[3] Acts 2:36. For this insight the writer is indebted to Kenneth Hamilton, The System and the Gospel, p. 161.

[4] Systematic Theology, Vol. II, p. 160.

When Tillich goes on to say that "the New Being _is_ the being of Jesus as the Christ,"[1] he seems to be both inconsistent and guilty of the Docetic monophysitism which he stringently disavows. This clearly monophysitic, if not Docetic, assertion is modified elsewhere by a description of the New Being as the "power" in Jesus as the Christ that conquers or resists estrangement.[2] Significantly, here Tillich's position becomes virtually indistinguishable from that of Schleiermacher, whom _he_ has charged with anthropocentrism and a failure to account for the essential unity of God and man in the Christ. The affinity appears even stronger in view of Tillich's acknowledgment that to participate in the New Being in the Christ is to participate in the realm of his own participation in God.[3] This is Schleiermacher's view restated!

Tillich's belief that the power of the New Being was and is expressed in the biblical picture of Jesus as the Christ and that an analogy exists between this picture and the actual personal life from which it arose is hardly satisfying. Why there should be such a true correspondence between the "picture" and Jesus of Nazareth is never adequately explained. The transforming power of the "picture" is insufficient to establish why Jesus was the Christ; faith can guarantee the New Being but not Jesus. The lingering question is: "How can we accept an interpretation if we do not know what is to be interpreted? How can we share the Apostles' interpretation if we choose to doubt the identity of whom and what they interpreted?"[1] Certainly it is true that no amount of historical evidence will add up to the assertion of faith that Jesus is the Christ, but this does not mean that the history is irrelevant. Insofar as Tillich abandons Jesus as Jesus, he is liable to the charge of Docetism.[2] After all, what is the human element in Jesus as the Christ, unless it is Jesus as Jesus?

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[1] _Ibid._, p. 176.

[2] _Ibid._, p. 125.

[3] _Ibid._, pp. 174-176.

The foregoing statements on the relationship of the New Being to Jesus of Nazareth or Jesus as the Christ illustrate a mélange of apologetic and kerygmatic motives within Tillich's Christology. On the one hand, the New Being appears to be used virtually synonymously with the power of being-itself that manifests itself in all periods of history, indeed, in all religions, through any finite medium. At most its manifestation in Jesus as the Christ is final in a decisive, universal, and normative sense. On the other hand, the New Being appears to be regarded

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1. Maria Fuerth Sulzbach, "The Place of Christology in Contemporary Protestantism," Religion in Life (Winter, 1953-1954), p. 212. Quoted in George Tavard, Paul Tillich and the Christian Message, p. 132.

2. Belatedly it was learned that this critical conclusion is shared by D. Moody Smith, Jr. in his article, "The Historical Jesus in Paul Tillich's Christology," Journal of Religion, Vol. XLVI (January, 1966), pp. 131-144.

as almost synonymous with Jesus as the Christ. Indeed, it is the new state of things brought by Jesus as the Christ. This amalgam, however, hardly achieves the purpose intended: an incarnational explanation of the adoptionist Christology. Instead, at various points the essential unity of God and man in Jesus as the Christ is attenuated, and disavowed Docetic tendencies are discernible.

While affirming the historical incertitude of and disclaiming interest in the historical Jesus, Tillich dialectically remonstrates against a view, such as Schleiermacher's, which fails to take seriously the reality of Jesus' temptations. The temptations, Tillich holds, clearly reveal the genuine humanity or the finite freedom of Jesus. But how can Jesus be the Christ if under the conditions of existence estrangement exists "prior to the decision to succumb or not to succumb to the temptation?"[1] Does this not imply that the salvation of mankind is left hanging on the decision of a finite individual?

Acknowledging the problematical implications of taking seriously the temptations, Tillich counters by saying that what happens to Jesus as the Christ is always a consequence of his destiny, that "the finite freedom of the Christ is imbedded in his destiny."[3] In other words, in the being of Jesus as the Christ destiny has complete control over freedom. Tillich does not seem to avoid completely the same Apollinarian tendency that was detected in Schleiermacher's treatment of the temptations.

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[1] Systematic Theology, Vol. II, p. 128. [2] Ibid., pp. 130-131.

Furthermore, his reference to destiny here has connotations of necessity which mitigate his own abhorrence of "reification." He says that only a "thing" can be completely determined and that man is not a "thing." Thus it does appear that in order to prevent his Christology from being in the end inadequate Tillich resorts to some rather desperate dialectics. In this instance, he affirms his opposition to Docetic tendencies, supports his affirmation, and then moves toward that which he originally opposed!

In summation, internal ambiguities and unsettled problems inhibit and, at certain points, prohibit Schleiermacher and Tillich from achieving their common christological objective: the establishment of the genuine humanity and divinity of the Christ. In emphasizing the Jesus-character of the event of Jesus as the Christ or the Redeemer, Schleiermacher takes seriously the historicity of Christ, but at certain points the humanity of Christ is problematical. Conversely, Tillich takes seriously the humanity of the Christ, but at certain points the historicity of the Christ is problematical. In stressing the Christ-character of the event of Jesus as the Christ, Schleiermacher elucidates the existence and activity of God in Christ, but at certain points Ebionitic as well as Docetic connotations are discernible. Tillich explains the Christ-character of Jesus as the Christ as the New Being, but the uncertainty of the essential unity of the New Being with Jesus of Nazareth or Jesus as the Christ endangers his incarnational alternative and Docetic connotations may be ascertained. Thus, the tenability of each man's Christological position becomes dubious insofar as it is unable to avoid the very pitfalls that prompted the creative alternative: tendences toward Ebionism and Docetism.

Both men seek to effect a dialectical balance between adoptionistic and incarnational emphases in their Christologies. Schleiermacher's adoptionistic focus on the Vorbildlichkeit of Jesus is unmistakably clear, but greater stress falls on His Urbildlichkeit. Thus, the incarnational idea that "God was in Christ" or that the "Word became flesh" seems to have priority. Conversely, Tillich's incarnational emphasis appears to be incapable of establishing the affirmed essential unity of God and man in Jesus as the Christ, allowing his avowed adoptionistic position to assume predominance.

The extremely dialectical and often seemingly contradictory nature of the Christologies of both men preclude any notion that the imbalance just cited is conclusive or binding. In any case, however, the balance for which they both strive seems not to have been accomplished with the success that they fully intended. Undoubtedly we have had to understand them in a way that is basically against their own intentions.

iii. Biblical Witness and the Historical Jesus

Consideration of the historical Jesus is integral to most Christological construction. To deal adequately with this segment of the Christologies of Schleiermacher and Tillich, more extensive critical attention must be focused on their divergent positions on the possibility and importance of historical inquiry into the life of Jesus on the basis of the New Testament sources. An exhaustive hermeneutical analysis and criticism of the apparent enlistments of biblical support for the Christologies will not be attempted. But their positions will be evaluated in terms of their faithfulness to an interpretation which takes with equal seriousness the interpretative nature of the sources and the importance of the historical Jesus within the sources themselves.

The normative interpretation invoked here approximates the position explicated by James M. Robinson and represented in general by such scholars as Ernst Käsemann, Ernst Fuchs, Günther Bornkamm, and Hermann Diem.[1] The essential features of this interpretation will be delineated in the subsequent application. It is particularly amenable to the purpose at hand in that it takes a path lying between the basically positivistic position of Schleiermacher and the essentially skeptical view of Tillich on the significance of the historical Jesus for the Christian faith and Christology.

In order to provide a context for this evaluation some general critical observations will be offered on the relationship between the Christological intentions and performances of Schleiermacher and Tillich with regard to their critical reading of the New Testament.

(1) General Critical Observations.--Schleiermacher and Tillich recognize the New Testament to be the basis of our knowledge of the Christ,

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[1] James M. Robinson, A New Quest of the Historical Jesus. Hereafter cited A New Quest.

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and they are rightly concerned to develop their Christologies in accord with the "picture" of or total interpretative witness to Jesus as the Christ or Redeemer in the New Testament. But even a superficial reading of the two men reveals that their Christologies fail to take seriously the total witness of the New Testament to the Christ. Their critical readings are actually highly selective readings. Their preference for the Fourth Gospel and Paul's Epistles is unconcealed, and only sweeping attention is devoted to the life, teachings, and ministry of Jesus as recorded in the Synoptics. However, despite the contiguity of their selective readings, divergence between them must be critically acknowledged.

Schleiermacher's concern to lay hold of the inner life-unity or the self-identity of Jesus leads him to explain how the prophetic, priestly, and prophetic offices of the Old Testament are united, fulfilled, and abrogated by Christ.[1] This emphasis doubtless stems in part from his endeavor to establish the Vorbildlichkeit of Jesus. His primary concern, however, is indubitably that of treating the teachings, miracles, suffering, death, resurrection and ascension of Jesus in such a way that they express His Urbildlichkeit, His absolutely potent God-consciousness, or the presence of God in Him. While taking seriously the concrete reality of these recorded events--indeed the resurrection and the ascension are taken literally--Schleiermacher seems to "psychologize" them, to use Tillich's terms, so that they are conceived to be communicative of Jesus' God-consciousness. For example, the ethical import of Jesus teachings and preaching of the Kingdom of God is untouched, as Schleiermacher interprets them as nothing more and nothing less than His Lebensmitteilung or self-presentation.

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[1] The Old Testament has value for dogmatic theology only insofar as the theologian draws upon it for explicatory purposes such as this, according to Schleiermacher. His constant concern is to avoid any idea that Christianity was simply a new development of Judaism or that Jesus was nothing more than a more or less original and revolutionary reformer of the Jewish law. Cf. The Christian Faith, p. 380.

Tillich rightly criticizes Schleiermacher's psychologizing tendency insofar as it fails to take seriously enough the interpretative nature of the New Testament sources. He contends that Jesus is beyond the grasp of any such historico-psychological investigation. However, his "ontologizing" alternative is hardly less problematical.

Recognizing fully the New Testament writers' central intent to communicate the kerygma, the Cross and the Resurrection are interpreted by Tillich to symbolize the subjection to and the conquering of the conditions of existence by the New Being manifested in Jesus as the Christ. The problematical nature of his view of the Cross has been treated already. Here his "restitution" theory of the Resurrection symbol is no less troublesome. It explains the resurrection as the overcoming of the disappearance of him whose being was the New Being. But does this really explain anything? He has already established that it is impossible for the New Being to disappear at all. The problem remains as to why Jesus of Nazareth would be indissolubly united with the New Being.

Tillich's resolution is that faith provides the certainty "that the death of Jesus of Nazareth was not able to separate the New

Being from the picture of its bearer."[1] But the "picture" is the result of the believers' reception of Jesus as the Christ, as the New Being! At this point Thielicke's criticism of Bultmann's theory of the Resurrection seems equally applicable to Tillich's" "If faith in the resurrection is only the reflex of an encounter, devoid of any objective, historical basis, it is in the last resort vulnerable to all the attacks of psychologists."[2]

Holding fast to his symbolical and ontological interpretation of the Cross and the Resurrection, Tillich proceeds to treat the recorded events of Jesus' life as corroborating symbols. Thus it would seem that with one symbolic sweep everything is included in Tillich's interpretation of the New Testament witness to Jesus as the Christ. Such is not the case. The undue minimization of the historical concreteness of the recorded events[3] and the implied separableness of Jesus and the Christ inherent in his symbolical hermeneutics leave out of view the full import of the apostolic witness to and proclamation of Jesus Christ. Indeed, Acts, which specifically treats the Apostles' activity, is mentioned or alluded to not at all in Tillich's definitive Christological construction. Perhaps if Tillich took more seriously the

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[1] Systematic Theology, Vol. II, p. 158.

[2] Helmut Thielicke, "The Restatement of New Testament Mythology," trans. by Reginald Fuller, in Kerygma and Myth, ed. by Hans Werner Bartsch (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1961), p. 153.

[3] This is the main criticism levied against Tillich by Avery Dulles, "Paul Tillich and the Bible," Paul Tillich in Catholic Thought, pp. 129-132.

Apostles as "our historical links with the Person of Jesus Christ and the witnesses to His work,"[1] he would be more vitally concerned with the details of Jesus' life.

It is precisely this unbroken continuity and congruity between the apostolic teaching and the earthly life of Jesus Christ[2] that Schleiermacher takes seriously. Yet, Tillich, who explicitly affirms his intent to translate the kerygma into meaningful terms and to take seriously "everything we read about Jesus in the New Testament,"[3] somehow overlooks the objective faith of the apostles that the crucified Jesus was both Lord and Christ.[4]

Thus, it would appear that Tillich's "picture" of Jesus as the Christ results from a critical reading of the New Testament that is even more highly selective than Schleiermacher's. This much is at least clear: a gap exists between his theological performance and his intention to develop his Christology in correlation with the biblical "picture" as the total witness of the New Testament to Jesus as the Christ.[5] As for his ontological-symbolical interpretation of the biblical witness to Jesus as the Christ, it achieves that which Tillich intends: the placement of the Christ-event and the Christian message beyond the skeptical clutches of historical criticism. But along with this advantage there are some very real problems involved which must now be treated.

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[1] J. Robert Nelson, Criterion for the Church (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1963), p. 24. Underlining my own.

[2] Ibid., p. 21.

[3] Ultimate Concern, p. 54

[4] Acts 2:36. Nels Ferré goes so far as to say: "If Tillich is right, the objective faith of the apostles and of a great company of Christian witnesses throughout the ages was wrong, and he plainly tells us so!" "Book Review of Biblical Religion and the Search for Ultimate Reality by Paul Tillich," Christian Century, LXII (July, 1965), p. 1273.

[5] John Macquarrie points out that Bultmann draws almost exclusively upon John and Paul for his Theology of the New Testament because of

(2) The Historical Jesus.--In attempting to establish the humanity of the Christ, Schleiermacher and Tillich duly allow a place for the historical Jesus. For Schleiermacher the historical Jesus is the man Jesus of Nazareth who actually became ideal or in whom the Word became flesh. To grasp fully this absolute paradox one must participate in Jesus' God-consciousness and lay hold of his inner life unity or self-consciousness on the basis of the New Testament. For Tillich the historical Jesus is not the person who stands behind the gospel reports, for this Jesus supposedly recovered by historical research is unimportant. The historical Jesus is the factual element in the event of Jesus as the Christ or the transformation of reality in that personal life portrayed in the New Testament picture of the Christ. Thus, the historical Jesus, for Tillich, is a "question of faith and not of historical research."[1]

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their congeniality to his existential and demythologizing hermeneutical approach. His consequent criticism, which seems equally applicable to Tillich's Christology, is that he is guilty of a certain distortion of the New Testament message due to his lack of interest in the details of Jesus' life and personality as recorded in the Synoptics. Surely, says Macquarrie, the historical Jesus cannot have quite the subordinate role in Christian theology that Bultmann assigns him. Cf. Existential Theology (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1958), pp. 63-66.

[1] Systematic Theology, Vol. II, p. 107.

Philosophical presuppositions and hermeneutical methods undoubtedly contribute to this divergence between these two men on this matter of the historical Jesus, as we have seen. An attempt will now be made to delineate some of the very real contributions as well as some of the deeper problems involved in each man's views.

Schleiermacher justifiably pursues an inquiry into the life of Jesus on the basis of the congruity between Jesus' proclamation and the apostolic witness in the New Testament. He insists that Jesus proclaimed Himself and communicated His absolutely potent God-consciousness in His message of the Kingdom of God, thereby calling his hearers to decision and faith. This contention takes seriously the fact that the Gospel is "bound to the one who *before* and *after* Easter revealed himself to his own as Lord."[1] Essentially this is the formal pattern of the new quest of the historical Jesus.

The new quest shares real affinity with Schleiermacher's basic thesis that the apostolic witness is a continuation of Jesus' message and an evaluation of the historical person of Jesus of Nazareth. The concern to apprehend Jesus' "transcendent selfhood" is virtually indistinguishable from Schleiermacher's attempt to lay hold of Jesus' absolutely potent God-consciousness.[1] Whereas advocates of the new quest hold that Jesus' transcendent selfhood is constituted by God's intervention in history, Jesus' God-consciousness for Schleiermacher means the indwelling of God in Him.[2]

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[1] *A New Quest*, p. 91. Ernst Käsemann writes: "Fuchs, Bornkamm, and I see ourselves compelled to restrict the assertion that Easter founded the Christian *kerygma*; we must enquire as to the meaning of the historical Jesus *for faith*." *Ibid.*, p. 85. Even Bultmann concedes that in Jesus' lifetime "he *had* demanded decision for his person as the bearer of the Word; the church has now made this decision. Jesus' call to decision implies a Christology." *Theology of the New Testament*, trans. by Kendrick Grobel (New York: Chas. Scribner's Sons, 1951), Vol. I, p. 43.

As a dogmatic theologian who writes for the church, Schleiermacher quite rightly disavows any claim to prove that God acted in Jesus or that Jesus had an absolutely potent God-consciousness. Also, he declares that one can engage in meaningful discourse about Jesus only if one experiences His redeeming God-consciousness that is communicated within the act of preaching in the church. Hence, he takes seriously the temporal duality of the kerygma: its "pastness" as God's saving act in Jesus Christ and its "presentness" as it recurs in the act of preaching.

That which makes Schleiermacher's treatment of the historical Jesus genuinely problematical is its inclination toward historicism and psychologism. The methodological possibility of his inquiry on the basis of the New Testament, as he explains it, is at variance with his disclaiming any concern to prove the factuality of Jesus as the Redeemer. Consistently he maintains that the apostles had a perfect intuition[1] or a "pure and complete apprehension of the various aspects of Christ's life, . . . of His teachings and precepts."[2] The Synoptics are therefore held to be historical books, and John is believed to be an eyewitness account.[3] Thus, rather positivistically Schleiermacher declares that by means of the New Testament accounts of Jesus' proclamation of the Kingdom of God we can lay hold of Jesus' self-consciousness, that is, His God-consciousness or God's dwelling in Him.

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[1] The current New Testament scholar who shares the greatest affinity for Schleiermacher's position is Oscar Cullmann. In his work, The Christology of the New Testament, he focuses on Jesus' self-consciousness as Servant of the Lord, which he ascribes repeatedly to the baptismal experience, in his attempt to trace the way from the historical Jesus to the Logos doctrine of John. Cf. Markus Barth, "Review of Die Christologie des Neuen Testamentes by O. Cullmann." The Journal of Religion, XXXVIII (July, 1958), pp. 268-71.

[2] A New Quest, p. 107. Bornkamm, for example, shares Schleiermacher's concern to establish that there is no essential distinction between the messages of Jesus and Paul. He focuses upon the immediate and direct presence of God in Jesus' words and deeds. Cf. Günther Bornkamm, Jesus of Nazareth, trans. by James M. Robinson (New York: Harper and Row, 1960), pp. 24-26.

Not only has the discovery of the Church's kerygma within the Gospels vitiated such a quest for the historical Jesus, but Schleiermacher comes perilously close to saying that we can fully grasp by historical research all that Jesus actually was. He unintentionally therefore tends to move away from his own clarion call for involvement or participation in Christ's redeeming God-consciousness in order to comprehend fully the meaning of Jesus.

Schleiermacher doubtless would agree that "historically viewed, the life of Jesus is not the unique revelation of God's Word,"[1] and that one must not so focus on the bare fact of the Incarnation in Jesus that he forgets that "the consequence of this Incarnation is what really gives meaning to the fact."[2] Yet, the reader suspects that Schleiermacher's quest for the historical Jesus does not really transcend the historicism and psychologism so prominent in the nineteenth century view of historiography and biography.

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[1] The Christian Faith, p. 596.

[2] Ibid., pp. 600-601.

[3] Albert Schweitzer holds that Schleiermacher's one-sided preference for John as an eyewitness is what is fatal to his so-called "sound historical view." The Quest for the Historical Jesus, trans. by W. Montgomery (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1960), p. 66.

Some of the salient pitfalls of Schleiermacher's treatment of the historical Jesus may be elucidated by contrasting his view with some of the cardinal aspects of the new quest. Whereas Schleiermacher fails to distinguish between Jesus' message and the apostolic teachings in the evangelical narratives,[3] the new quest eliminates those elements which can be explained to have originated in Judaism and the early church. Then locating the pieces in the Synoptics which are authentic, the latter procedure seeks to distinguish the historical figure of Jesus in the midst of the interpretative sources.[4] Again, Schleiermacher tacitly assumes the authenticity of Jesus' sayings and demonstrates no real concern to take seriously their content and meaning. By way of contrast, advocates of the new quest probe carefully such authentic pieces as Jesus' kingdom sayings, parables, beatitudes, and exorcisms in order to apprehend the meaning of Jesus in terms of his intention and the eschatological existence to which he was committed.

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[1] J. Robert Nelson, The Realm of Redemption (London: The Epworth Press, 1951), p. 107.

[2] Ibid.

[3] The Christian Faith, p. 601.

[4] James D. Smart, The Interpretation of Scripture (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1961), p. 300. Some samples of authentic tradition cited by Käsemann: Mat. 4:17; 21:31; 18:31; 11:12f; Lk. 6:20f; 11:20.

Out of this examination the advocates of the new quest are convinced that Jesus' message is a call for a break with the old and evil eon and for a total commitment to God, to God's inbreaking Kingdom of which Jesus is the founder and center.[1] This message is continued in the church's kerygma, which drew out the implications of Jesus' preaching and mission by proclaiming Him Messiah and Son of God. Schleiermacher recognizes Jesus' self-proclamation but he fails to distinguish the eschatological nature of Jesus' message and the Christological nature of the church's kerygma.[2] Indeed, eschatology has no significant place in his Christology or in his theology as a whole.[3]

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[1] Hermann Diem's basic position is that Jesus proclaims himself in his proclamation of the Kingdom, and that the content of salvation is dependent upon Jesus. Therefore, he encourages us to search back to the proclamation of the earthly Jesus. "Here Diem has clearly moved to the position of the advocates of the new quest by accepting--in terms almost identical with those of Käsemann--the theological validity of the new quest, and by adopting the basic method of the new quest. . . . " A New Quest, p. 24.

[2] Ibid., p. 122.

[3] Albert Schweitzer's sharpest barb of criticism levied against Schleiermacher's Das Leben Jesu is that it fails to treat the thorough-going eschatological nature of Jesus' message. Because Schleiermacher makes no mention of Jesus' erroneous eschatological judgment, nor His use of the title of Son of Man in a Danielic sense, nor of His struggle in Gethsemane, Schweitzer concludes that he is not really in search of the historical Jesus but of the "historic figure which seems to him appropriate to the self-consciousness of the Redeemer as he represents it." The Quest of the Historical Jesus, p. 62.

Consequently, that Jesus did not teach a Christology as did the church would not have occurred to Schleiermacher. Thus, the final step of the new quest has no parallel in the thought of Schleiermacher.

Moving beyond the comparative terminology it is possible to discern a correspondence on the deeper level of meaning between Jesus' message and the church's kerygma. Whereas Jesus calls upon his hearer to break with the old or evil eon and commit himself to the inbreaking kingdom,[1] the kerygma calls upon the hearer to die to self with Christ and receive resurrected life with Christ.[2] This means that the meaning of Jesus may be grasped via the kerygma and via Jesus' message. Thus, the new quest takes seriously the historical Jesus without falling into historicism or psychologism. Moreover, it is able "to preserve the unity between the person whom men knew as Jesus of Nazareth and the person whom they acknowledged as the Lord of the church."[3]

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1. Cf. A New Quest, p. 124. Mt. 4:17; 21:31; 18:3; Lk. 6:20f; 11:20.

2. Ibid., p. 122. I Cor. 15:3-5; Lk. 24:26; Rom. 1:3f; I Tim. 3:16; I Pet. 1:11.

3. James D. Smart, The Interpretation of Scripture, p. 301. James M. Robinson and Ernst Fuchs tend to go beyond Käsemann by insisting that it is possible to have an interaction with the Jesus of the dead and gone first century and with the Jesus who encounters us in the kerygma (A New Quest, p. 96f.). Their real concern is to lay hold of Jesus' transcendent selfhood which is constituted by the eschatological intervention of God into history. While basically approving the quest, Smart attacks Robinson's historiographic route to the meaning of Jesus for either dissolving theology into anthropology or for trying to prove the validity of the content of the kerygma (Smart, pp. 303-4). This nuance of difference between Robinson's position and that of the other new questers has not been included in the treatment of aspects of the new quest, because the critical discussion that would be entailed moves beyond the scope of our concern. However, it has been noted that

Whatever else may be said about Schleiermacher's quest for the historical Jesus, his dissatisfaction with the mere allowance of the historicity of the event in which the Word became flesh is surely correct. That the Word became flesh in Jesus of Nazareth and none other is the absolute paradox at the heart of the Christian faith. If we fail to work out what can be known about the historical Jesus, we can hardly avoid mitigating the absoluteness of that paradox. Indeed, the humanity of Christ may become lost to us, and "we may find ourselves committed to a mythological Lord."[1]

Insofar as Tillich is concerned to avoid the positivistic tendencies of a view such as Schleiermacher's, he speaks meaningfully and helpfully on the problem of the historical Jesus. One finds no trace of historicism or psychologism in his thoughts on the subject, His contention is largely true that we are not interested in what can be known of Jesus' personality and character by the scientific methods of historicism. Indeed, the kerygma is not concerned with "Jesus according to the flesh," if by that is meant the historically proven Lord.

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the concern to lay hold of Jesus' transcendent selfhood is virtually indistinguishable from Schleiermacher's concern to penetrate to Jesus' God-consciousness.

For a penetrating critical analysis of the new quest of the historical Jesus, see Hugh Anderson, Jesus and Christian Origins (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1964), pp. 149-184.

[1] This statement by Ernst Käsemann formally opened the discussion a new quest of the historical Jesus in 1953. Cf. A New Quest, pp. 13-14.

The Gospels themselves are permeated by the early Church's kerygma. This Tillich has apprehended, and he is therefore justifiably skeptical that Jesus claimed for himself the exalted titles attributed to him in the New Testament.

Certainly it is true that no Christian ought to be anxiety-ridden over the possibility that the historical foundation of the Christian faith will be discredited by the biblical critics. Yet surely Tillich is overstating the matter when he holds that historical investigation into the life and character of Jesus is of inconsequential value to the numinous picture of Jesus as the Christ in the New Testament. Oscar Cullmann writes:

> Anyone who underestimates the necessity and the role of philological and historical exegesis in the first place proves that he has a false theological conception of the nature of biblical revelation. In fact the very essence of the central affirmation of the Bible has to do with history.[1]

Although Tillich does not deny that Jesus was a historical person in whom the New Being probably manifested itself,[2] it is a grave question whether he takes seriously enough the totality of the facts pertaining to the event of Jesus as the Christ.[1] His allowing an *analogia imaginis* between the biblical picture and the personal life from which it has arisen and tracing the historical development of the Christological symbols applied to Jesus indicate that he actually wants it both ways. "He can speak of the results of historical research as irrelevant to belief in the revelatory event of the New Being in Jesus as the Christ because he is tacitly taking for granted the main historical framework."[2]

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[1] Oscar Cullmann, "The Necessity and Function of Higher Criticism," The Early Church, ed. by A. J. B. Higgins (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1956), p. 8.

[2] A. T. Mollegen is right at this point to defend Tillich against those who accuse him of abandoning the historical Jesus. But in attempting to clarify Tillich's assumption of the biblical, historical event, the Incarnation, Mollegen himself demonstrates an unconcern for individual historical facts pertaining to the event of Jesus, which is the real basis for the criticism of Tillich's position. Cf. "Christology and Biblical Criticism in Tillich," The Theology of Paul Tillich, pp. 231-237.

Tillich quite agrees with Bultmann that the New Testament reveals no interest in biographical and psychological *Historie* of Jesus.[3] Yet Bultmann's demythologization provided the impetus for the new quest by dissolving the *kerygma* into the meaning of Jesus in whom God acted.[4] Here Tillich becomes more radical than his mentor. When he looks through the kerygma he sees only the New Being as essential being in a personal life under, yet conquering the conditions of existence. The Cross and the Resurrection are said to symbolize this kerygmatic event which is guaranteed by our participation in the New Being.

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[1] Tillich's affinity for the position of his colleague and teacher, Rudolf Bultmann, is particularly noticeable at this point. Bultmann writes: "By the tradition Jesus is named as bearer of the message; according to overwhelming probability he really was. Should it prove otherwise, that does not change in any way what is said in the record." *Jesus and the Word*, trans. by Louise P. Smith and Erminie H. Lantero (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1958), p. 14.

[2] Dorothy Emmett, "Epistemology and the Idea of Revelation," *The Theology of Paul Tillich*, p. 213.

[3] Rudolf Bultmann, *Glauben und Verstehen* (Tuebingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1933), p. 212f. Also cf. *Jesus and the Word*, pp. 12, 13-15; *Jesus Christ and Mythology* (New York: Chas. Scribner's Sons, 1958), pp. 50-59.

[4] *A New Quest*, p. 80.

Thus, one must conclude that for Tillich the factuality of the encounter of the earliest Christians with Jesus, whom they received as the Christ, hinges on our faith. And since the name "Jesus" in relation to him who was the Christ cannot be guaranteed by faith, the only real factuality in these kerygmatic events is our present participation in the New Being.

Now Tillich's assertion is surely correct that we cannot grasp the meaning of God's saving act in the unique kairos of Jesus as the Christ, unless we ourselves are grasped by it in a kairotic moment. But he seems to have lost sight of the kerygma as a witness to God's past action in Jesus as well as God's calling upon me to accept my death and resurrected life.[1] Nowhere does he assert that "the Christian kairos is rooted in the historical Jesus, who is extra nos, given prior to faith and determining our present, as the history upon which our existence is constituted."[2]

This means that Christian history becomes for Tillich simply a series of present situations, with no real consideration for the fact that our present possibilities and decisions are determined by events of the past. Insofar as this is true of Tillich, he tends not to take seriously enough his own concepts of destiny, the realistic aspect of his epistemological position of belief-ful realism, and the miracle or "given" side of revelation.

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[1] A New Quest, p. 42.

[2] Ibid., p. 79. On one occasion Tillich states that "historical existence is not directed toward the past at all." Theology of Culture, p. 101.

The critical conclusion is unavoidable that Tillich acknowledges fully that a historical Jesus apart from the risen Lord would have been an abstraction for the early church. But he does not take with equal seriousness the fact that for the early church the risen Lord would have been an abstraction apart from Jesus of Nazareth. His ontological-symbolical method of hermeneutics is contributory toward his lack of concern with the concrete reality of the series of events of Jesus' life, and he joins Kähler in saying that no attempt needs to be or ought to be made to go behind the kerygma of the early church.[1] Yet the whole New Testament insists upon the importance of the earthly life of Jesus, a life of history. The Gospel record shows "how Jesus was remembered, was known still, and was interpreted."[2] Jeremias forcefully declares that in Jesus something happened, something unique, something that never existed before, and that "every verse in the Gospels hammers it in."[3] As for the kerygma, no matter how many mythological concepts may have been used to get the message across, it is attributed to and an evaluation of none other than the earthly Jesus.[1]

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[1] For a penetrating analysis of Kähler's radical removal of the knowledge of Jesus Christ from dependence upon historical scholarship, see James D. Smart, The Interpretation of Scripture, pp. 254-255.

[2] John Knox, Christ the Lord (New York: Harper and Bros., 1945), p. 73. Quoted in Daniel Day Williams, What Present-day Theologians are Thinking, p. 100.

[3] A New Quest, p. 24.

Thus, the New Testament itself does not warrant fully Tillich's attitude that we should leave off the attempt to get at the historical facts in relation to the life of Jesus and be content with the testimony of the New Testament authors. After all, there are certain pieces of the Synoptic tradition whose authenticity and historicity must be accepted, says Käsemann, if one wants to remain a historian.[2] We cannot therefore be turned aside from probing carefully the recorded events of the preaching and mission of Jesus. This method of seeking to get at the historical Jesus takes seriously the reality of the events surrounding his life. Yet it recognizes fully in them the same claim for faith which the kerygma directs to us if we are to apprehend their real meaning and the meaning of the historical Jesus.

It is precisely this continuity and congruity between Jesus' message and the church's kerygma that is of no vital concern to Tillich. Even Paul's interest in the historical Jesus seems to elude him: "For while we live we are always being given up to death for Jesus' sake, so that the life of Jesus may also be manifested in our mortal flesh."[3] Indeed, if we have understood Tillich correctly, his real tendency is to depreciate the significance for the Christian faith of the actual series of events that took place in and around the life of Jesus. Consequently, it remains highly questionable whether we can truly "have Christology without an answer to the question why it is that here in this particular history of Jesus and his community faith finds its proper object and redemptive source."[1]

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[1] A New Quest, p. 90

[2] Ibid., p. 105.

[3] II Corinthians 4:11. Cf. II Cor. 4:5-10; 13:4; Gal. 4:4. Curiously, on this issue Tillich believes that Barth is correct in assuming that Paul has no real interest in the human character of Jesus on the basis of Paul's saying: "Even though we have known Christ after the flesh, yet now we know him so no more" (II Cor. 5:16. Cf. "Natural and Revealed Religion," p. 160f.). But this passage probably means, says Donald Baillie, that in becoming a Christian Paul had given up his former conception of the Messiah! See God Was in Christ, p. 45.

If one were to pinpoint the most disturbing implication of Tillich's elimination of the quest for the historical Jesus, it would be his overlooking the fact that the Christ was causally bound within the historical reconstruction of first-century Judaism. Indeed, his consequent Christological position imperils the unity of the historical Jesus of Nazareth and the person whom the early church acknowledged as Lord, thereby threatening us with Docetism. Thus, in spite of his insistence on the full humanity of the Christ, Tillich does not seem to take "seriously enough the fact that God became flesh and dwelt with man in a certain limited historical time and space."[2]

We cannot conclude without saying that every Christological position has its difficulties. The moment we lean too far in emphasizing the importance of the objective facts, as Schleiermacher is inclined to do, we tend to forget that only "eyes of faith," in Paul Minear's phrase, can see truly who Jesus is. Also, the moment we lean

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1. Daniel Day Williams, What Present-day Theologians are Thinking, p. 107.

2. Otto Piper, Recent Development in German Protestantism, p. 144. Cited in Donald Baillie, God Was in Christ, p. 53. Significantly, Piper passes the same judgment on Barth.

too far in emphasizing the importance of the personal aspect of faith, as Tillich seems to do, we may begin to discount the importance of objective facts and move toward Docetism.

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSIONS

The conclusions of the dissertation on the Christologies of Schleiermacher and Tillich may be stated under three major headings: areas of convergence, areas of divergence, and critical evaluation.

1. Areas of Convergence

i. For Schleiermacher and Tillich Christology is a function of soteriology and must begin with an analysis of man and his need of salvation. The divinity of the Christ may be asserted without minimizing his genuine humanity, because as the *microcosmos* or *imago Dei* man is fully capable of the infinite and can be determined completely by God-consciousness. However, man is in a state of becoming, confusion, and estrangement from himself, the world, and God. The consciousness of this sinful state carries with it a universal awareness of the need of slavation brought by the Redeemer, the Christ, or the New Being.

ii. Christology must be developed in accord with the picture or total witness to the Christ in the New Testament. All the Scriptural accounts are interpretative in nature, making it impossible to establish a *Chronik* of Jesus. The two men share preferences for the Fourth Gospel as a means of explaining the absolute paradox at the center of the Christian faith--the incarnation. The Logos doctrine is congenial to their concern to avoid the idea of a metamorphosis or transmutation myth.

iii. In order to establish the genuine humanity and divinity of the Christ a co-ordinate attempt is made to balance adoptionistic and incarnational emphases. The doctrine of two natures is believed to be inadequate and is replaced by a doctrine of a perfect, eternal, and essential unity between God and man in the Christ. This unity, which expresses the Incarnation, is Jesus' _Urbildlichkeit_ for Schleiermacher and the New Being manifested in Jesus as the Christ for Tillich. Christ as the _Urbild_ is essential man or Man-in-himself in the process of change and becoming, and the New Being is essential being under the conditions of existence. Both men aver that their dialectical Christologies are devoid of Docetic and Ebionitic tendencies.

iv. Meaningful discourse about the Christ must be knowledge _out of_ experience with Him rather than knowledge _about_ Him. Therefore, the Christological assertions of these two men are essentially soteriological assertions about the bringer of the salvation which they claim to have experienced. Salvation is equated with revelation and is effected through man's participation in the God-consciousness or the New Being manifested in the Christ. It brings man into the new life of essential man-in-himselfness or the New Being, as the split between man and himself, other men, and God is overcome.

2. Areas of Divergence

i. While both men reject the Augustinian doctrine of original sin, Schleiermacher allows that the first man sinned and that due to the interdependence of men in history all mankind is in a corporate state of sin and guilt. Dismissing the idea of corporate guilt, Tillich interprets the Fall as a symbol for the transition from essence to existence which is transcendent, a transhistorical quality of finite being and creation itself. In other words, actualized creation and estranged existence are identical. Thus, a dissimilarity between the Christological positions is inevitable. Schleiermacher will adapt his view to a soteriological need which is historical in nature, and Tillich will correlate his Christology to a soteriological quest which is historical and non-historical in nature.

ii. For Schleiermacher the congruity between Jesus' self-proclamation in His message and the New Testament witness allows us to pursue the life of Jesus historically and to gain access to His self-consciousness. Such an inquiry must be undertaken to clarify the absoluteness of the paradox of the Word's becoming flesh or the historical Jesus' being the ideal or Urbild. The sources disallow such a historico-psychological investigation, contends Tillich, and we must be content with the biblical picture of Jesus as the Christ as the historical foundation of the Christian faith. Quite unlike Schleiermacher, Tillich maintains that to focus on the life of Jesus would be of inconsequential value to the Christian faith, as it may lend support to Jesusolatry by distortedly equating or identifying the Christological symbols with Jesus of Nazareth. Moreover, the biblical writings do not "psychologize" but "ontologize," that is, they express the appearance of the New Being under yet conquering existence. The Cross and the Resurrection are the central symbols of this manifestation, and all other New Testament accounts are corroborative symbols. Tillich's symbolical hermeneutic departs considerably from Schleiermacher's concern with the historical concreteness of the New Testament witness to Christ.

iii Schleiermacher's adoptionistic emphasis centers on Jesus' Vorbildlichkeit which prompts God's choice of Him as the Redeemer. Discounting any focus on Jesus' Vorbildlichkeit for fear of Jesusolatry, Tillich's adoptionism assumes the form of an inverted kenosis theory. Jesus becomes the Christ on the Cross, wherein is consummated his self-negation and complete transparency to or final revelation of the logos of being. The essential agreement between their incarnational alternatives to the two-nature doctrine is ascertainable. Yet the uncertain status of Jesus of Nazareth in relation to the New Being in Tillich's incarnational emphasis has no parallel in Schleiermacher's insistence that the Word or the existence of God was in Jesus of Nazareth.

iv. Redemption is accomplished solely by Christ's Lebensmitteilung in the preaching of His church, according to Schleiermacher. Tillich holds that salvation can and does occur apart from an encounter with Jesus as the Christ, because the New Being as the power of being is independent of every form in which it appears. This divergence has its origin in their equating salvation and revelation, while holding dissimilar views of revelation. Schleiermacher dogmatically holds that the Redeemer mediates all revelation of God which develops the potency of God-consciousness among men. For Tillich, the history of revelation requires recognition of manifestations of the *logos* of being apart from Jesus as the Christ, which are saving events in which the power of the New Being is present.

1. Critical Evaluation

i. *Man and Soteriology*. The mystical *a priori* beginning points and the equation of revelation and salvation in the two theological systems empty man's real need of the salvation of the Christ of its real magnitude. This is largely traceable to their holding in ambiguous unity the philosophical idea of man as *microcosmos* (one who encounters the infinite immediately) and the Christian view of man as sinner (one who is in the state of estrangement from God).

Clarity and consistency are problematical at several points in this portion of each man's thought. For example, if one takes seriously Schleiermacher's concept of "becoming," which contains the idea that the spirit never completely overcomes the flesh in human development, it would seem that he could not maintain Jesus' sinlessness and absolutely potent God-consciousness without sacrificing his humanity. Also, on the one hand, Schleiermacher makes the soteriological assertion that man is "assumed" into fellowship with Christ solely as a result of Christ's implanting of His God-consciousness. On the other hand, this "assumption" refers to Christ's stimulating man's feeble God-consciousness to turn progressively away from evil to greater harmony with the impulses of God-consciousness which can never be fully received by the believer. This is surely irreconcilable with his apologetic contention that the feeling of absolute dependence is a universal element of life.

Similarly, if Tillich's assertion that the New Being is independent of every form in which it appears is taken seriously, three problematical implications must be faced: (1) It becomes unclear as to how the New Being really does appear under and overcome the conditions of existence. (2) The soteriological correlation to the existential analysis is rendered less than complete, since the overcoming of man's unbelief, hubris, and concupiscence is attributed to Jesus as the Christ in whom the saving power of the New Being is present. (3) The saving power of the New Being is made indistinguishable from that which is ascribed to being-itself, thereby making the status of the Christ and the New Being itself tenuous and ambiguous.

Monistic tendencies in the thought of both men, especially in that of Tillich, threaten the idea of separation or estrangement. Their consequent failure to distinguish carefully between sin and finitude connotes what both men disclaim--that sin and the Christ are necessities. Yet, unless Jesus were the Redeemer, Schleiermacher could not explain the origin of the experience of redemption in the church. Likewise, Tillich holds that unless men participate in the New Being they could cease to exist, and its manifestation in Jesus as the Christ satisfies the need for a norm for judging all saving processes in history.

Schleiermacher largely succeeds in basing his Christology on an analysis of the redemptive experience of the church. But he countenances a relationship between Christ and the church that renders Christ incapable of being the judge of humanity both within and without the church. His fluid distinction between Christ and the church is reflected in his equation of the Holy Spirit with the common spirit of the believers, which is hardly in full accord with the New Testament description of the Holy Spirit.

Tillich, developing his Christology in correlation with his existential-ontological analysis, distinguishes the Christ from the church by interpreting it as the symbol for the New Being which is independent of historical contingencies. But when he equates the New Being with the Spiritual Presence which may be found in all religions and cultures, the kerygmatic emphasis on the Spirit as the power of Christ at work among believers pales into insignificance alongside his ontological and apologetic motif.

ii. Christological Alternative. The Incarnation and the divinity of the Christ are imperilled by Schleiermacher's viewing him as a man more conscious of God than other men and by Tillich's treating him as a man more transparent to God than other men.

Schleiermacher's emphasis on Jesus' Vorbildlichkeit which enables him to communicate redemption or to be chosen of God to be the redeemer is an objectionable version of adoptionism, believes Tillich. It borders on Jesusology and points toward a moral rather than essential union between God and man in the Christ. Yet Tillich's own adoptionistic emphasis fails to surmount the difficulties he cites in Schleiermacher's; it is constituted by an inverted kenosis theory in which Jesus becomes the Christ on the Cross. Therefore, their attempts to establish the qualitative difference between the Christ and other men resolve into a quantitative difference.

The Incarnation and humanity of the Christ are endangered by Schleiermacher's placing Jesus above error and moral struggle and by the problematical relationship between Jesus and the New Being in Tillich's thought.

Although Schleiermacher maintains that there is never a moment in man's life which is devoid of sin or absolutely determined by God-consciousness, he dialectically attributes sinlessness and absolutely potent God-consciousness to Jesus. Also, while rejecting the idea that the divine alone was active in Christ, he refuses to attribute moral struggle and error to Jesus because His God-consciousness was absolutely in control of His human nature so that it offered no resistance to the activity of God in Him. Indeed, he even says that this was true from His birth. Such statements indicate Schleiermacher's less-than-complete avoidance of Docetic tendencies.

Tillich takes seriously the finite freedom of Jesus and his involvement in the tension and ambiguities of existence, but he refuses to identify the Christ with Jesus of Nazareth. His concern to avoid idolatrous worship of Jesus blends imperceptibly into a possible dispensing with the historical Jesus altogether. He exposes himself thereby to charges of Docetism, in so far as the humanity of the Christ can hardly be other than Jesus as Jesus. Moreover, the divine character of Jesus as the Christ, which is the New Being, is held to be independent of historical contingencies. This places in jeopardy the Incarnation in Tillich's own terms, the essential unity between God and man in the Christ.

The internal ambiguities and unsettled problems just cited inhibit and seemingly prohibit Schleiermacher and Tillich from achieving their common christological objective: the establishment of the genuine humanity and divinity of the Christ. Schleiermacher takes seriously the historicity of Christ, but at certain points the humanity of Christ is problematical. Conversely, Tillich takes seriously the humanity of Jesus as the Christ, but at certain points the historicity of the Christ is problematical. Schleiermacher elucidates the existence and activity of God in Christ in terms of Jesus' absolutely potent God-consciousness and _Urbildlichkeit_, but Ebionitic as well as Docetic connotations are not fully surmounted. Tillich explains the Christ-character of Jesus as the Christ as the New Being, but the uncertainty of the essential unity of the New Being with Jesus of Nazareth or Jesus as the Christ endangers his incarnational alternative and points toward Docetism. Thus, the tenability of each man's Christological position becomes dubious in so far as it is unable to avoid the very pitfalls that prompted the creative alternative: tendencies toward Ebionism and Docetism.

Both men seek to effect a dialectical balance between adoptionistic and incarnational emphases in their Christologies. However, Schleiermacher's adoptionistic focus on the _Vorbildlichkeit_ of Jesus is unmistakably clear, but greater stress seems to fall on His Urbildlichkeit. Hence, the incarnational idea that "God was in Christ" or that the "Word became flesh," seems to have priority. Conversely, Tillich's incarnational emphasis appears to be incapable of establishing the affirmed essential unity of God and man in the Christ, leaving his self-avowed adoptionistic position to assume predominance.

The extremely dialectical and often seemingly contradictory nature of the Christologies of both men preclude any notion that the imbalance just delineated is conclusive or binding. Nevertheless, the balance for which they both strive seems not to have been accomplished with the success that they fully intended.

iii. Biblical Witness and the Historical Jesus. A gap exists between the theological performances and the intentions of Schleiermacher and Tillich to develop their Christologies in accord with the total witness of the New Testament to the Christ. Their critical readings of the New Testament are actually highly selective readings. Their preference for the Fourth Gospel and Paul's epistles is unconcealed, and only sweeping attention is devoted to the life, teachings, and ministry of Jesus as recorded in the Synoptics.

Schleiermacher's acceptance of the Synoptics as historical books and of the Fourth Gospel as an eyewitness account is now generally considered to be untenable. And his rather positivistic contention that on the basis of the New Testament accounts of Jesus' self-proclamation we can lay hold of Jesus of Nazareth and His self-consciousness fails to transcend historicism and psychologism. That is, it unfortunately infers that a historico-psychological investigation can grasp all that Jesus actually was.

Tillich's ontological-symbolical hermeneutic unduly minimizes the historical concreteness of the recorded events of Jesus' life, and implies a separableness of Jesus and the Christ which leaves out of view the full import of the apostolic witness and the proclamation of Jesus Christ. His complete satisfaction with the biblical picture of Jesus as the Christ is not wholly warranted by the New Testament witness. A continuity and congruity between Jesus' message and the church's kerygma may be detected therein, and the kerygma itself is attributed to none other than the earthly Jesus. His elimination of the quest of the historical Jesus cannot but mitigate the absoluteness of the central paradox of the Christian faith, the Word's becoming flesh in Jesus of Nazareth. And his consequent Christological position imperils the unity of the historical Jesus of Nazareth and the person whom the early Church acknowledged as Lord, thereby threatening us with Docetism.

Surely it is true that every Christological position has its difficulties. The moment we lean too far in emphasizing the importance of the objective facts, as Schleiermacher is inclined to do, we may begin to forget that only eyes of faith can see truly who Jesus is. Also, the moment we lean too far in emphasizing the importance of the personal aspect of faith, as Tillich seems to do, we may begin to discount the importance of objective facts and move toward Docetism.

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ABSTRACT

This critical comparison of the Christologies of Schleiermacher and Tillich includes an exposition of their theological methods and Christologies, comparative statements on areas of convergence and divergence, and an internal critical evaluation.

Areas of Convergence

1. As a function of soteriology Christology begins with an analysis of man and his need of salvation. Man, the microcosmos or imago Dei, is fully capable of the infinite. However, he is conscious of his state of existential estrangement and of his need of the Redeemer or the New Being.
2. Christology must be developed in accord with the total witness or picture of the Christ in the New Testament.
3. Adoptionistic and incarnational emphases are dialectically balanced to establish the genuine humanity and divinity of the Christ and to avoid Ebionitic and Docetic tendencies. The two-nature doctrine is replaced by a doctrine of a perfect, eternal, and essential unity between God and man in the Christ. Schleiermacher expresses this as Jesus' Urbildlichkeit and Tillich as the New Being manifested in Jesus as the Christ.
4. Christological statements are essentially soteriological assertions about the one who brings man into the new life of man-in-himselfness or the New Being.

Areas of Divergence

1. For Schleiermacher the historical interdependence of mankind adequately accounts for man's universal state of sin, guilt, and need of the Redeemer. Tillich equates estranged existence and actualized creation, thereby pointing to man's transhistorical as well as historical need of the New Being.
2. Schleiermacher holds that the congruity between Jesus' self-proclamation in His message and the New Testament witness allows us to pursue the life of Jesus historically and gain access to His self-consciousness. The sources not only disallow such a historico-psychological investigation, contends Tillich, but the biblical picture of the Christ is fully sufficient as the historical foundation of the Christian faith.
3. Schleiermacher's adoptionistic emphasis which centers on Jesus' Vorbildlichkeit is rejected by Tillich, because it borders on Jesusolatry. His own adoptionism countenances an inverted _kenosis_ with Jesus' becoming the Christ on the Cross. The uncertain status of Jesus of Nazareth in relation to the New Being in Tillich's incarnation view has no parallel in Schleiermacher's insistence that Jesus actually was the Word or the _Urbild_.
4. Because the New Being is independent of every form in which it appears, Tillich dismisses Schleiermacher's contention that redemption results from Christ's _Lebensmitteilung_ within the Church.

Critical Evaluation

1. The mystical _a priori_ beginning points and the monistic tendencies of the two theological systems empty man's sin and the need of the salvation of the Christ of their real magnitude. Tillich's insistence that the New

Being is independent of all historical contingencies contains three problematical implications: the New Being's appearing under and overcoming existence become uncertain; the soteriological correlation to the existential analysis is less than complete; the saving power of the New Being is indistinguishable from that ascribed to being-itself.

2. The divinity of the Christ is imperilled by Schleiermacher's viewing him as a man more conscious of God than other men and by Tillich's treating him as a man more transparent to God than other men. The humanity of the Christ is endangered by Schleiermacher's placing him above error and moral struggle and by the problematical relationship between Jesus and the New Being in Tillich's thought. Thus, these men do not avoid completely the very pitfalls that prompted their Christological reinterpretations: Ebionitic and Docetic tendencies.

3. These Christologies are not developed in accord with the total biblical witness as intended. Schleiermacher's rather positivistic inquiry into the life of Jesus does not take seriously enough the interpretative nature of the sources, whereas Tillich's essential skepticism mitigates the absoluteness of the Christological paradox.

AUTOBIOGRAPHY

I was born in Richmond, Kentucky, on June 28, 1937. I am the second of three sons in the Methodist family of the Rev. and Mrs. E. T. Perkins. At the time of my birth, my father was a tobacco farmer with a sixth grade education. Shortly thereafter he experienced a religious conversion, left the farm, and returned to school. After my father completed his secondary, undergraduate, and seminary education, we moved to Indiana where he began his ministry in the Indiana Conference of the Methodist Church.

Of the various towns in Indiana in which we lived, I consider Indianapolis to be my home. There I attended Tech and Southport High Schools. My undergraduate work was taken at Asbury College, where I was graduated magna cum laude in June of 1959. In June of 1962 I received my S.T.B. degree, summa cum laude, from Boston University School of Theology.

While in Boston from 1959-66, I served for four years as associate minister of Harvard-Epworth Methodist Church located on the Harvard University campus in Cambridge, Massachusetts. And for three years I was the pastor of St. John's Methodist Church in Medford, Massachusetts.

I am an ordained Elder in the Methodist ministry and a full member of the Indiana Conference of the Methodist Church. At present I am serving as Director of Religious Life and Head of the Department of Philosophy and Religion at the University of Evansville in Evansville, Indiana.

I am married to Sally M. Perkins, and we have two children, Jennifer and Daniel.